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Greece within the Eurozone Crisis. 2019. Dissertação (Mestrado) – Instituto de Relações 
Internacionais, Universidade de Brasília. Brasília, 2019. 
This dissertation highlights the intersection of international relations, European studies and 
international political economy in the context of the eurozone crisis. Under the framework of 
Varieties of Capitalism and ideas, I stress the impact of different interests of European 
countries during bailout negotiations. The analyses demonstrate that economic divergence 
within the Eurozone is central to understand the tension between Germany and Greece during 
the North Atlantic Financial crisis. The crescent instability in the eurozone permitted the 
asymmetrical economic power of Germany to shape rules and norms accordingly to 
ordoliberal ideas, privileging export-led countries and causing democratic insurgency in 
Greece. This research helps understand why Germany to see politics of debt as a moral hazard 
and enforce structural reforms within the European Union, causing further conflicts between 
debtors and creditors in Europe. 
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RESUMO 
Franco, Renato Ventocilla. Of Rules and (Dis)order: The Conflict between Germany and 
Greece within the Eurozone Crisis. 2019. Dissertação (Mestrado) – Instituto de Relações 
Internacionais, Universidade de Brasília. Brasília, 2019. 
A dissertação destaca a interação das áreas de relações internacionais, estudos europeus e 
economia política internacional no contexto da crise da zona do euro. Sob a ótica de 
Variedades de Capitalismo e ideias, eu enfatizo o impacto dos interesses diferentes de países 
europeus durante as negociações para ganhar acesso a fundos de liquidez. A análise demonstra 
que a divergência econômica dentro da zona do euro é central para entender a tensão entre 
Alemanha e Grécia durante da crise financeira do Atlântico Norte. A crescente instabilidade 
dentro da zona do euro permitiu que o poder econômico assimétrico da Alemanha adaptasse 
normas e regras segundo ideias ordoliberais, privilegiando países de economias exportadoras 
e causando uma insurgência democrática na Grécia. Essa pesquisa ajuda a entender o porquê 
da Alemanha ver as políticas de débito como um defeito moral e pressionar reformas 
estruturais dentro da União Europeia, exacerbando conflitos entre devedores e credores na 
Europa. 
Palavras-chave: União Europeia, Alemanha, Grécia, Ordoliberalismo; Zona do Euro 
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INTRODUCTION 
On the morning of April 4, 2012, people were emerging during rush hour from a metro 
station nearby Syntagma Square. The city’s central plaza is close to the Greek Parliament 
building in the centre of Athens, Greece. As the flow walked and people dispersed to go to 
work or other daily activities, one saw a 77-year-old man shouting “I am not committing 
suicide. They are killing me.” at the Parliament steps, shooting himself in the head afterwards 
(SMITH, 2012). 
Dimitris Christoulas worked as a pharmacist until 1994, when he retired to live on his 
pension. However, since the Greek government reined in spending, Christoulas received a cut 
in his pension, leaving him unable to pay for essential medications. Hopeless, Christoulas did 
not find another way. Soon after his suicide, bypassers left handwritten notes and flowers on 
the tree near the Greek Parliament which he had stood. Dimitris’ death acquired special 
significance, representing the Greek older generation increasingly despair due to crescent 
slash in pensions. 
The economic crisis in Greece forced the government to reduce spending on social 
services. Among those, health services were profoundly affected. Clinics reported more 
numbers of suicides and depression (STRUCKLER; BASU, 2013, p. 77). Christoulas suicide 
was a tipping point that sparked a series of riots against the Greek government. The police 
eventually suppressed protesters, but dissatisfaction remained. 
Protests against social cuts were not solely in Greece. The effects of the financial crisis 
in the European Union (EU) provoked a sudden policy-shift in member-states. Principally in 
Eastern and Southern European countries, countries notably dependent on foreign credit, the 
rupture in the financial system profoundly affected the economies. Nevertheless, Southern 
countries belong in the eurozone, so they could not use monetary tools to resolve the crises as 
they were incapable of adjusting the currency.   1
The eurozone languished a hindrance due to the fragility of European economies 
heterogeneity. Some countries within the group, such as Germany and France, bailed out 
 It is worth noticing that Northern European countries like Iceland and Ireland entered in crisis. Likewise, 1
France is a Southern European country. However, in terms of Varieties of Capitalism, France, England, Iceland, 
and Ireland have specific characteristics that differ from the cases commented in this work. For further analysis 
on this issue, Regan and Brazys (2017); Oren and Blyth (2018); Molina and Rhodes (2007); Schmidt (2017).
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banks as a solution while others, too dependent on international liquidity, were not so lucky. 
The risk of contagion transformed the financial crunch in small countries into a systemic 
crisis that threw the single currency on the verge of collapse. 
When the financial crisis hit the United States, after Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, 
Europeans criticised Anglo-Saxon capitalism as a problem of moral hazard (DEUTSCHE 
WELLE, 2009). America's thirst for financial risks and deregulation represented a perilous 
warning to global financial stability. One year later, Greece confessed tampering with deficit 
numbers, bidding financial assistance to other European countries in exchange of deficit 
reduction plans. With rating agencies endorsement, Greek coined fake financial data to escape 
the supervision of the European Commission. The Greek economy was insignificant in 
parallel with the European Union, but soon significant economies like Ireland and Portugal 
required financial help. European leaders sought to restrain the deterioration that pervaded the 
eurozone, but Italy and Spain too suffered downgrades. Conjectures about the future of 
eurozone rose. Ultimately, all those countries accepted to comply with a set of rigid rules to 
gain access to financial support from other European countries.  
However, negotiations among European leaders reached a standstill due to the "no-
bailout" rule that underpinned the Maastricht Treaty. France, invoking the principle 'European 
solidarity', convened European countries to coordinate a plan of European economic stimulus, 
which was rejected by Germany. Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, asserted that 
Germany would only take part of the financial package to European countries in financial 
difficulties if the IMF was involved. Even though the IMF participated in bailouts procedures 
in Eastern Europe such as Hungary and Finland, European countries from the core of the 
eurozone hesitated to accept Germany's proposal. There was a notorious prejudice against the 
image of countries that recurred support to the IMF, with an angrily Sarkozy spurning that 
"The IMF is not for Europe. It is for Africa - It is for Burkina Faso!" (SARKOZY apud 
BLUSTEIN 2016, p. 97). Nevertheless, the European Union requested the IMF to partake 
bailouts in the eurozone. 
Eurozone countries soon approved a plan in consortium with the IMF for financial 
support to Greece and Ireland. Both countries had to sign a "Memorandum of Understanding" 
(MoU), a contract that pledged to deliver a set of economic structural reforms, in order to 
receive the fiscal support. The IMF, alongside the European Commission and the European 
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Central Bank (ECB), formed a group, later termed as the “troika", that would supervise 
countries that signed the MoU. 
From all countries that received bailouts, Greece converted into one of the most 
problematical states. After severe reforms, the Greek economy still did not react. Greece 
received two bail-outs without a sign of leaving the adjustment program. European leaders 
decided to engage in negotiations with Greece for a third economic support package in 2015, 
but the Greek elections in January critically shifted the political landscape. SYRIZA, a small 
far-left party, defeated PASOK, the centre-left party that committed with the MoU. SYRIZA 
gained massive support from disillusioned Greeks due to its position vehemently contrary to 
economic orthodoxy. Accusing the MoU agreement with European countries as blackmail, 
SYRIZA confronted the European establishment over the years of austerity caused by 
economic reforms. SYRIZA was not a eurosceptic country, but the severity of the MoU and 
the lack of progress turned the tide of support for European, thereby ‘technocratic’ solutions.  
Following a myriad of unprofitable meetings and consultations, the far-left party 
abruptly determined to call a referendum on the continuation of austerity in Greece in order to 
obtain a third bailout. Receiving no previous deliberations about the referendum, the troika 
and Germany asserted that it was imperative for Greece to honour its previous compromises. 
Otherwise, Greece had to leave the euro, as it was absorbing benefits from other member 
states without paying back. In the creditor's view, Greece lived beyond its means in an era of 
overflowing financial liquidity; therefore it should pay for its debts now that there was no 
financial growth.     
The decision of the Greek referendum ended with a crushing 'No' (Oxi) victory. 
SYRIZA's intention with the result was to demonstrate to the Troika and the EU that Greece 
did not aim for more cuts in social spending or reforms. However, Alex Tsipras, the Greek 
prime minister, made a series of political miscalculations during negotiations about the third 
bailout that further isolated him among European leaders. There were reservations to the 
rigour of structural reforms even amidst European leaders and members of the Troika. 
However, continuously defying European authorities impeded Tsipras from pushing for 
attenuation of the reforms in Greece, as there were no incentives for European leaders to 
support the Greek's plea. As a result, Tsipras ended up accepting terms of the MoU that was 
harsher than the ones previously offered (BLUSTEIN, 2015, p. 435). In the end, the far-left 
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party ended up behaving according to the MoU norms, dwindling the possibility of a schism 
in the EU or further instability in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). 
SYRIZA's capitulation to circumvent austerity exposed a particular point that fueled 
populist claims in Europe. The victory of a political party that rejects economic orthodoxy 
does not imply that it can detach from financial commitments when in power. Staying in the 
euro set a staggering economic limitation that was unbearably painful to the Greek electorate, 
but there was no other choice. SYRIZA promoted itself as the "legitimate will of the people" 
against austerity and used it against Greek commitments when confronted by European 
institutions, revealing the tenuous tension between legitimacy and responsibility (MAIR, 
2009, p. 8). Greece had the democratic freedom to hold elections but lost the liberty to choose 
its economic policy.  
The possibility of a 'Grexit' from the EU or further instability in the euro engendered 
by the crisis had unpredictable consequences for the eurozone, at the point of menacing the 
viability of the single currency as a whole. As polarisation between debtor countries, situated 
in the periphery of the eurozone, and creditors, in the core, grew, Germany stood alongside 
the troika.  Since the beginning of the crisis, Berlin was reluctant to coordinate European 2
measures to resolve the crisis. Merkel reiterated the importance of moral hazard, stipulating 
that member states must take responsibility for their actions. Nonetheless, German inaction 
was unsustainable as the crisis politicised, obliging Germany to coordinate economic 
measures with other European countries. 
Germany bolstered the value of price stability as the foremost solution to the 
instabilities in the eurozone. Engaging in conversations to propel a series of reforms in order 
to improve the rule-based framework of the single currency, Germany envisioned the 
institutionalisation of fiscal rules in order to correct the dysfunctional architecture of the euro. 
During the crisis, German leaders advocated ideas that permeated German politics since the 
reconstruction period. Under the inspiration of 'ordoliberalism', Merkel and other leading 
German actors determined fiscal reforms in the eurozone to ensure that fiscal crisis such as 
the Greek would not happen again. Pushing for modifications in the European mechanism of 
 Creditor countries in general were Northern European countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, 2
Luxembourg), also considered the ‘core’ of the European Union, the Coordinate Market Economies (CME). 
Southern Europe, or Mixed Market Economies (MME), the ‘periphery’ of the eurozone, ended up as debtor 
countries (Italy, Greece, Portugal, Cyprus, and Spain). England, Ireland, and Iceland, the Liberal Market 
Economies (LME) are liberal economies that are inserted in a different context that is not in this work due to 
space constraints.
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economic surveillance (SGP), Merkel embedded the euro into a set of economic rules that 
resonates with the ordoliberal sign of “Ordnungspolitik” (the ordering of the institutional 
framework). However, the German emphasis on effective monitoring encountered resistance 
from part of the electorate of European countries that signed the MoU. 
This dissertation highlights the intersection of international relations, European studies 
and international political economy regarding European economic governance in the context 
of the eurozone crisis. It attempts to contribute to the field of international political economy 
by outlining how ideas influence varieties of capitalism, thus changing the nature of 
macroeconomic governance in the eurozone. As the structural problems of the euro derive 
from the quintessential fact that the EMU was a political choice and not an economic one, the 
European Union had to coordinate European economies. Only by investigating systemic and 
domestic variables is possible to define how countries drove for or struggled against the 
institutionalization of economic rules. 
This work proposes a framework in which the influence of ideas that advocates 
technocratic rule-setting engenders an antagonistic political impact in national elections, 
thereby threatening the previous arrangements. To do so, the hypothesis conjecture that 
polarization between actors escalated due to the role of principled beliefs in crisis-
management policies and solely halted after the enforcement of institutional rules. 
Thereby, this dissertation demonstrates the role of ideas in European policymaking in 
three different chapters. It begins by outlining the evolution of banking regulation after the 
Great Depression in the United States and Europe until the financial crisis of 2008. Likewise, 
it explains the divergent ideas of France and Germany regarding the economic and monetary 
union (EMU), arguing that instead of similarities, it was the willingness to compromise and 
bringing others with them that originated the common currency. However, German insistence 
on its beliefs of moral hazard transformed the euro into an incomplete currency. As a result, 
the architecture of the EMU became dysfunctional in the long term due to a rift between 
European monetary politics and national fiscal surveillance.      
The second and third chapters will explain how ideas influenced economic 
policymaking in the EU and the subsequent elections during the North Atlantic Financial 
crisis. Thus, this dissertation will employ a case study to analyse the central argument. The 
consequences of the ideas will demonstrate how the European Union dismantled the process 
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of economic convergence through the ascension process of European member states that did 
not qualify for the convergence criteria. As a result, macroeconomic imbalances within the 
eurozone increased due to the lack of economic harmonisation intertwined with lax national 
regulation. The close links between financial markets in the United States and Europe 
transformed the impact of what looked like a bank run in American financial markets into a 
multiscaled North Atlantic Financial crisis that was so close to collapsing the global financial 
system that Ben Bernanke confessed that "we may not have an [American] economy on 
Monday" (BERNANKE apud SORKIN et al, 2008). The massive crash in Europe hindered 
recovery. The structural imbalances in the euro architecture appeared, leaving eurozone 
countries like Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus, and Iceland on the edge of 
failure (notwithstanding the calamitous effects of the crisis in Latvia, Finland, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania). This dissertation will 
thus explore the relationship between Greece and its creditors, therefore Germany, during the 
crisis. The belief of creditor as ‘saints’ and debtors as ‘sinners’ influenced the eurozone crisis, 
opposing Greece and Germany as two opposite models. Germany is considered the Northern 
country that “closely approximates the virtues of stable money, sound finances, and efficient 
local-factor markets […] and is essential to any solution to Europe’s crisis.”, while Greece 
“most closely approximates the opposite of German virtue on all three dimensions” (JONES, 
2012, p. 166). 
In Europe, member states committed to sign a MoU if they not coped with financial 
duties. Greece was the first member state to request financial aid to the EU. However, 
structural reforms required by the MoU caused a counter-movement by the electorate, 
politicising the crisis in the eurozone as other European taxpayers did not want to pay for 
profligacy countries. Greece fit in this situation because, after two support packages and bitter 
structural reforms, the Greek electorate voted for SYRIZA, a far-left populist party that 
wanted to dismiss Greece's previous commitments to its creditors. Consequently, Germany, 
already considered the European 'hegemon', engaged in negotiations with Greece to ensure 
that the Greek crisis would not contaminate the rest of the eurozone and threat the euro. 
Therefore, polarisation paved the way for populist countries in both creditor and debtor 
member states.  
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The craft of the case study consisted of analysing the role of ordoliberal ideas in the 
European monetary governance through the eurozone crisis. To do so, the author observed the 
political and economic effects of the crisis in different types of European capitalism through 
the methodological-typology of Varieties of Capitalism. Likewise, the methodological use of 
'historical institutionalism' was a paramount tool, as the concept of 'critical junctures' was 
essential to examine the critical processes and events that influenced the transmutations of 
European monetary governance during the eurozone crisis. The research demanded a myriad 
of references, ranging through primary and secondary sources. The former constituted of 
datasets from the World Bank, European laws, official reports from the European 
Commission, statistics from European Central Bank, statements from the International 
Monetary Fund and the OECD, and autobiographical records of the events. The latter was a 
literature review on European governance, international political economy, democracy and 
democratic erosion, Greek politics, German politics, macroeconomic policy, regional 
integration, contemporary history of Europe, economic sociology, populism, and the crescent 
field of regional ‘disintegration’ theories.  
Moreover, international newspapers, magazines, and think tanks reports were 
fundamental to conduct the research. All information contained in biographies, interviews, 
and in the press that ended into the dissertation passed through a rigorous process of fact-
checking. The myriad of sources in the dissertation thus contributes to the literature a new 
perspective on how ordoliberalism, the economic ideas that influenced Germany in the 
reconstruction period, shaped European economic governance during the eurozone crisis. 
Besides, the structure of the dissertation introduces the possibility of developing the analytical 
framework of the research by adding less studied countries of interest like Portugal, Spain or 
Italy. Although the crisis emerged as a recurring object of research in recent years due to 
Lehman's bankruptcy tenth anniversary, research concerning the relations between European 
monetary governance interwoven with the successful "Geringonça" left-coalition in Portugal, 
or the rise of the alliance between the League and Five Stars are still underdeveloped.    
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1 SPINELLI’S DREAM AND THE FORGOTTEN LEGACY OF THE EURO 
1.1 The US withering heights 
A financial crisis is capable of changing the world. Crisis creates challenges, induce 
policy shifts, and turn priorities upside down, hence transforming politics. A crisis is capable 
of altering how we perceive our worldview. Defying established rules that reigned in different 
places such as academic classrooms or policy auditoriums, such events easily break old 
paradigms.   
An essential step to understanding a financial crisis is to review the flaws of the 
current conventions. The financial crisis of 2008 represented one event of those events. 
Ending the prosperity cycle known as the “Roaring Nineties”, it crashed the power and beliefs 
of “The Masters of the Universe” (STIGLITZ, 2003). Martin Wolf (2015, p. 34), the chief 
economics commentator at the Financial Times, asserted that it is crucial to find the 
intellectual meaning of the crisis to understand its impact. Economists as policy-makers must 
rethink their understanding of the world to answer what indeed happened. The 2008 crisis 
showed that established visions of how the economy and the financial system worked were 
absurd premises. Adam Tooze (2018) affirms that crisis can be misleading, prompting us to 
think only about the consequences or the next one, instead of what was it. 
Even discussions about the chronological order of the North Atlantic crisis seem 
arbitrary. Academics disagree over the issue due to different frameworks of what caused the 
crash. To pinpoint an event of action requires the assignment of a worldview, thus exposing 
different narratives that diminishes divergent views while supporting others. According to 
economist Andrew Lo (2012, p. 152), there are multiple discussions about when the crisis 
started. Assuming accounts by politicians, economists, analysts, there is a myriad of 
testimonies that attest different truths about what the crisis was and how it happened. 
Moreover, as time passes, historians use new sources and methods to uncover different points 
of view that were absent during the clash. They are capable of finding indirect relations with 
new phenomena, reviving discussions under the scrutiny of the political moment 
(THOMPSON, 2017). 
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However, one can be confident that the crisis gained worldwide repercussions when 
Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy during the morning of September 15, 2008 
(WEARDEN; TEATHER; TREANOR, 2008). The so-called “Lehman Day”, the demise of 
one of the biggest North American investment banks, startled investors around the globe. The 
bankruptcy was a reckoning that financial stability was menaced, creating apprehension that 
other American banks could follow Lehman Brothers’ same path. Financial interdependence 
meant instability in the whole system if one major bank faltered. Politicians from diverse 
continents understood that their economies were not invulnerable to the shock. They had to 
convene to develop a global solution in case the United States was not able to contain the 
crisis alone. 
The first interpretations of the origins of the North Atlantic financial crisis considered 
the structural fragility of the North American housing system. That view was detailed by 
Robert Schiller when he analysed home-price indexes, looking for repeat sales instead of 
appraisal values. Schiller, an economist from Yale, stated that a bubble’s burst in housing 
prices could engender severe impacts on the American economy. The Yale economist 
demonstrated that a pervasive contagion of mistaken beliefs about future economic behaviour 
was driving up real estate prices, thus popping the housing bubble and declining prices (LO, 
2012, p. 156). According to his view, the lack of common knowledge delayed the burst and 
intensified the impact. 
The formation, and next burst, of the housing bubble, exposed a systemic failure of the 
North American banking system. The evolution of the banking system in the United States 
after the Great Depression followed a path of countermeasures against regulation imposed by 
the American administration. Therefore, the housing bubble originated from the continuous 
deterioration of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 that dismounted ‘universal banks’, separating 
commercial banking from investment banking. The Glass-Steagall Act “prevented deposit-
taking from engaging in security and insurance underwriting” (EICHENGREEN, 2014, p. 
66). The Act impeded the expansion of investment banks with deposits from commercial 
banks that combined spiralled the damage of the North Atlantic Financial crisis. 
1.2 Masters of the Universe and the Rise of Shadow Banks 
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The end of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s eroded the competitiveness of 
commercial banks. The sharp rise of inflation diminished investment returns offered by 
regulated banks. As a result, insured deposits fell heavily. The destabilising factor was the 
higher uninsured returns provided by shadow banks that looked increasingly competitive in 
comparison to regulated commercial banks. The growth of shadow banks in the North 
American banking system was a direct response to the lack of regulated banks’ 
competitiveness. Inattentive to the changing trend, regulators did not realise the expansion of 
shadow banks. Without supervision to oversee their operations, investment banks filled the 
space that previously belonged to commercial banks.  
Shadow banks are, as a matter of fact, investment banks. Functioning as lightly 
regulated firms, they offer two forms of deposit. The first is the money market mutual funds, 
where someone buys shares in a mutual fund that invests in safe short-term assets that pay 
interests similarly to regular deposits. The other is the repurchase agreement, consisting of 
assets sold to depositors with an agreement to buy back (repurchase) it at a fixed price in a 
later time, in which the difference of both prices would act as the interest rate (BAYOUMI, 
2017, p. 45). Both methods had less regulation than the conventional practices of commercial 
banks, so uninsured deposits allured attention increasingly from depositors.  
The higher returns of uninsured deposits incentivised a financial interest movement 
from commercial banks. As returns continued growing, regulated banks also started to deposit 
their loans in shadow banks instead of maintaining them in their balance sheets. The move 
generated mutual gains. Commercial banks regained competitiveness. As shadow banks held 
low amounts of capital against loans, the capital invested by commercial banks would dilute 
the minimum required for investment banks to hold.  
Moreover, commercial banks gained because they could obtain more knowledge of 
their clients to create loans and transfer them to investment banks. Through securitisation, the 
process of selling loans, such as mortgages, in exchange for money, commercial banks 
intertwined their clients with investment banks. Securitisation, therefore, served to transform 
“illiquid loans into tradable securities” (GABOR, 2016, p. 2). Regulated banks used 
securitised assets to sell loans to shadow banks. As a result, regulated banks could regain 
competitiveness because of discarding the assets enabled regulatory and tax benefits to them. 
Moreover, the banking sector was able to develop a system of borrowers credit-worthiness in 
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standardised credit-scores, thus creating conditions to evaluate riskiness and independent 
checking of consumers (BAYOUMI, 2017, p. 48). 
The American state was the first to establish close ties with mortgage finance. The 
Federal housing policy initiated the practice of securitisation by lowering mortgages costs to 
create a secondary market where investors could commercialise loans. Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), spread the practice of mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) in order to “issue simple bonds backed by packages of mortgages 
they held” (HELLEINER, 2011, p. 70). Helen Thompson (2012, p. 402) highlights that since 
the 1930s the American government created conditions to engage in and support mortgage 
lending. Responsible for the first wave of securitisation, Freddie and Fannie would eventually 
shift practices when private firms entered the market. Even though the American Federal 
Government underlined that GSEs’ bonds were not guaranteed, investors believed the 
contrary (THOMPSON, 2009, p. 17). GSEs became increasingly interwoven with regulated 
and shadow banks through new private label securitisation, increasing the crash’s intensity 
later. 
Since 1970, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were the dominant GSEs. Fannie Mae was 
the larger one, transformed into a private shareholder in 1968 due to a regulation made by the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development. Its purpose was to support home ownership 
and devote a proportion of its mortgage purchases to low-income housing. Freddie Mac 
appeared later, created by the Emergency Home Finance Act in 1970, to aid specialised 
mortgage lenders to overcome difficulties such as high inflation and interest rates. Both GSEs 
pursued different business models. While Fannie Mae kept mortgages in its balance sheet, 
Freddie Mac bundled its mortgages into mortgage-backed securitisations and then sold to 
investors. Due to investors’ belief that both agencies were close with the federal government, 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac borrowed below market rates while central banks bought their 
debt “in the same way as US treasury bonds to hold as foreign exchange 
reserves” (THOMPSON, 2009, p. 17). Investors presumed that both agencies had insurance 
against default by homeowners, as their objective solely targeted protection. As Freddie Mac 
did not hold any mortgage on its sheet, it could not be affected by interest rates and soon 
became more profitable than Fannie Mae.  
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In the 1990s, the agencies became significant players in the securitisation of loans to 
low and mid-income earners. Freddie Mac operations in sub-prime securitisation influenced 
Fannie Mae to abandon its business model and follow its sister. Instead of issuing single 
bonds, the GSEs packed a myriad of differing mortgages with different risk, including sub-
primes, turned them into MBSs and sold their loans directly to investors. Both companies 
acted as financial intermediaries, selling mortgages to investors with insurance. Furthermore, 
“the resulting MBSs themselves also began to be divided and repackaged together into new 
collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) whose cash flows derived from other 
bonds” (HELLEINER, 2011, p. 70). 
Securitisation transformed the American financial market. In the 1980s, home 
mortgages issued by banks remained in their balance sheets. After the end-1990s, Fannie Mae 
and Freddie sold home mortgages in large scale to investors, creating the national housing 
market (BAYOUMI, 2017, p. 50). Financed by borrowing, both agencies could make a profit 
using borrowers’ information and knowledge of the market, leaving them as the largest buyers 
of sub-prime and Triple-A mortgage-backed securities. Consequently, sub-prime lending 
increased and enticed the attention of members of Congress, but, Freddie Mac and Fannie 
Mae easily raised the argument that regulators were “opponents of affordable housing and 
unsympathetic to minorities” to keep pressure low (THOMPSON, 2009, p. 23).      
Private label securitisations increased advantages of shadow banks in comparison to 
regulated ones. Likewise, it created incentives for commercial banks to use their private label 
securitisations and transfer them to shadow banks. As a result, shadow banks bundled their 
loans with the ones from regulated banks. Regulation to commercial banks transfigured 
shadow banks into efficient recipients of private mortgage securities. Commercial banks 
created loans for buyers but sold them to shadow banks instead of keeping it. 
Under increasing pressure from regulated banks, the FED reduced restrictions on 
commercial banks to pursue activities similar to investment banks. It was a shift of paradigms 
to the Federal Reserve’s philosophy that the market could be able to look for itself. Thus, 
regulators advocated deregulation as the best method to increase fair competition. 
Furthermore, the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 deregulated national banks. Even the 
Federal Reserve assumed that investors would be more efficient to supervise those banks than 
public regulators (GREENSPAN, 2008, p. 372). The growth of shadow banks intrinsically 
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interlaced with regulated banks. Although shadow banks could not receive government 
support and access to emergency Federal Reserve funds, those banks were out of the FED 
scrutiny. 
Investment banks implemented creative solutions such as secondary markets, allowing 
trade among investors and institutions after the initial offering. Different from the primary 
markets, where banks set prices, supply and demand of buyers and sellers that determine 
prices in secondary markets. It permitted institutions to operate among themselves. Likewise, 
the increasing complexity of finance attracted engineers and statisticians due to the utility of 
mathematics techniques to maximise return in comparison with risk. Through sophisticated 
techniques of derivatives to create incentives to develop new instruments in finance, such as 
hedge funds, technology transformed the banking system, restructuring the dynamics of 
financial market regulation. 
The hedge funds had as primary objective to make financial returns on riskiness. They 
were exempt from disclosure requirement by regulatory entities; hence funds could operate 
without state supervision (KUTTNER, 2018, p. 88). They increased liquidity in the financial 
market and created demand for products derived from investment banks, such as returns on 
mortgage-backed securities. It was a virtuous circle in which investment banks and the hedge 
funds supplemented each other.  
The quest for deregulation was a consequence of multiple pressures from commercial 
banks. The increasing competition for international investors generated a demand for 
liquidity. A flexible and convenient solution for providing liquidity in the banking system was 
the use of repurchase agreements (repo). According to Gabor (2016, p. 2), Repos involve the 
sale and repurchase of an asset (also called collateral). In a repo transaction:  
One institution agrees to buy an asset from another and sell the asset back to the 
borrower at a pre-agreed price on a pre-agreed future date. If the borrower is unable 
to repurchase the asset, “the lender gains the fee (repo interest rate payment) and can 
sell the asset.  (GABOR; BAN, 2016, p. 619) 
Repo markets also involve third-parties, “where management of collateral is 
outsourced to an agent” (GABOR, 2016, p. 2). Reforms to facilitated access to repo markets 
deepened the role of US assets in international banking, incentivising universal European 
banks to do the same. 
Consequently, banks continued pressuring further deregulation in the United States. 
The evolution of the banking sector abandoned its ancient model in the 80s, where small 
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regional banks still predominated, to the rise of regulated national banks such as Citi and JP 
Morgan in the 2000s. The emergence of those institutions through acquisitions and mergers 
increased competition against smaller investment banks like Bearn Stears and Lehman 
Brothers (BAYOUMI, 2017, p. 67). The expansion of investment banks to compete with the 
national banks intensified the participation of European universal banks in the United States. 
European banks acquired securitised assets through repo markets, accelerating house prices 
and financing the creation of sub-primes (p. 93). 
The belief that national houses prices in the US had never fallen induced banks and 
investors to continue expanding. Rather than verifying the capacity of borrowers to pay back, 
the GSEs continued accepting riskier mortgages, securitising them and charging banks for 
insured creditworthiness (p. 68). The positive cycle of rising lending, spending and asset 
prices created a trend. European banks used repos to access dollars, intertwining European 
capitals with the expansion of US repo markets. As a result, the growth of the United States in 
the 1990s absorbed more imports from abroad, which raised deficits and increased borrowing. 
Americans were living beyond their means. 
In Europe, a similar phenomenon was happening in the eurozone. Southern European 
countries such as Greece increased its trade deficit due to artificially low-interest rates. As the 
European single currency reduced risk, markets equated Greek rates with German ones, 
resulting in the fall of long-term interest rates. Greece ignored its trade imbalances and 
continued importing without attending to the crescent bubbles that blossomed in US and 
European markets.   
The global financial system depended on its supposed never-ending liquidity. 
However, American politicians and economists believed that China, whose holdings of dollar-
based assets and securities were close to $700 billion, could destabilise the system 
(BRADSHER, 2009). Trying to control the crescent trade deficit, the FED was controlling 
inflation without considering demand factors.         
The regulation was unable to perceive the growing instability of the financial system. 
Central bankers in Europe overestimated the resilience of the Euro, and the FED continued 
incentivising deregulation. The rating agencies remained. However, the close relationship 
between rating agencies and investment banks affected the criteria for ratings. As the North 
American financial market obliged agencies to be close to investment banks, their ability to 
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evaluate bonds riskiness became frail due to difficulties in discerning loans. Investment banks 
and rating agencies had opposed intentions. Shadow banks created loans that would maximise 
the possibility of receiving high grades from rating agencies, biasing them to reflect the 
imperfections of the risk agencies evaluation program. Ergo, they adapted their models to 
pass undetected through agencies, transforming risky assets into safe products (BAYOUMI, 
2017, p. 62). 
Ranging from derivatives to collateralised debt obligations (CDOs), diverse products 
were evaluated by rating agencies as average assets. The consequence of that practice 
permitted investment banks to focus on the possibility of default instead of losses in case 
default would occur, blinding the whole financial system to the belief that regulation was 
working due to the markets. As Robert Kuttner (2018, p. 87) argues, interactions between 
shadows banking and ranking agencies interweaved commercial banks and the two bigger 
GSEs into the idea that investors were better at managing risks. National regulation was 
unable to verify the American and European financial system. Global regulation followed the 
same path. 
1.3 Lost in Translation or The Basel Accords 
The Bank for International Settlement (BIS), based in Basel, organised a series of 
efforts to standardise global finance in 1974. The solution involved the development of a 
system in regulating global banking standards. There was an interest in controlling capital 
regulation to avoid a series of subsequent crisis that happened during the 1970s, such as the 
failure of the Franklin National Bank and the Herstatt Bank in 1974.  
Monetary authorities decided to establish the ‘Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision’ within the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) to discuss such questions. 
Central bankers were convinced that regulation should prevent bank failures and the global 
crisis that could emerge as a consequence of new transnational banks. To standardise capital, 
central bankers envisioned to cover “risk reduction, lowering liabilities, and reaching an 
agreement on acceptable practices” (MAJOR, 2014, p. 200). 
The initiative to make adequate standards questioned advantages from different 
national rules that provided a competitive edge to national banks at the international level. 
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Regulation aimed to contain internationally active banks, capable of holding more significant 
margins of capital. Competitive pressures from new financial hubs in international banking 
pressured the reach of an agreement. Likewise, it represented a forum of discussion to present 
ideas capable of regulating transnational capital flows, as national policies were unable to 
touch it (MAJOR, 2012, p. 543).  
Worries over the question escalated when banks’ bankruptcies surged international 
demands over capital flights, prompting countries to continue the discussions in order to 
formalise an accord. Progress happened when the United States and the United Kingdom 
decided to build a universal rule on capital. The negotiations of 1987 defined uniform norms 
for bank assets and which asset was considered capital (BAYOUMI, 2017, p. 25).  
In 1988, the talks settled a set of rules about adequate banking standards that should be 
internationally adopted. The first Basel Accord, or Basel I, had to be implemented by all 
member states until 1992 (BANK FOR INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS, 2018). Basel I 
included two levels of minimal capital buffers to supervise banks that held thinner margins of 
it. The Accord also supervised banks that diluted capital to pretend a secured margin of 
capital. The International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) would conduct 
the monitoring of global securities markets. 
Basel I represented a breakthrough in a new era of transnational finance, where central 
banking practices focused on inflation targeting and price and exchange-rates were highly 
volatile (MAJOR, 2012, p. 542). Basel standards covered prudential measures to “bank 
supervision, securities regulation, insurance, accounting, auditing, payment systems, and 
corporate governance” (HELLEINER, 2011, p. 72). Notwithstanding its supervisory 
functions, the Basel Accords was a technocratic body that aimed to diffuse norms of 
behaviour to Central Banks, inclosing them from constitutional powers. Moreover, Basel I did 
not develop defences against instruments developed by shadow banks.  
The changing trend of the period posterior to the Bretton Wood system also influenced 
the weaknesses of Basel I. Central bankers had to keep inflation under control to avoid the 
flight of investment. The high capacity of capital’s mobility pressured governments to cede 
autonomy to central banks, so measures to contain capital flight were immune to democratic 
backlash. It was a signal of a broader trend that emphasises the role of markets self-
regulation, in which the state’s role, with little multilateral cooperation, to regulate bank 
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capital reserves should be minimum. The pressure to maintain inflation under control further 
legitimised the monetary policies of central banks, engendering international competition for 
foreign capital (MAJOR, 2012, p. 551). 
The Basel Accords fixed various ratios of capital to debt concerning different 
categories of bank assets. Such a measure had the purpose of reducing riskiness in the 
international banking system. Nonetheless, it was not enough to sway globalised capital. The 
BIS was unable to supervise securitised assets if it did not appear in bank’s balance sheets, so 
banks were not obliged to accumulate reserves in terms of the Basel Accords. According to 
Major (2012, p. 544), financial institutions started to securitise assets to increase the supply of 
asset-backed securities in global financial markets. The method attracted banks precisely 
because it was efficient to avoid regulatory supervision. Therefore, Basel I ended up 
stimulating the practice of assets securitisation, making it extremely difficult to evaluate bank 
balance-sheets (MAJOR, 2012, p. 548). By the end-1990s, it became clear that banks have 
hidden quantity of capital reserves through securitisation. 
European banks expressed discontentment against Basel I. They called the agreements 
counter-productive, as they created safeguards that diminished incentives to create internal 
risk models. In 1996, the Committee modified the rules on international capital buffers, 
allowing large banks “to use their internal value-at-risk models to calculate capital changes 
for market risk” (HELLEINER, 2011, p. 72). As Bayoumi (2017, p. 29) asserts, regulators 
agreed that banks were better at understanding risk than supervisors. To increase their banks' 
competition, “both US and European regulators allowed banks to lower their reserves through 
the purchase of CDS contracts, even though issuers were not subject to the same capital 
requirements as banks” (HELLEINER, 2011, p. 72). Rather than manage transnational capital 
flows and monetary stability, Basel I “created powerful incentives for financial institutions to 
securitise debt and for investors to purchase new forms of debt securities” (MAJOR, 2012, p. 
538).   
Instead of halting softer capital standards, the Committee condoned Basel I to permit 
the use of internal models. The outcome of the Committee engagement with international 
banks was the enforcement of a “market-friendly” bias that trusted self-regulation. It indicated 
the pervasive belief among international institutions and countries that market discipline was 
enough to contain risk. International banks continued adapting its capital buffers to use their 
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value-at-risk models, impacting the surge of competition in European markets. As a result, 
European investment banks developed more aggressive risk models. 
After the end of the Bretton Woods system, new banks grew under capital ratios that 
were below the ones permitted in the United States and Europe.  However, it raised fears that 
improved competition would turn systemic banking crisis such as the ones in the 1980s more 
common, thereby a new set of regulatory measures was required. Consequently, the G7 
countries pressured the Committee of the Basel Accords to promote the global adoption of 
international standards. Meanwhile, the Basel Committee still tried to converge new capital 
standards through new rounds of negotiations (KUTTNER, 2018, p. 64). The impact of the 
1994 Mexican crisis and the 1998 financial crisis in East Asian countries influenced the 
Committee to initiate talks to overhaul the Accord. The Committee enhanced the Basel I 
framework, although still permitting “larger banks to use internal risk models to determine the 
amount of capital to put aside for overall credit risk” (HELLEINER, 2011, p. 72).  
The outcome of the alteration was the Basel II Accord, finished in 2004. Instead of 
evaluating assets into broad categories, banks could use their models to analyse assets. As a 
result, Basel II widened the use of risk models to create credit on loans. That change 
permitted banks to use different manners to evaluate assets with similar risk. Hence, banks 
could lower the risk of their assets based on their preferred system. The supervision of the 
new method was assigned to a small number of recognised credit-rating agencies such as 
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s (MAJOR, 2012, p. 548). As previously discussed, agencies 
gained regulatory authority, keeping a close relationship with banks, which affected their 
internal ratings-base approach. Mathematical modelling that was easily manipulated therefore 
substituted real regulatory oversight.  
The effect of Basel in Europe was the massive growth of European universal mega-
banks. The reduction of capital buffers and the extension of the use of internal risk models to 
entire operations permitted those European banks to abandon the European core and move to 
the United States and Southern Europe. Without constraint from European supervision, as 
banking supervision in Europe was a national obligation, universal banks expanded in an 
unsustainable manner. As Basel II reduced control from national states and gave permission 
for banks to move to subsidiaries, “there was very little regulatory power in international 
supervisory bodies” (MAJOR, 2012, p. 545). 
  38
In the United States, the FED maintained a hard stance against the Basel Accords. 
Basel I was incapable of expanding securitisations that American regulations wanted to lift. 
Moreover, there was discontentment with the regime imposed by Basel II. The Committee 
adopted a complacent attitude towards the FED, offering constant revisions to entice 
American supervisors. The FED ended up accepting Basel II, promising to incorporate the 
international standards by the end of 2007.   
The Basel Accords tried to standardise a system of rules that would ease central banks 
pressures against each other. Nevertheless, it permitted major banks, under the protection of 
developed countries, to continue expanding using sophisticated processes of asset 
securitisation. Rather than controlling supervision, the agreements restrained international 
supervisory bodies through rating agencies that were not able to visualise the flaws of the 
financial system. On the other hand, there was already pressure from the United States to 
alleviate rules of the Basel Accords. The FED willingness to lift regulation of regulated banks 
was incompatible with the primary intention of the agreements. 
In the end, the Basel process was compromised with regulators inclined to trust the 
capacity of markets self-regulation while the United States banking system privileged risks 
(KUTTNER, 2018, p. 92). The solutions proposed by the Bank for International Settlements, 
also reiterated by the International Monetary Fund during the 1990s, was capable of 
containing inflation and volatile exchange rates. However, it was insufficient to contain 
financial instruments that developed to bypass regulation and the structural flaws of the 
European single currency. 
1.4 Vanished Symbols: The Currency of (Different) Ideas    
The creation of the Euro was a complicated process with constant withdrawn and slow 
progress. Ideas about a single monetary instrument in Europe were present in economic 
debates since the sixties. Institutions moved carefully to promote economic and financial 
integration, notwithstanding the setbacks that paralysed the procedure. The initiative of 
convening the Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the European Economic 
Community (CoG) in order to set up talks about a unified monetary system was a pivotal step. 
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The purpose of a European common currency was defined before its creation when the 
German chancellor Konrad Adenauer discussed in Parliament that the European project had 
political ends instead of an economic ideal. However, France and Germany disputed the role 
of monetary integration. The controversy between ‘monetarists’ and ‘economists’, where the 
former was following France’s ideal of “plans for greater exchange rate stability and 
exchange rate support mechanisms” and the latter “under Germany, emphasized the 
coordination of economic policies and convergence of economic performances, especially 
inflation, as a precondition for EMU” (MAES, 2004, p. 21). Those debates defined the future 
of European monetary integration in a period where postwar miracles, such as the 
Wirschaftswunder in Germany, the French Trentes glorieuses or il Boom in Italy, encouraged 
European countries to shape the monetary system to its interests. 
Support for integration in Europe increased due to beliefs that the creation of the 
European Economic Community promoted impressive European growth.  The popularisation 3
of pan-Europeanism ideologies in the 1960s gave impetus to that trend. Nevertheless, Harold 
James (2012, p. 36) argued that the EEC was part of a broader trend of postwar efforts at trade 
liberalisation that reinforced integration. European countries promoted trade within the 
European Economic Community (EEC) but were unable to expand overseas due to 
agricultural protection within the United States. American retaliatory tariffs imposed 
constraints in markets that ventured outside the European area, thus stimulating commerce 
within the continent. 
The consequence of the EEC to European countries was that coherent economic policy 
required a higher degree of harmonisation (JAMES, 2012, p. 41). Policies to coordinate 
European economies were paramount in order to elaborate on effective economic planning. 
Consequently, the Treaty of Rome stipulated the creation of the Monetary Committee of the 
European Community (MC) to oversee monetary and financial policies that established 
obligations and responsibilities to member countries. The function of the MC was not related 
to the creation of a single currency due to the incompatibility of a fixed exchange rate regime 
at the time, as American influenced all sorts of economic affairs. Bretton Woods sustained the 
 The Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, creating the European Economic Community (EEC). It was composed 3
by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany. The Treaty aimed to progressively 
reduce customs duties and establish a custom union. Moreover, it suggested the creation of a single market for 
goods, labour, services, and capital among member states. The Treaty also discussed the foundation of a 
Common Agricultural policy, a Common Transport Policy and a European Social Fund.
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global economic system. Therefore, the American consensus shaped regulation through 
international organisations. 
The international organisation was responsible for European economic affairs was the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), based in Basel. The BIS conveyed the responsibility 
of monitoring the European Recovery Plan. European central banks could engage with the 
BIS in Basel, cooperating through the MC to coordinate conjunct action. Likewise, the MC 
was an entire discussion forum to central banks because those institutions lacked continued 
active cooperation. As political parties controlled central banks, central bankers were chosen 
based on political preferences. Nevertheless, the desire for further cooperation among central 
bankers within the MC pervaded dissatisfaction in certain European countries. 
The president of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Karl Blessing, remained a sceptic that the 
MC should be considered central bank cooperation (JAMES, 2012, p. 44). Contrarily to other 
European central banks, the Bundesbank was already independent due to the Bundesbank Act 
of 1957 (BIBOW, 2009, p. 155). The sole priority of the Bundesbank president was to 
maintain the stability of the German currency. As cooperation among central banks could 
eventually muster policies to harmonise European countries, it would foster an inflationary 
bias in Germany. Therefore, Blessing was against any measure that coordinated Germany 
with other EEC member countries.  
Progressive current account surpluses in Germany in the late 1950s epitomised a trend 
that repeated continuously during contemporary German politics. German stubbornness to 
keep account surpluses raised multiple criticisms from Europeans and Americans. At the 
height of Adenauer’s popularity in Germany, Blessing convinced him to disregard central 
bank cooperation with the MC, as cooperation policies would alter price stability in Germany. 
Economists attribute German high growth during Adenauer’s Wirtschaftswunder to stability-
oriented monetary policy and union wage moderation (SCHARPF, 2018, p. 5). Nevertheless, 
German postwar exceptional performance resulted from the macroeconomic rationality of 
Adenauer’s finance minister, Ludwig Erhard, who lifted wages and price controls while 
liberalising trade (2018, p. 10). Without consulting other EEC members, Americans pressured 
Germany and the Netherlands to adjust their currencies in order to correct imbalances within 
the EEC.  
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The domination of American institutions in monetary policy reduced the role of 
central banks. The stability of the Bretton Woods system made the case that “so long capital 
markets were not connected and exchange rate policies were not problematical, the case for 
greater monetary cooperation was pretty weak” (JAMES, 2012, p. 44). Monetary policies that 
created instabilities in the system, such as the Italian Lira in 1964 and the crescent over-
liquidity of the Dollar in the monetary system, divided Europeans in CoG discussions. 
The CoG provided short-term financial facilities and a swap network to support 
European currencies in difficult. As a forum of discussion, it permitted Europeans to 
formulate a collective action to international financial problems that affected Europe. France 
accused Americans of using the Dollar as an “Exorbitant Privilege”, accumulating huge 
deficits without having enough gold or assets and using collective trust in the Dollar as 
insurance. Germany still preferred US solutions instead of engaging the initiative to develop a 
European system.  
The German position in the CoG was to ensure monetary stability and discard 
disturbances that could undermine monetary policymaking (JAMES, 2012, p. 58). It sharply 
contrasted with France’s profile. The divergent positions created a dilemma in which France 
needed to contract its economy or Germany should pursue expansive measures.  
Keynesian economics predominated at the French Planning Office. Elites in public 
service originated from the “Grandes Écoles”, composed an “epistemic community” that 
permitted informal ties between government and market forces. Strongly influenced by the 
engineering tradition in economic thought, French economic strategy prioritised industrial 
expansion and focused on market imbalances (MAES, 2004, p. 24). 
The French economy centred towards the role of the exchange rate, as it favoured 
expanding the economy to focus on domestic policy priorities. Stimulating economic activity 
and inflation, the Franc created pressures on the EEC. Contrarily to the French mainstream, 
the finance ministry was orthodox, pressuring for intense periods of devaluations to restore 
competitiveness during periods of crisis. Thus, the position between Keynesianism or a free 
market-oriented pro-European divided France. 
France accompanied the United States as a country vulnerable to deficits. However, de 
Gaulle’s anti-Americanism influenced him to refuse any concerted action against surplus 
countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Japan. The alternative was to bid for 
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American creditors to act within the CoG. The European response gave credit lines to France, 
strengthening French reserves. Even the Bundesbank accepted the case due to fears that the 
Deutsche Mark could suffer severe revaluation. Nevertheless, the vulnerability of the 
American dollar prompted action among EEC members. France devaluated the Franc in 1969, 
refraining inflation and creating an opportunity for concerted European action to create a 
common market (MAES, 2004, p. 24). 
Speculation facing the Franc engaged the EEC in discussions about cooperation in 
monetary and economic policy. The fixed-exchange-rate regime was increasingly vulnerable, 
causing worries that American institutions would not sustain the system permanently. The 
shifting conditions of the end-1960s in international monetary politics compelled European 
countries to engage with other members of the EEC. Even Germany, initially wary of the 
CoG, envisaged it as a forum to develop economic and monetary solutions to guard their 
economy against an unstable economic system.  
American policymakers rested assured that the United States was not responsible for 
global instabilities in the economic system. In their view, West Germany and Japan were 
currency manipulators, gaining recurrent current account surpluses on the expense of the rest. 
Such tensions forced Europeans to ambition a monetary currency that reflected their interests, 
independent from the US. However, differences between France and Germany continued 
emerging. 
Germany was unwillingly to abstain from surpluses and low inflation, so European 
economic coordination had to be an effort from other countries' adjustment. Finance Minister 
Strauss of the conservative Bavarian Christian Democrats opposed any movement of the 
Deutsche Mark, paralysing discussions about effective European coordination. German 
immobile pressured France that received support from European countries to fix its exchange-
rates and adopt monetary orthodoxy (JAMES, 2012, p. 60).   
The development of the German growth model was a profound reaction against the 
planned economy of Nazi Germany. Likewise, the influence of the United States in German 
reconstruction stimulated the decentralisation of the German political economy. Inspired by a 
group of academics from the University of Freiburg, Ludwig Erhard interlaced the principles 
of social elements with economic liberalisation to elaborate reforms in Germany during 
Adenauer’s term. The combination of free markets with social protection under a strict 
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regulatory framework to conduct the economic reforms of 1948 engendered the 
Wirtschaftswunder in the 1950s. The German “social market economy” was a product of the 
interdependence between the economic order and legal, social, and political sectors (MAES, 
2004. p. 25). 
The emphasis on “social market economy” remained in policymakers. ‘Ordoliberal’ 
ideas, derived from the Freiburg school, endorsed a free market economy under the tutelage 
of an active state with limited duties. Ordoliberals quintessentially advocated the state to 
participate in the economic order, regulating cartels and monopolies to enforce fair 
competition. Moreover, ordoliberalism underlined the importance of the state in the 
foundation of the Ordnungspolitik (Policy of order), the settlement of a rule-based framework 
to coordinate the economic order. 
Ordoliberals focused above all on the capacity of safeguarding currency stability. 
Avoiding the planned economy of Nazi Germany and the liberal surge that caused the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, they envisioned a state model that would reduce monetary instability 
in case of inflation or uncertainty. Thereby, it was an utmost necessity to give autonomy to an 
independent central bank in order to solely pursue price stability. 
Differently from France, Germany was determined to maintain price stability as its 
primary focus. However, German foreign policy priority envisioned the reconciliation with 
France. Erhard, an ordoliberal economist, was a sceptic of European monetary integration. 
The German finance minister thought that further integration with other European countries 
would supersede the consistency of the German growth model. Germany strived for a 
European common market similar to its own, a rules-based market economy, but faced stiff 
opposition of the French.   
In December 1969, Georges Pompidou assembled European leaders at the Hague 
Summit. Constant devaluation crisis of the franc persuaded the French president that 
European monetary union had to be pursued. Nevertheless, Pompidou maintained the Gaullist 
tradition of promoting a European currency as a French instrument (MODY, 2018, p. 37).   
The Hague Summit of 1969 materialised monetary union as the prime goal of French 
diplomacy. European leaders convened at the Summer agreed on the economic and monetary 
union as a goal of the European Community. European leaders gathered a Committee to 
identify “the basic issues for a realisation by stages of economic and monetary union in the 
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Community” (JAMES, 2012, p. 74). Chaired by Pierre Werner, the president of Luxembourg, 
the Committee reunited a team of specialists. The result of the “Werner Committee report” 
was the prediction that “the inevitable tensions and pressures within the incomplete monetary 
union would force member nations toward “progressive development of political 
cooperation”.” (MODY, 2018, p. 46). The “Werner Report” thus assigned that European 
member states should pursue a political union (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1991). 
The Werner Report exposed the fundamental differences between France and 
Germany. The ambiguity of the “Werner Plan” showed the contrasting economic ideas of 
European countries to the purpose of the monetary union. France, Luxembourg, Belgium, 
Italy, and the Commission wanted an accelerate monetary integration and small exchange-
rates fluctuations. In their view, monetary union would inevitably lead to political union. On 
the other hand, Germany and the Netherlands argued for economic harmonisation, suggesting 
that all European countries should adjust their economies to the markets.   
The Werner report explored the vague idea of ‘stability’ to appeal to the Germans and 
the French. The “Werner Committee” proposed three stages without timetables. The measure 
envisaged to avoid pressure on European member states, but the Committee set the 
achievement of an economic and monetary union within ten years (EUROPEAN 
PARLIAMENT, 2015). The report enticed both French and German policymakers using a 
language of harmonisation intertwined with independence from the dollar. Moreover, the 
Committee emphasised flexibility in the first stage to allure wary European countries to join.  
However, Germany continued unwillingly to step further into financial integration, 
still insisting that political union as a first step before the monetary union. As France 
disagreed over any possibility of longer-term institutional integration, Germany rested assured 
that there was no possibility of deep commitments. 
The report offered specific details solely into the first stage of monetary union, leaving 
open the future process of monetary integration. The solution to avoid conflicts between 
French and Germans was to allow “parallel progress” in monetary and economic areas 
(EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 1970). The report emphasised fiscal transfers in the long-term 
to avoid fears that economic differences could erode integration. 
However, conservative Gaullists criticised the Plan because of its supranational 
aspects (MAES, 2004, p. 28). Talks about the European central bank continued a sensible 
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issue. German policymakers continued advocating autonomy while the French aimed to 
restore the franc evaluation through central bank cooperation and coordination of fiscal 
policy.   
The reflection of Germany in the plan’s framework increased France’s dissatisfaction. 
Even though a monetary union prescribed “coordination of short-term economic policy, 
including the harmonisation of fiscal policy, and intensified bank cooperation”, France 
resisted integrating further than the first phase (JAMES, 2012, p. 83). France’s wariness to 
transfer sovereignty to European institutions reflected different economic perceptions. 
Economic policies in France were still extremely nationalised, different from stability-
oriented policies in Germany (MAES, 2004, p. 29). 
The lack of a deadline to accelerate the new phases of the integration process ended up 
harming the Werner plan. Without France cooperation to pursue further integration, Germany 
proposed in 1971 a plan of continuing monetary integration if accompanied by measures to 
coordinate economic policy. Apart from the seeming disposal to continue the process of 
economic integration, the lack of cooperation between the two countries halted the 
progression of the Werner. Even though Germany was not interested in the monetary union, 
“Germans wanted to be perceived as good Europeans citizens”, thus avoiding the image of 
“setting back European integration” (MODY, 2018, p. 53).  
Before initiating the agreement, a combination of external constraints with internal 
constraints intensified the pressure on the EEC’s monetary unification. The Werner Plan 
stressed the assumption that the US dollar would remain stable (EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 2015). Nevertheless, a high inflow of dollars in Europe destabilised the 
German monetary system. Policy coordination remained limited, constraining German action 
without the support of other European countries. Biding to European countries to temporarily 
widen the margin of bands so the mark could fluctuate, Germany expected that concerted 
floating would force the “United States to devalue the dollar” (JAMES, 2012, p. 86). Without 
success to convince its European counterparts, Germany floated unilaterally, engendering 
inflationary pressures. The movement strained relations among Germany and other European 
countries. Policy coordination remained limited, constraining German action without the 
support of other European countries. 
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In August 1971, out of nowhere, the United States suspended the convertibility of the 
dollar into gold. Richard Nixon, president of the United States, declared that the US would 
leave the fixed-exchange-regime without any previous consultation, signalling the end of the 
Bretton Woods system. Volatile exchange rates became the norm. The unstable monetary 
system rifted the coordination of European economies objective, ending the Werner Plan. 
The plan’s abandon demonstrated the potential consequences of policy convergence 
combined with divergent ideas. Notwithstanding the crescent frailty of the Bretton Woods 
system, consistent Keynesian policies in European countries impeded the harmonisation of 
economic and monetary policies. However, Amy Verdun (2001, p. 96) points out that the 
Delors Commission’s blueprint of economic and monetary union is extraordinarily similar to 
the Werner Plan’s framework.   
As an effort to continue monetary cooperation, European central bankers developed 
approaches to reduce fluctuations among different European currencies. In April 1972, they 
signed the “Basel Agreement”, devising the ‘Snake in the tunnel’ mechanism. Under that 
system, “European currencies could fluctuate within narrow limits against the 
dollar” (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2015). All members states of the EEC entered the 
mechanism. Even European countries in the period of ascension, such as Britan, Denmark, 
and Ireland joined the snake before gaining EEC membership.     
Eventually, disputes between Germany and France arisen. The mark received a 
tremendous source of capital from other European countries. However, capital flight to 
Germany weakened other currencies. Under speculative pressure, France demanded to 
Germany to aid other countries through lower interest rates. Germany refused, thus forcing 
Britain to leave the snake in June 1972, delivering a blow to France (MARSH,  2011, p. 66).     
After Britain, the ‘Snake in the tunnel’ destabilised after the oil crisis and the dollar’s 
float in 1973. In Europe, Italy left the snake in February 1973, ending abruptly “il Boom”, its 
postwar miracle. As pressure grew, France was unable to keep pegged to the Deutsche Mark. 
Despite German endeavours to maintain the franc in the system, France abandoned the snake 
in January 1974. Pompidou’s successor, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, promised to bring the franc 
back to the snake mechanism, which happened in July 1975. However, “the Snake had 
stopped being a Community mechanism and had become instead a club of strong 
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currencies” (JAMES, 2011, p. 137). High inflation and succeeding current account deficits 
forced France to leave the snake again in March 1976. 
The ‘Snake in the tunnel’ mechanism agonised. France was unable to compete with the 
Deutsche Mark, and inflation was rising through EEC members. The turbulence of the Snake 
notwithstanding, Germany perceived it as the core of economic and monetary cooperation. 
The Snake mechanism forced market discipline, so European countries were forced to adjust 
to remain in the group or leave.  
In 1977, Roy Jenkins, president of the European Commission, developed a new 
proposal to proceed with the economic and monetary union in Europe. After initial 
scepticism, Giscard d’Estaing and Helmut Schmidt, the German chancellor, supported a 
limited version of the proposal. The new effort to EMU was the transformation of the ‘Snake’ 
into the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979. The EMS consisted of the European 
Currency Unit (ECU), a basket of national currencies, and an Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM), a system that reduced exchange rate within narrow margins of the ECU for each 
currency of the EMS. Thereby, bilateral rates could be fixed. Giscard d’Estaing emphasised 
the ESM as a symmetrical system, where the Deutsche Mark would act as an external anchor 
for weaker currencies. Interventional obligations calibrated the EMS, ceded by Schmidt, and 
guaranteed short- and medium- term credit assistance. Germany preserved the autonomy of 
the Bundesbank. German policymakers were wary of the chancellor’s compromise with 
Giscard d’Estaing to ensure the EMS, as Schmidt’s stance to Europe was divergent from 
previous chancellors. The German leader was concerned about the dollar’s instability, so he 
intended to shield the Deutsche Mark through a European monetary system. 
The answer of American policymakers to the new system was cold. The British were 
hesitant to join due to the notable anti-American tone of Schmidt (JAMES, 2012, p. 149). 
Other European countries were less reluctant, as Ireland entered the EMS as part of a 
diplomatically strategy to reconnect with the rest of Europe and release itself from British rule 
(MARSH, 2011, p. 86). Likewise, the Italian government was reluctant, as it feared that high-
inflation would soon become uncompetitiveness within the system while optimists aimed to 
import German discipline. 
However, geopolitical questions interwoven with monetary issues confirmed Italian 
angst. The Iran-Iraq war in 1979 soared old prices, inducing inflation. As the obligatory 
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German compensations in the EMS were subtle, high inflation in EMS countries engendered 
the loss of competitiveness to deficit-led European countries (MODY, 2018, p. 59). Like in 
the ‘Snake’ mechanism, Italy and France devalued their exchange-rates. Moreover, Carter’s 
support package in November 1978 depreciated the dollar in order to increase 
competitiveness and coerce the German economy to reduce its surpluses through monetary 
expansion. Schmidt refused, calling the strategy of the American treasury secretary, Michael 
Blumenthal, suicidal. Consequently, the devalued dollar deteriorated European monetary 
coordination due to the appreciation of the Deutsche Mark (JAMES, 2011, p. 152). The 
“dollar/Deutsche Mark Polarization” indirectly weakened European currencies within the 
EMS. 
The transatlantic political crisis concluded after Paul Volcker, the Federal Reserve 
chairman, announced spending cuts, capital control, monetary tightening in 1980. The 
Bundesbank answered by suspending lending, hence skyrocketing interest rates to 30 per cent 
(MARSH, 2011, p. 97). The effects of the sudden-stop caused profound electoral changes in 
the United States and Europe.  
In 1980, Ronald Reagan defeated Jimmy Carter in the American elections due to 
Volcker’s relentless fiscal tightening. In Europe, the asymmetrical costs of the EMR 
adjustment resulted in Giscard d’Estaing’s defeat to François Mitterrand in the 1981 French 
elections. After ceaseless endeavours, Schmidt failed to convince the Bundesbank to lower 
interest rates and stimulate the economy. Receiving a no-confidence vote in the Bundestag, 
Helmut Schmidt concluded his chancellorship. 
The impact of Bretton Woods and the first oil shock shifted assumptions of monetary 
policy and exchange rates. Ideas of Anglo-Saxon economics to contain inflation became 
predominate in the economic mainstream. The emphasis on supply-side policies gained 
momentum as price stability began to be pursued by governments. Likewise, central bank 
interdependence, initially supported by German policymakers, gained scope in economic 
discussions. In that changing macroeconomic regime, France elected its first socialist 
president.  
After Giscard d’Estaing’s orthodoxy, Mitterrand promoted an intense expansionary 
economic program, emphasising interventions and privatisations. However, France’s 
weakness to external factors, capital outflows, and declining competitiveness pressured the 
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franc, strangling the economy. The oil crisis forced the socialist president to abandon his 
original economic planning in 1983. Refusing to continue devaluating the franc, Mitterrand 
adopted the “Politique de Rigueur”, a set of conservative policies to stabilise the economy 
(MAES, 2004, p. 30).  
François Mitterrand would become the last president to adopt interventionist policies, 
orienting the French economy towards the German growth model after two years of economic 
expansionism. The French government liberalised priced, settled the exchange rate, and 
focused on “sound money” policies. The economic activism from the Socialist Party 
vanished, becoming the franc fort policy. Therefore, the French commitment to fiscal 
discipline reduced inflation and interest rates converged to a lower level. 
The growing consensus about “sound money” is pinpointed by the political scientist 
Erik Jones (2013, p. 147) as crucial furtherance towards Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). The French compromise with economic stability quelled the economic divergences 
between Germans and the French. As coordination among European countries increased, 
Mitterrand shifted his priorities to European policies. French policy-makers accepted German 
conditions to move France in the direction of the European Monetary Union. 
 Jacques Delors, President of the European Commission, established liberalisation of 
capital movements as a measure to promote the internal market through the Single European 
Act in 1987. That decision was a positive signal from Mitterrand to accelerate European 
economic integration. The act transformed the European Community, inaugurating 
arrangements such as the free movement of capital and services. Banking activity, mainly, 
grew massively after regulatory barriers were lifted. The opening of capital markets in 
Europe-wide banking territory permitted the expansion of a single banking model that would 
predominate in European territory. However, almost all of the increase came from the 
northern core of the EEC and the lack of cross-border takeovers induced large banks to 
overseas investment banks operations (BAYOUMI, 2017, p. 33).  
The harmonisation of European economic and monetary policies did not diminish 
French complaints against German dominance of the EMS. They were still common during 
Mitterrand’s term. Helmut Kohl, the German chancellor, was quite reticent to discuss the 
advancement of EMU. Kohl himself opposed the system of exchange rates. Conscious of 
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criticism against the EMU because of the lack of European countries’ convergence, he tried to 
stall conversations about the creation of a single currency. (MODY, 2018, p. 66). 
Mitterrand coaxed Kohl to proceed with the single currency, but the German 
chancellor was more worried about internal affairs. In the same way as Adenauer, Kohl 
considered that the ultimate goal of European cooperation was a political union, not an 
economic one. He wanted to strengthen the European Parliament and more powers to 
European decision-making but was reluctant to reduce Germany fiscal sovereignty. Kohl was 
aligned with the Bundesbank president, Karl Otto Pöhl, who was a critic of the idea of a 
European single currency.  
Despite protests of German asymmetry in the ESM, Mitterrand could not inveigle 
Kohl to agree with the single currency. Moreover, geopolitical questions were counter-
manoeuvring French influence. Americans and Soviets were supporting the process of 
German reunification, and there was nothing that France could do (MODY, 2018, p. 78).  East 
Germans immigrated in high inflow to West Germany because of economic penury and 
reunification seemed an adequate response to the situation. Kohl placated Mitterrand 
announcing in a conference in Strasbourg that he would proceed with the European single 
currency after introducing a ten-point plan to German reunification. However, German 
intentions did not appease every European leader. 
Margaret Thatcher was especially frosty to the hypothesis of reunification. Against the 
German plan, the British prime minister tried to convince Gorbachev to oppose the plan. In a 
reunion with Mitterand, Thatcher showed maps of Germany’s border before and after the 
Second World War. Pointing to Silesia, Pomerania, and East Prussia, the British prime 
minister said that the Germans would eventually capture all those territories alongside 
Czechoslovakia (MARSH, 2011, p. 141-143). Mitterrand used Thatcher’s German scepticism 
in order to bargain with Kohl further conditions to the EMU.  
Kohl erstwhile reticence to EMU still aimed political union as an end. However, 
France’s refusal to abstain of sovereignty left the question of the EMU’s purpose. The 
German chancellor was opposed to burdening sharing through the economic union. 
Furthermore, Pöhl and the East German Bundesbank president, Horst Kaminsky, were still 
opposed to any idea concerning EMU. 
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The German Federal Election in 1990 curtailed the stalemate. Kohl used German 
reunification and the single currency proposal to his gain, making a campaign where 
European and German integration were his achievements. Promising a reunification process 
that would engender no cost for West Germans and investments to Easterners, Kohl branded 
critics as nationalists or anti-Europeans. In order to win, he assured the electorate that he was 
responsible for the new European impetus. The German chancellor reluctance to the single 
currency turned into zestful vindication. 
Kohl’s campaign distanced him from Karl Otto Pöhl. The Bundesbank president 
alleged that European nations were not prepared for monetary union. Even though Pöhl was a 
pro-European, he believed that Europe could only work under a strict set of rules. Inspired by 
Ludwig Erhard’s idea of Ordnungspolitik, Pöhl feared that the wave of European integration 
could drive the monetary side unilaterally without economic harmonisation (JAMES, 2016, p. 
178). 
Mitterrand considered that a monetary union should be a collective undertaking but 
was aware that the Germans would not disregard economic stability. Karl Otto Pöhl ’s stance 
concerning the single currency did not change, but Kohl was decided to proceed with it. To 
assuage German discomfort, Mitterrand indicated Jacques Delors to be chair of the European 
Commission. Delors possessed an orthodox view of economics, working previously as 
Mitterrand's finance minister. Mitterrand and Kohl supported the Delors Committee in 
economic issues due to the technical expertise of its members, composed generally by central 
bankers (BAYOUMI, 2017, p. 122). Nevertheless, the homogeneity of economic thinking 
within the Commission was not enough to avoid clashes.  
Pöhl was extremely irritated to the point of bashing in a reunion with the Bundesbank 
council that the European Commission would “dominate the work of the Committee and that 
‘Latin’ monetary views would prevail at the expense of German commitment to the culture of 
stability” (JAMES, 2016, p.181). The Bundesbank president was inclined to refuse his 
participation in the Delors Committee. Even so, Wim Duisenberg, his Dutch counterpart, and 
others convinced him that was more effective to strive for ‘sound public’ finance and an 
independent central bank within the Committee than outside it (MARSH, 2011, p. 125-126). 
Pöhl views were non-negotiable, presenting a challenge for other central bankers.  His 
cold attitude towards the Committee was perceptive, preferring to show a “disdainful body 
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language than outright discussions […], leaving critical views on monetary union to be 
articulated by Denmark and Luxembourg” (MARSH, 2011, p. 129-130). Delors understood 
that the Bundesbank president “had political instructions, from the German government, to be 
cooperative, and that he could not block agreement” (JAMES, 2016, p. 182). However, Pöhl 
kept a hard line against political interference in economic affairs, defending slower 
institutionalisation and financial regulation at the national level. Likewise, the Bundesbank 
president proposed the Bundesbank’s framework as the ideal version of a hypothetical 
European central bank. Pöhl was against any consensus that Europe’s monetary union needed 
a fiscal union (MODY, 2018, p. 84). So, an independent European central bank would not be 
constrained to burden-sharing European economies. Moreover, Pöhl defended that the sole 
duty of the central bank should be the enforcement of price stability within the European 
Community. 
Contrary to his initial expectations, Pöhl got involved with the Committee to push for 
an independent European central bank blueprint. He preferred a slower institutionalisation of 
the integration process, but the EMU’s advancement forced Pöhl to remark his sine qua non-
conditions. Wim Duisenberg, a Dutch central banker, supported German demands alongside 
Denmark and Luxembourg. Also, Delors, himself a technocrat, acknowledged the fact that 
Pöhl was disposed of “to do anything that was needed to get a result which looked like a 
Bundesbank-type central bank” (JAMES, 2016, p. 182). 
However, Pöhl’s disinterest to shape agreements in the Committee was an obstacle to 
his ideas. That permitted other members of the Committee to drive the Commissions agenda. 
Even though Duisenberg set out German policies more consistently than Pöhl, the French 
Jacques de Larosière and the British Leigh-Pemberton efficiently pushed their agenda through 
diplomatic dialogue. The Italian Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, deliberately left space for further 
economic integration in the future (BAYOUMI, 2017, p. 122).  
Pöhl’s case for an independent central bank was part of a series of German movements 
that advocated ‘sound money’ policies within the EEC. Likewise, the European Act of 1986 
that established the abolition of tariffs and free movement of goods, services, labour and 
capital was a French-German instituted to persuade Germany to accept the EMU. Delors 
knew that his liberal orientation made him a consensus among Kohl and Thatcher and any 
weaver toward Mitterrand’s economic gestures would paralyse the integration process. The 
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Germans were still wary that the French planned to use the EMU for pipe-dream of 
‘Gouvernement Économique’, so any discussion of the central budget would cause an uproar 
in Germany. A fiscal union was one step ahead of the still on-going process of monetary 
union. 
Mitterrand and Kohl were focused on their agendas and not for advanced economic 
debates. The German chancellor expressed unambiguously clear that Germany chose the 
monetary union because of political reasons, not economic ones. Delors knew that European 
countries’ unwillingness to pursue further financial integration, thereby he instructed Padoa-
Schioppa to leave a space in the original report to continue discussions in the future (JONES, 
2012, p. 153).  
The Delors Committee finished the report counting with the participation of the Euro 
System of Central Banks (ESCB) to coordinate the program. The report carried Pöhl’s 
influence on rules and supported the competitive market established by the Rome Treaty. The 
‘Delors Report’ targeted two questions. First, related to economic arrangements procedures 
that could guarantee a monetary union. The second concerned the adequate mechanisms that 
should be adopted in order to accomplish the monetary union (MAES, 2004, p. 33).  
The predominance of German emphasis on stability still disturbed Mitterrand, who 
imposed date for the start of the ‘monetary union’ as a counter-measure. Moreover, France 
craved for a German commitment to common obligations. The Germans continued insisting 
that economic criteria should be more efficacious. German fixation with rules even distressed 
Delors. However, Germany and other European countries were a sceptic that European 
countries such as Italy would be able to take part in the European single currency. Still, the 
European commissioner complained that obsession with numbers could be unrealistic in the 
face of the EMU future challenges. Consequently, the solution to Franco-German 
disagreements over the transition was a set of rules that stimulated economic harmonisation. 
The final draft presented in 1989 fixed German demands and enshrined economic 
themes into rules. The final agreement, composed of three phases, was the basis of the future 
Maastricht Treaty. The Maastricht agreement allowed European countries to retain 
sovereignty of their tax revenues and spend it on their national priorities. The Treaty 
established a single currency, an independent European central bank, norms to ensure 
monetary stability and a “no bailout” rule. There would be no supranational aid for European 
  54
countries in crisis. Europeans could call it a monetary union, but the lack of fiscal union 
impeded the term. 
Pöhl was still pessimistic about the future of the EMU. Regarding the main difference 
of European economies as irreconcilable, the Bundesbank president believed that the common 
currency was destined to fail. The European experience would have the destiny as the 
disastrous conversion of the Ostmark into the Deutsche Mark (MODY, 2018, p. 83). Similar 
to his initial preference to ‘slow institutionalisation’, Pöhl defended that any commitment 
about the monetary union should not circumvent necessary discussions about harmonisation. 
Later, he would “present himself as someone who had been trying to prevent ‘disaster’ in 
Europe’ (JAMES, 2016, p. 192). His differences with Kohl, a wholehearted exponent of the 
EMU, increased until he resigned from the Bundesbank in 1991. The new Bundesbank 
president, Helmut Schlesinger, continued pointing out Pöhl’s objections about the single 
currency. 
In 1992, European leaders convened to sign the Maastricht Treaty. The European 
Community became the European Union (EU). The Treaty allowed EU member states to meet 
a set of specific economic conditions until 1997 in order to enter the final stage of the EMU. 
European countries that complied with the Maastricht rules would be able to adopt the euro in 
1999.  
The convergence criteria for joining the euro was the institutional consolidation of 
German stability-oriented policies. It did not consider that “fiscal responsibility was “socially 
embedded in very different national contexts” (JONES, 2012, p. 149). The focus on inflation 
control intertwined currencies with the European central bank, whose sole purpose was to 
ensure the stability of the euro. Moreover, ‘sound’ public finances and limits on national debt 
repudiated European particularities, such as the Italian economy. The harmonisation of 
European economic through macroeconomic efforts required a sudden period of austerity and 
orthodoxy in South European countries.    
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Figure 1 – The Euro Convergence Criteria 
!  
Source: EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2019 
The rules seemed unachievable to certain countries. In September, investors 
abandoned the Italian Lira. Panic in markets drove Italians to expect German solidarity by 
lowering interest rates, engendering a shared adjustment to relieve distressed European 
countries. The Bundesbank showed a display of its independence and kept its interest rates. 
The economic slump in European countries affected new members as well. Greece, Spain, 
and Portugal had high inflation and worryingly numbers of unemployment. However, the first 
victim of the instability in European markets was Britain, who release the pound from the 
ERM and threw questions about the viability of European institutions in periods of crisis. 
Similar to the pound, The franc was vulnerable to speculative attacks. The French 
economy had high unemployment that was set to worse if France raised its interest rates. 
Germany worried that further instability could force France to leave the ERM, menacing the 
common currency. As a result, the Bundesbank devalued the Deutsche Mark. In 1993, France 
was hit again by a recession that menaced the Franc’s permanence into the EEC. Unlike the 
last time, German support did not come. The Bundesbank defended that European countries 
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should abandon the ERM and float their currencies. The Bundesbank hesitated to alter the 
interest rate in order not to threaten the German economy, forcing France to devalue the franc. 
Germany favoured other options for European devaluation instead of appreciating its 
interest rates. However, European countries continued under an increased margin in the 
exchange-rates of the ERM solely to keep France in. The issue was especially sensible for 
France, that kept the “franc fort” policy as its pivotal symbol. Although both countries wanted 
economic coordination of economic policies, France expected displays of ‘European 
solidarity’ from Germany. 
German wariness with France increased after the French elections of 1995. Jacques 
Chirac, the French president, criticised austerity. The European margin constrained France to 
maintain orthodox economic measures even if the French president preferred otherwise. It 
was seemingly clear that France’s commitment to the European Monetary System seemed to 
be solely political. Lionel Jospin, the prime minister from the socialist party, promised to 
break the 3 per cent of GDP limit on the French budget. Jospin wanted to reclaim control over 
monetary policy in 1997. His ideas over expansive economic measures were capable of 
causing deficits that would fall over other European countries. 
Kohl continued determined to comply with the Maastricht Treaty. However, Germany 
needed an assurance from France, as the German chancellor had to contain the fierce 
domestic opposition. During 1996, the SPD, a party of the opposition, frequently attacked the 
capacity of the EMU to ensure stability in Germany. Kohl was conscious that German voters 
would not accept a transfer union. The idea of sharing economic risk with other Europeans, or 
German taxpayers unwillingly transferring cash to other countries, was one of the main 
reasons for the EMU slow progress. Reassuring Germans that he did not permit the bailout of 
other European countries, the German chancellor would pressure for stricter fiscal rules. As 
there was no possibility of renegotiating the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty 
again, Theo Waigel, the German finance minister, elaborated a surveillance mechanism for 
further economic convergence. Waigel proposed a scheme of mutual supervision that 
triggered automatic economic sanctions in case of excessive deficits. In December, European 
countries reached a compromise over Waigel’s proposal with the European Council, turning it 
into European legislation. The so-called ‘Stability Pact’ (SP) would observe European 
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economic performance, penalising current account deficits with the ‘Excessive Deficit 
Procedure’. 
Jospin was tempted to keep its campaign promises but abandoned his planning in 
exchange for a compromise with the German chancellor. France would promote economic 
growth in exchange for a revision on the Stability Pact, renaming it as Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP). As a result, France respected the deficit limit, complying to the SGP and the 
Maastricht Treaty.   
Different from France, Italy left the ERM in 1992. Suffering difficulties to recover, 
Italians industries could not compete with East Asian countries and cheap Eastern European 
products. Nonetheless, Italy tried to enter the common currency without meeting the 
convergence criteria. Italian leaders believed that European institutions would force countries 
like Italy to develop discipline with the rules. The Dutch and the Bundesbank were 
vehemently against the Italian bid. As a sign of good faith, prime minister Romano Prodi 
managed to put the Italian budget under control, but the Italian debt still reached 120 per cent. 
It was far away from a minimum of 60 per cent allowed (MODY, 2018, p. 120). Italy was 
incapable of respecting the requirements. The circumstances changed because of Kohl 
intervened, supporting the Italian bid to join the euro. However, it was a political decision 
rather than a straightforward economic answer.  
In 1998, Kohl signed the adoption of the euro at the Bundestag, becoming one of 
eleven countries to use the single currency. The economic and monetary union worked under 
three conditions: fixed exchange regimes, price stability, and fiscal austerity. A German 
victory during the Delors talks, as the French privileged an institution prone to democratic 
accountability, the European central bank (ECB) was immune to external interference. Its 
only responsibility rested in maintaining price stability. 
The architecture of the EMU highlighted the division of powers to different 
authorities, ranging from the European Central Bank to national financial regulation. France 
strived for the tradition republicaine, built on the principle of sovereignty and trust on the 
technical expertise of the Banque de France to implement economic policies. Nevertheless, 
Germany vetoed. Northern European emphasis on decentralisation prevailed. The German 
model, underlining rules and order, left an imprint in financial regulation and monetary 
policy. 
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The ECB controlled monetary policy and left fiscal and structural responsibilities to 
individual member states. The asymmetry of economic and monetary coordination demanded 
economic surveillance with rigid rules to minimise fiscal profligacy. However, The ECB had 
no control of national economic decisions within the economic bloc. The fact that the 
Maastricht Treaty restrained financial regulation to the national level notwithstanding, the 
Treaty kept supranational institutions unable to control banking activity. The European single 
currency functioned without a banking union, although the European Commission left 
orientations to fix that frailty in the future through a fiscal union. In sum, there was no 
institution overseeing the evolution of the European banking system. 
The process of economic integration within European reflected largely in industries. It 
was complicated for banks to perform in other European countries. National regulation 
differed across Europe, impeding the possibility of cross-border banking. Due to different 
tariffs and complex regulations, European banks preferred to operate within their country 
borders. Moreover, the costs to exchange currency discouraged cross-border activity. 
However, German preferences over liberalisation of goods, capital, and services soon 
reflected in banking activity. The Single European Act synchronised the European banking 
model through the Second Banking Directive in 1989. Determined by the European 
Commission, the directive allowed operations of investment and commercial banking through 
the EEC. The ideas emphasising strong competition and the elimination of trade barriers 
eventually permitted the multiplication of pan-European banks. 
While the universal banking model popularised, huge banks expanded to other 
European countries, becoming “national champions” (BAYOUMI, 2017, p. 37). Universal 
banks that united commercial and investment services were common in  European countries 
like Germany. However, the rules’ homogenization through the EEC expanded banks services 
and stimulated competition. A small number of universal banks from Germany, France, the 
Netherlands, and Belgium expanded continually, becoming mega-banks. Even though 
regulation remained at the national level, European countries softened supervision to support 
the expansion of national banks against other European banks (GABOR; BAN, 2016, p. 623). 
National regulations from core countries gave a stimulus to create mega-banks as 
counter-measure to larger banks from abroad. Deutschebank, ING, Societé Générale, and 
others grew so much that by the 2000s they transferred their banking systems in risky areas to 
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invest in the periphery of the Euro area. Furthermore, these mega-banks diversified their 
portfolio internationally, as the core of the eurozone remained unattractive. 
Supervisors were unable to control banks that operated in the eurozone, so they 
stimulated smaller Southern European banks to merge vastly in their regions as a defensive 
agglomeration against mega-banks. As commercial banking practices were widespread in 
Southern Europe, mega-banks had the leverage to invest large amounts of capital on 
investment banks operations. Therefore, they obtained an advantage to compete with 
commercial banks. Soon, the process of banking expansion permitted growth in Southern 
Europe generated by loans given by the core. As a result, the expansion of mega-banks within 
the eurozone permitted a consisted growth of different European economies. 
As the ECB centred its policies solely towards monetary issues and there was no 
continental banking supervision, the lack of communication hindered the possibility of 
controlling the unsustainable growth of the banking sector. National responsibility was 
obstructed by European competition in order to guarantee the protection of domestic banks 
against foreign mega-banks. The European dissensus about the EMU was too involved in 
monetary affairs to discuss the financial dynamics of the EU.  
The compromise between Mitterrand and Kohl was based ultimately in a political 
calculus, hence there were no concerns over the geofinancial consequences of the European 
banking sectors expansion. Germany advocated the separation of monetary and national fiscal 
regulation under the idea that states should take responsibilities for their actions. German 
policymakers would not allow transforming the euro into a fiscal union if that meant giving to 
other countries access to German funds. Talks to define the economic and monetary union 
defined by the Maastricht Treaty exposed German and Dutch unwillingness to subject their 
tax revenues to a European regime. The political commitment interlocked the economy into a 
framework of ideational norms. 
Capital market integration and liberalisation of cross-border banking in the end-1980s 
framed the structural foundation of the euro (JONES, 2015, p. 44). However, Germany 
entrenched the euro as a monetary union without a fiscal union intertwined with an 
independent central bank that only complied with stability-led measures. As the growth of 
shadow banks in the US forced supervisors to dismount regulation and subdued Basel II 
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regulation, European banks became less capitalised in order to be more competitive 
(BAYOUMI, 2017, p. 91). 
The norms that reigned the eurozone from Maastricht and onward would not herald a 
coherent worldview due to the omission of a banking union. Weak regulation would cause 
inaction capable of paralysing integration and engendering conflict within the eurozone area. 
As McNamara (2015, p. 26) argues, a currency is a political symbol that depends on the 
notion of ‘embeddedness’ to control dovetail social, cultural and economic differences in a 
region. Therefore, the euro was a political symbol that was incomplete to operate as a 
complete currency of heterogeneous economies. Consequently, the unfinished European 
monetary integration enthralled many criticisms from American economists, accusing the 
common currency as inadequate to be an “optimum currency area” (OCA). The currency had 
only monetary functions, as the table shows: 
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Figure 2 – Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) Overview 
!  
Source: EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2014. 
The theory of the OCA established the criterion for a sustainable currency operate in 
the long-run. It demanded free movement of people, goods, and services to ensure ‘factor 
mobility’ and a degree of homogenous adjustment in the economy to economic shocks 
(MUNDELL, 1961). Furthermore, a central bank should coordinate fiscal transfers to create a 
harmonious equilibrium among diversified economies (KENNEN, 1963; MCKINNON, 
1969). However, the architecture of the euro skipped the mechanisms that comprised a real 
monetary union.  
Table 1 – Determinants of Successful Monetary Union 
Source: MCNAMARA, 2015 
Optimum Currency Area Theory 
(OCA)
Embedded Currency Area Theory
Factor Mobility (K & L) (Mundell)
A "True" Lender of Last Resort function 
(LOLR)
Wage and Price Flexibility (Mundell)
Fiscal Redistribution, Sovereign Debt Pooling 
(Fiscal Union)
Openness to Global Markets (McKinnon)
Financial Market Regulation, Bailouts, 
Resolution Mechanisms, Deposit Guarantees 
(Banking Union)
A diversified Economy (Kenen)
Legitimate and Democratic Institutions of 
Governance (Political Union)
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According to critics, the European consensus of a single monetary currency area is far 
from a truly common monetary area. The ambiguous purpose of the euro as a “currency of 
ideas” in European politics, meaning the culmination of German foreign policy of “good 
European” or the French reversal of the franc decline concerning the Deutsche Mark, is the 
answer. Paradoxes of politics would trump economic rationality. 
Ambivalent pacts towards the rule-settled monetary framework demonstrate that 
asymmetrical economic relations can shape the eurozone through minimum consensus. Such a 
position was evident when the German Constitutional Court (GCC) ruled out that no German 
or European institution could set up economic burden-sharing. Consequently, German 
decision-making is neither an ideology nor macroeconomic policymaking, but the foundation 
of a paradigm, the “Brussels-Frankfurt consensus”. As Erik Jones (2012, p. 152-153) 
highlights, “[the consensus] works like a paradigm insofar as it sets out a clear notion of 
progress with shared assumptions […] Many of the mechanisms at work in Kuhnian ‘normal 
science’ operate within the context of interlocking ideational commitment”. Germans 
established a minimum agreement with other European countries emphasising stable money, 
‘sound finance’, and market-structured reforms. Nevertheless, Germany’s push for banking 
supervision at the national level exposed the “principled belief” of moral hazard to justify 
normative assumptions (KEOHANE, GOLDSTEIN, 1993, p. 9). Thus, German insistence that 
individual members states should supervise their banking regulation was an ideational 
commitment towards fiscal integration that only reinforced German views on price stability. 
Concrete measures to intensify economic integration could resolve the dysfunctional 
financial regulation in Europe. Delors and Padoa-Schioppa left space for integration reforms 
in the Maastricht Treaty. However, after the economic reforms to meet the convergence 
criteria requirements, eurozone countries had no political will to continue the integration 
process. There was no pressure to adopt reforms nor consensus about which integration, as the 
Germans were resolute to veto financial reforms and the French were unwilling to cede 
sovereignty to the EU. As a result, the space opened by Delors and Padoa-Schioppa in the 
Treaty was ignored.  
1.5 Götterdämmerung or The Stability and Growth Pact  
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After initial fears, the Euro seemed stabilised as a common currency. Even though 
European countries like Italy or Greece did not meet the convergence criteria, there were 
legitimate efforts to comply with economic harmonisation. However, after adopting the euro, 
European countries stalled economic adjustments. In the aftermath of the German elections in 
1998, Gerhard Schröder, Kohl’s successor as chancellor, promised job created as the most 
important factor of his agenda. 
There were few motives to believe in Schröder’s promise. Due to the European central 
bank constant evaluation of the euro as an effort to converge European economies, German 
exporters suffered heavily. German capitalism was an export-led economy, so Germany 
depended on devaluation to have competitive products in markets abroad. However, East Asia 
and the economic collapse of Russia plummeted German exports. Consequently, 
unemployment soared, dropping the German economy on the verge of a recession. Germany 
was “the sick man of Europe” (THE ECONOMIST, 1999). 
In 2001, the contraction of world trade exacerbated the stagnation. The extreme 
circumstance plummeted the French economy after keeping up growth alongside smaller 
European countries. Germany’s stagnation induced deficits, leaving the German public 
finances dangerously close to the limits established by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). 
The SGP was designed to decline the risk of fiscal crisis in individual states. As the 
impact of a crisis could hit all European countries within the eurozone, European leaders 
realised that there were no incentives to prevent states from relaxing their fiscal policy. The 
European Commission was responsible for reviewing each economic program and making 
recommendations. If the report were incapable of succeeding, the Commission would send the 
case to the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN), where it could exhort a veto 
and subsequent sanctions. (BAERG; HALLERBERG, 2016, p. 972-973). 
The European Commission eventually blacklisted France, Germany, Italy, and 
Portugal as budgetary offenders. European leaders pleaded flexibility while some, like 
Romano Prodi, complained: “I know very well that the stability pact is stupid, like all 
decisions which are rigid.” (PRODI apud L'OBS, 2002). 
  The Stability and Growth Pact enshrined convergence criteria limits—fiscal deficits 
lower than 3 per cent of GDP and government debt around 60 per cent—into law. The 
European Commission set up the process of giving forewarning to follow the SGP. However, 
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the German economy exhibited no signs of recovery, so Germany ignored the warning. The 
rule of mutual surveillance presumed that European countries would coerce breachers, but 
fears of future admonishments pervaded reluctance to notify German leaders. France, 
Portugal and Italy were particularly hesitant to take any action against Germany (MODY, 
2018, p. 146).  
However, the ECB and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) sided with the 
Economic Commission. On November 2002, Italy decided to enforce the rules, 
recommending an Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) against Germany. Defying the 
European Commission, Schröder allied with Chirac against the ECB and Italy. In 2003, the 
European Commission settled that Germany and France breached the SGP and demanded that 
both approved spending cuts. The German response to the Commission was a fiscal package 
and insistence on flexibility encompassing growth instead of fixation with fiscal discipline.   
The French and German violation of the SGP seemed to polarise the European Union, 
as Italy took the stance of the Commission with the ECB. The Commission initiated the 
sanctioning process against France and German. Nevertheless, Chirac and Schröder gathered 
political support to influence the intergovernmental European Council to rescind the 
supranational Commission. As a result, the ECOFIN council eschewed from approving the 
sanctions. France and Germany nullified the procedure.        
The European Commission protested alongside the ECB, the Italians, and the Dutch. 
Furthermore, the case provoked a revolt in smaller European countries. Worries that largest 
countries like Germany or France could rig European institutions succeeded in the promises 
that such states would set the example (MARSH, 2011, p. 218). Italy accused Germany of 
violating the rules, raising the case to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) to revoke the 
council decision. Even though the ECJ affirmed that excessive deficit should not continue, the 
council acted within its jurisdiction (MODY, 2018, p. 151). 
The creation of the SGP happened due to the asymmetrical influence of Germany in 
shaping fiscal policy within the EU. However, the severe recession that affected European 
countries like Germany and France between 2002 and 2004 ended those countries’ support for 
the SGP. After disclosing the rigidity of the SGP as sternly rigid, Schöder backed changes in 
the mechanism. Consequently, the Netherlands and Austria still enforce the SGP, but their 
bargaining power is far inferior to Germany (HEIPERTZ; VERDUN, 2011, p. 776). 
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In 2005, European member states revised the SGP. They weakened the EDP and 
allowed the European Council to interfere with the interpretation of the 3 per cent deficit rule. 
Moreover, countries experiencing negative annual growth or accumulating a loss of 
production during long periods of slow growth were exempt from the EDR (MATTHIJS, 
2016, p. 381). The revised changes permitted members to pursue budgetary plans 
independently of sanctions, point out any justification for economic decline and present it to 
the Commission. 
German and French efforts to diminish the SGP and weaken the ERD had 
consequences for the future of the euro. The erosion of the Commission’s ability to oversee 
European budgetary activity skipped “the main institutional bulwark at the European Union 
level against higher deficits and debts” (BAERG; HALLERBERG, 2016, p. 997). Likewise, 
the overhauling of the Commission influenced states to pursue un-cooperative strategies. The 
SGP modifications ended up creating incentives to the contrarily of the originally intended. 
1.6 Spinelli’s shattered dream or the burst of the North Atlantic Financial crisis 
When Mussolini’s Fascist Special Tribune condemned Altero Spinelli, he gained the 
right to renounce his ideas and obtain a revision of pardon to his 16 years sentence in jail. 
Born from a socialist family and a communist himself, Altero refused. Held captive on the 
island of Ventotene, he eventually abandoned communist ideas and envisaged a utopic future 
after World War Two, where a European federalist movement would triumph as an antithesis 
of fascism. Inspired by the federalists' writings and other political prisoners, Spinelli wrote the 
“Ventotene Manifesto”, describing his vision about a federalist Europe. The Manifesto is one 
of the first documents defending the idea of a European constitution and a supranational 
European federation of states (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2019).  
The postwar period was a time of opportunities to Spinelli. The former Italian war-
hero advocated further European integration in the Italian government, and his political 
initiatives catapulted him to the European Parliament (EP). As a Member of the European 
Parliament (MEP), he made his demands heard, as the Parliament approved his “Draft Treaty 
Establishing the European Union”, also known as the “Spinelli Plan”. The document settled 
the framework of the Single European Act of 1986 and for the Maastricht Treaty, driving 
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European integration further. Positive economic outcomes would inevitably lead to 
harmonious politics, triggering a vicious circle. Spinelli thought that a European union should 
be the highest outcome to reach; hence he criticism towards politicians that adopted a hesitant 
position towards integration. He was a believer that Europe was a forward-looking process of 
appeasement but did not imagine that Europe could ever polarise through stepping closer 
towards integration.  
Optimism in American markets inexorable raised concerns about the sustainability of 
the positive trend in the North Atlantic financial system. The American boom in housing 
prices accompanied a gradual fall in long-term interest rates. Meanwhile, overconfidence in 
the MCU continued attracting investments in Europe due to lower funding costs. However, 
the massive dollar reserves held by emerging markets, European banking expansion, and the 
liquidity of safe assets caused curiously decreasing returns of yields (BAYOUMI, 2017, p. 
99-100). 
It became a matter of time until investors eventually realised mortgage-backed 
securities kept most of the bad loans sold. After lenders questioned the value of collateral and 
the viability of banks, they recognised that by private mortgage-backed assets companies that 
dominated markets depended on risky loans to survive. In mid-September 2008, the American 
government rescued Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac because of the massive losses that both 
GSE’s suffered (HELLEINER; 2011; p. 69). The loss of confidence froze repo markets. 
Without access to tri-party repo funding, Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns collapsed 
(GABOR, 2016, p. 2). Failure of American consumer protection for subprime mortgage left 
borrowers exposed to risky loans by lenders. Moreover, the American government rescued 
and nationalised the world’s largest insurance company, American International Group (AIG). 
In Europe, the European central bank envisaged the European repo market as an 
integrationist of a single financial space for the transmission of interest rate decisions 
(GABOR; BAN, 2016, p. 618). The European financial system should be large enough to 
sustain the sudden shock, but as European mega-banks invested massively in the United 
States, they held less capital in their balance sheets. The impact of Lehman’s bankruptcy 
induced an extreme liquidity freeze in European banks. Consequently, the capital inflows 
from Northern universal banks to the periphery of the eurozone evaporated.  
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The effects of the North Atlantic financial crisis decimated the stability that reigned in 
the eurozone since its creation. Likewise, the mess that pervaded Europe unveiled the 
deficient structure of the Economic and Monetary Union. Instability in Europe rifted the 
continent into polarisation and political disputes. Likewise, it shattered Spinelli’s dream of 
European unity when the European economy burst. 
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2 THE ODYSSEY  
2.1 An Iliad to join the EMU: Greece’s path to the Euro and fiscal responsibility  
During the mid-1970s, Greece became a democratic regime after a dictatorship that 
lasted from 1967 to 1974. Under the leadership of Konstantinos Karamanlis, a former prime 
minister that spent the dictatorial period in exile, Greece fulfilled the transition to democracy. 
The “Colonel’s regime”, as the dictatorship was known, ended with Greece under institutional 
chaos, internationally isolated, and on the brink of war with Turkey. 
As the first prime minister of the democratic period, Karamanlis had as its first 
objective to stabilise Greece. The new Greek prime minister made pivotal improvements on 
democratic, economic, and institutional issues. Karamanlis tried to transform the country and 
guarantee membership at the EEC, thus ending the period of international isolation and 
enhancing the economy. The prime minister also reformed institutions to be compatible with 
liberal democratic values, legalising the Greek Communist Party and other previously banned 
leftist parties while neutralised the army’s political influence (PAPPAS, 2013, p. 34). 
In 1974, the prime minister made a plebiscite about the monarchy continuity, despite 
keeping the president’s seat and the 300-members unicameral parliament. In 1975, 
Karamanlis approved a new constitution, thus strengthening inclusive political institutions 
and a plural party-system. As part of the process, the prime minister also founded his party, 
the liberal-conservative “New Democracy” (ND).  
In the European strategic sphere, Karamanlis signed Greece’s full EC membership in 
May 1978, even before other European countries that also passed through dictatorships such 
as Portugal or Spain. The membership eventually led to Greece’s entrance to the European 
Community in 1981. The primary purpose of the negotiations to enter the bloc was to enforce 
liberal democracy in Greece due to the EC’s influence. Still considered a “frail democracy” 
and one of the countries that belonged to the “third wave of democracy” that was stabilising 
itself from a dictatorship, Greece still needed support to achieve full democratisation 
(HUNTINGTON, 1991). 
Membership in the European Community was essential to the Greeks because of its 
symbolism. The process answered domestic doubts about Greece’s identity belonging to the 
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West or the East. In terms of security, dependency on the US diminished as Greece entered 
the EC’s orbit. Karamanlis took advantage of the EC’s funds to modernise the economy, still 
based on agriculture, attempting a development model close to the French “Dirigisme” that 
emphasised state capitalism (PAPPAS, 2013, p. 34).        
Karamanlis abandoned the premiership in 1980 and became president. The 
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) won the legislative elections in 1981 and obtained 
the premiership. PASOK was a democratic socialist party that adopted a high confrontational 
style, attacking the process of democratic transition initiated by Karamanlis from a left bias. 
Andreas Papandreou, leader of PASOK, became prime minister. Papandreou was the son of a 
former Greek prime minister, Georgios Papandreou, who governed Greece before the 
Colonel’s regime, but a monarch’s plot with the army arrested him in 1967. 
To gain the elections, PASOK adopted a populist style in the campaign, dividing 
society between the “pure people”, represented by PASOK, and the political establishment as 
“corrupted elites”. Exploiting the image of itself as “defender of the people’s will”, the party 
defeated New Democracy and gained the elections with a considerable margin, enabling 
significative changes in the premiership. According to Takis Pappas (2013, p. 35), PASOK 
was the first single-party governing the country, being able to change the distributive model, 
thus rejecting the state-led growth promoted by Karamanlis’ ND. Focusing on directed 
redistribution, Papandreou created a symbiotic relationship with political actors that settled 
Greece’s model of capitalism.  
Not only PASOK but also ND tried to form clientelistic ties with labour unions 
appointing a myriad of clients to the public sector. They used the monopoly in electricity, 
telecommunications, transport, water, sewage, ports, radio, television, petrol, defence, and 
cement to build a robust clientelistic network. However, the left party was more successful 
due to its close relations with the public sector. 
Andreas Papandreou kept anti-competitive regulation, barriers to trade, and stable 
product-demand. The Greek economy continued with a high level of structural 
unemployment, a large informal economy, attachment to statism in services, and low reform 
activity (FEATHERSTONE, 2011, p. 197). Papandreou held firm control of the party’s labour 
organisation, expelling unionists or leaders that expressed signs of autonomy or factionalism, 
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hence making the unions excessively dependent on the approval of the party’s leadership 
(TRANTIDIS, 2015, p. 9). 
The Greek state functioned as a paradox, according to Kevin Featherstone (2011, p. 
196). It combined a mixture of governance that tried to be labelled a liberal democracy while 
intermixing clientelism, rent-seeking, and high standards of corruption. The prime minister 
possessed almost presidential powers, leaving other ministers with low ministerial powers, 
enabling poor coordination, low efficiency, and weak control of expenditures, thus permitting 
high quantities of tax evasions. 
State-society relations in Greece depended solely on decisions taken by the governing 
party, thus creating a “parentela” framework of highly fragmented demands that competed 
with each other, incapable of establishing common social policies capable of improving 
society (TRANTIDIS, 2015, p. 9). Unions knew the channels to make their bids, so they 
lobbied the formation of centralised parties that kept clientelistic networks active.     
Greece’s development within the European Community meant that the Greek 
economy interacted with European economies embedded within international institutions that 
stimulated domestic political stability. The process of institutionalising coordinated economic 
action among markets and states to ensure prosperity, or the “embedded liberalism” regime, 
served to consolidate social coalitions within the state (RUGGIE, 1982). Although Greece 
grew exposed to higher levels of competition within the European Community, the EEC 
membership increased disparities between the urban and rural sectors and kept internal 
economic divisions (FIORETOS, 2013, p. 312). The regime stabilised PASOK’s influence in 
Greece along with its ND, its main opposition. 
Interest groups within the Greek state used the economic growth that Greece gained 
due to its integration with financial markets to pressure for higher state spending. The public 
sector grew significantly despite the European Community’s calls for economic reforms to 
harmonise the Greek economy with European laws notwithstanding (TRANTIDIS, 2015, p. 
10). Furthermore, the reforms on market liberalisation, state aid, and competition created 
conflicts between PASOK and unions, resulting in mutual losses at the Greek legislative 
elections of 1985. 
Andreas Papandreou was re-elected but suffered significant losses in the parliament 
seats. European institutions demand to shift the economic policies adopted in Greece 
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threatened PASOK’s influence in the public sector, thus harbouring conflict with its 
supporters. After the election, Greece entered in crisis due to its balance of payments, creating 
a rift with PASOK’s bases. The prime minister pursued austerity policies, froze wages, 
increased taxes, and devaluated the drachma, which led to two-digit inflation. As a result, 
unions affiliated with PASOK distanced themselves from the government and aligned with 
the Greek Communist Party. 
Under the definition of Varieties of Capitalism, which is “the conception of how 
behaviour is affected by the institutions of the political economy”, Greece represented an 
ambiguous type (HALL; SOSKICE, 2001, p. 4). Initially considered to some extent a 
“Mediterranean economy”, Greece combined a large primary sector and a constant history of 
state-intervention. Therefore, it enabled specific characteristics of a coordinate economy 
while keeping liberal aspects in the economy, specifically in the labour market due to benefits 
in specific sectors while strong competition in others (HALL; SOSKICE, 2001, p. 21).  
According to Trantidis (2015, p. 6), Greece “developed under the long-term exchange 
of benefits, morphing the pattern of collective action into a clientelistic system that 
proportionated mutual individual and collective benefits entrenched in preference formations 
of the bargaining power”. Whence, the main political parties, focus on guaranteeing political 
stability through cooperation with interest groups, thereby aligning preferences to obtain 
political hegemony.   
PASOK’s support base was pressuring a change of the economic policy’s course as 
tension soared because of Greek discontentment. Rebel unionists even tried to take control of 
one of the leading associations connected with the private sector to show dissatisfaction with 
the situation (TRANTIDIS, 2015, p. 11). Eventually, Andreas Papandreou stopped the 
reforms and tried to alleviate his economic policies one more time to gain support for the 
1989 election. To protect his supporters in the public sector, Papandreou abandoned plans for 
privatisations, market deregulation, end of state-owned companies, and reductions of the 
state. Unionists that previously joined other leftist parties returned to support the PASOK 
candidate and preserve the status quo. Nonetheless, PASOK lost in the 1989 legislative 
election.  
After the three months in 1989-1990 of the caretaker government of Xenophon 
Zolotas, who became prime minister when there was no clear majority for any of the main 
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parties, ND returned to the premiership in 1990 under the command of Konstantinos 
Mitsotakis. The new centre-right prime minister tried to strengthen the economy and reinforce 
political institutions. Mitsotakis made the Greek entrance for the European Single Market as 
the government’s primary objective, creating a plan that centred on cutting public spending, 
reforming the civil service, and privatisations (PAPPAS, 2013, p. 35). The reformist agenda 
received strong opposition from PASOK’s bases and deputies in the government, which were 
able to halt part of the original plan. 
ND was defeated again in 1993, restoring Andreas Papandreou in the prime minister’s 
office. The Greek legislative election of 1993 represented the collapse of New Democracy. 
Trying to label itself as a viable alternative to PASOK’s policies, ND started to use the 
language of the “people’s party”. Under the new leadership of Kostas Karamanlis, nephew of 
Konstantinos Karamanlis, the party expelled right-wing liberals and propelled rhetoric similar 
to PASOK’s leadership.  
As stated by Takis Pappas (2013, p. 41), that moment represented a critical point in 
Greek politics as both parties became populists. The concept of populism denotes a thin-
centred ideology that considers society to be divided between the “pure people” against the 
“corrupt elite” and that politics should follow the general will of the people (MUDDE; 
KALTWASSER, 2017, p. 6). Its thin-centred characteristic permits assimilation by different 
ideologies so left and right can possess similar populist features. Using a polarised discourse 
that generated political instability and enabled the creation of a zero-sum game, in which 
one’s losses would result in the other’s gains, ND and PASOK’s electorate flourished. The 
strategic polarisation was pursued by the two pragmatic parties to reduce political competition 
to a single dimension, thus keeping the narrative of confrontation between a moral majority 
against a corrupted minority symbolised by the other party.  
Andreas Papandreou initiated his term in 1993 by excluding all possibilities of 
privatisations and suspended structural reforms. Those politics increased PASOK’s influence 
with political actors, hence consolidating its hegemonic position among unions. The left party 
promised higher wages in the public sector, generous pensions, and early retirement age. The 
attention given to those sectors rendered support from sectoral organizations (kladikes) to 
PASOK, which also controlled most unions and the two leading Greek associations: The 
Confederation of Civil Servants (ADEDY) and the General Confederation of Greek workers 
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(GSEE), which reunited the private-sector and state-owned enterprises (TRANTIDIS, 2015, 
p. 9). 
Papandreou was not able to finish his term as prime minister, retiring in January 1996 
due to an illness and dying months later. In his place, Kostas Simitis assumed the premiership. 
The new leftist prime minister was a moderate and a technocrat. Different from Andreas, 
Simitis decided to take on economic reforms to ensure Greece’s entrance in the Economic 
Monetary Union.   
Conscious that the Greek electorate had a strong feeling towards European integration, 
Simitis used it in his favour, justifying that economic reforms were a precondition to enter the 
EMU (FEATHERSTONE, 2011, p. 198). The prime minister was forced to carry the reforms 
either way because he knew that Greece would lose creditworthiness if it were out of the 
Euro. Using admission to the EMU and the bid for the 2004 Summer Olympic Games in 
Athens as symbols attached to his mandate, Simitis was able to maintain his popularity.  
The prime minister had a strategy to shift the Greek state permanently. He invested in 
public infrastructure, raised taxes, and made a gradual reform in the pensions and the labour 
systems. Planning to lighten European attention at the Greek economy, he modernised the 
economy harmonising Greece’s economy with European directives such as the Maastricht 
Convergence Criteria and European policy surveillance. Nonetheless, Skeptics at the EEC, 
especially from the Netherlands and Germany, considered Greece unprepared to enter the 
EMR and consequently to the euro due to its chronic macroeconomic imbalances relative to 
high inflation and unemployment (MODY, 2018, p. 106).  
The possibility of privatisations made unions and the public sector wary of the prime 
minister. However, Simitis and PASOK were not disposed to lose the union’s support. The 
government reassured that would sell only minority shares of state-led companies, and the 
state would maintain control. The Greek government would protect enterprises from 
competition through informal barriers and protect employees from the public sector while 
hired new ones without the benefits, preventing disruption. 
The reforms carried by the government soon lost steam. Informal clientelistic ties that 
ranged from ministers to unionists ensured workers that support from the Greek government 
would persist. Unions and politicians shared mutual interests in a PASOK’s successful 
government as unionists were aware that an alliance with PASOK implied the possibility of 
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ascension in politics. Avoiding the error made in 1985, when unionists rebelled and 
abandoned the party, unions instead declared opposition to the reforms but remained in the 
party, obtaining concessions through negotiations (TRANTIDIS, 2016, p. 13). 
The strategy functioned, which delayed significant economic reforms. Simitis won the 
legislative elections of 1996 and signed a social pact with unions in 1997, establishing wage 
moderation, but giving benefits in modern employment law. However, the prime minister 
inability to carry on the reforms would create structural damage in the Greek economy, 
resulting in Greece’s economic frailty during the Eurozone crisis. As stated by Hall and 
Soskice (2001, p. 13), the importance of informal rules was fundamental “to securing the 
equilibria in the many strategic interactions of the political economy”. The Greek economy 
eschewed responsibilities to keep its dependence on agriculture instead of improving the 
manufacturing sector, using EU funds to foster the public sector and maintain clientelistic 
relations with unions. 
Greece experimented economic growth in the late 1990s, even though it resulted in a 
higher demand for imports, inflows of foreign capital, and cheaper credit (FIORETOS, 2013, 
p. 313). Simitis knew that reforms were a critical condition to Greece obtain access to the 
Euro. However, during his whole term, he needed to negotiate with PASOK unionists and 
contain the possibility of a confrontation that would appear during the implementation of 
orthodox economic measures.  
Criticism against the Greek prime minister due to his economic policy pervaded 
intermediaries of the party to unions and associations. Leaders within PASOK knew that they 
could not rebel against Simitis due to Greek desire to enter the EMU. Even though the 
Maastricht criteria forced the imposition of austerity to regulate Greek macroeconomic 
imbalances, unionists pressured to avoid the costs of the reforms and channel it towards other 
sectors. 
Simitis continued part of the orthodox program until 1998 when the Greek 
government sold a middle-sized bank. The continuity of reforms caused an uproar among 
PASOK supporters. The reaction to the privatisation caused a rift between the party and its 
unions. To appease PASOK supporters, Simitis declared it as an isolated case and rejected the 
possibility for more significant structural reforms and cancelled further privatisations. 
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In 2002, the Greek prime minister tried to impose a reform in the pension system that 
mainly affected the public sector. Opposition to the measure was fierce, as protesters emerged 
in the streets and gained strength when GSEE and ADEDY threatened to engage in a mutiny. 
The Greek government halted the idea to avoid conflict and passed a timid reform as a 
substitute. The politics of “coordination with co-optation”, in the words of Trantidis (2016, p. 
14), were not enough to control the unions and prevent dissension. The Greek prime minister 
proposed a reconciliation offering protectionist benefits and promised to stop the reforms in 
exchange for support from unionists to proceed with minor reforms that would not dissatisfy 
PASOK’s supporters.  
In 1998, European leaders excluded Greece from entering the euro due to the 
macroeconomic imbalances. Nevertheless, Greece’s progress in adopting orthodox measures 
engaged in discussions in 1999 that recognised Greek efforts to control its fiscal deficit 
(MODY, 2018, p. 133). At first, European leaders asserted that inflation in Greece was still 
higher than what was limited by the Maastricht criteria, but due to Simiti’s efforts to continue 
the austerity program, they alleviate the rules to let Greece in. Even though interest groups 
reduced the possibility of economic coordination to guarantee its privileges from the Greek 
state, Greece eventually gained access to the EMU in 2000. 
Containing the ‘reform fatigue’ from endeavours to obey the Maastricht criteria, the 
prime minister decided to use the inflow of cheap capital from Northern European banks to 
regain support from the Greek electorate instead of continuing reforms to increase 
competitiveness (NÖLKE, 2015, p. 12). That was an important measure to reestablish 
conciliation between the government economic policies and the public sector expansion that 
led to PASOK’s victory in the legislative election of 2000. 
Historically, Greece never achieved the conditions to enter the EMU. The Maastricht 
criteria were supposed to be a severe condition for European countries’ admission in the 
EMU, but its rigidity was weakened by Kohl to admit Italy, whose debt surpassed by far the 
60 per cent required. Thereafter, the French and the Germans lobbied to expand the eurozone 
and label critics as eurosceptics, letting Greece enter as a sign of strong Europeanism.  
The macroeconomic stability enshrined by the Stability and Growth Pact was never 
achieved in Greece since European governments had no reason to supervise each other as 
Germany and France had already broken the rules. Nonetheless, the costs of the adjustments 
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were imposed differently across the population due to the core interests of PASOK’s client 
groups in the public sector (TRANTIDIS, 2016, p. 16). The preservation of those ties within 
the party corroborated the clientelistic networks with unions that PASOK maintained to assure 
its hegemonic position within the left.  
The unequal costs of liberalisation in Greece to different sectors meant that Simitis 
was not able to govern without continuing the practices of cronyism, corruption, and 
inefficiency. PASOK was unable to detach itself from the image of a corrupt party. That 
represented a political liability during the Greek legislative elections of 2004, as PASOK lost 
to ND.  
The centre-right party promised to transform the state administration and end 
inefficiency and corruption altogether. Kostas Karamanlis became prime minister and 
initiated a program of full privatisations of the state communications, enterprises, and banks 
during his term. ND was not dependent on the support from the public sector, so Karamanlis 
faced fewer costs to carry on the reforms. However, the party kept clientelistic ties with 
specific professional associations, so ND protected them from liberalisation policies. 
Therefore, practices to improve the public sector and increase transparency were not 
implemented in all sectors, only varying the losers of the conservative measures. 
ND’s failure to cope with its promises opened space for PASOK at the 2009 Greek 
legislative elections. George Papandreou, the president of the leftist party, became the new 
prime minister. According to Pappas (2013, p. 33), Greece was a “populist democracy” until 
that time. The government served solely to ensure economic distribution to certain sectors of 
the Greek society, using its clientelistic clients to remain in power. The two-party system 
heightened polarisation and increased the costs of bargaining to approve conservative 
measures; thus resistance to approving reforms in order to gain benefits was extremely 
effective.         
Two mechanisms sustained Greek democracy: The two-party system and clientelistic 
ties with unions and associations that were protected by the state. According to Kevin 
Featherstone (2015, p. 299), the Greek state had strong and deep-rooted legal formalisms, it 
was hierarchical, emphasised a centralist model, and stressed on procedural regulation over 
innovation. The Greek model of growth functioned upon New Democracy’s periods of 
selective orthodoxy and variations of PASOK’s ties with unions, defined by Trantidis (2015, 
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p. 10) as “open confrontation”, “coordination with co-optation’, and “contained 
confrontation”. Relations with the public sector and associations of workers were determinant 
to keep the government functioning. Thereby, Greek democracy was only functional until the 
eurozone crisis.  
2.2 Greece at the center of the European storm  
After worries with subprime loans in 2007 became global panic with Lehman 
Brothers’ bankruptcy, loss of confidence paralysed investors and halted repo markets,  ending 
the abundance of liquidity that reigned in global finance. Market prices plummet, causing a 
frenzy of write-downs in American and European banks, hollowing the capital in banks 
balance sheets and promptly affecting them, as they were forced to raise capital somehow to 
meet the minimum capital obligations. 
Initially, politicians from the periphery used the opportunity to denounce the 
decadence of Anglo-American capitalism. The former president of Brazil, Lula da Silva, 
claimed that G7 nations “no longer spoke for the world” and demanded a new economic order 
(apud LYNN, 2009). The French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, expressed concern over global 
finances and advocated for a rewriting of banking rules to end the “folly” of deregulated 
finance (CODY, 2008). Europeans, in general, wanted to dismiss the financial crisis as an 
American problem of markets’ ambition. 
A general perception that the Dollar weakened while the Euro gained influence 
pervaded global politics. Sarkozy’s condemnation of the American financial system shed light 
on the desire for a new economic order in which the European Union could be the leading 
player (CODY, 2008). European economic hegemony entailed the possibility of the Euro 
relishing the same position of “exorbitant privilege “ that the Dollar possessed. French 
ambitions notwithstanding, Europeans realised that the North American financial system 
deeply intertwined with their banks. 
As Bayoumi (2017, p. 105) points out, regulated American banks were better 
capitalised than European ones. Even though American investment banks were extremely 
vulnerable and the economy fell steeply, the burst of housing and financial market would 
undoubtedly affect the European Union. However, the intensity of the crisis astonished 
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European politicians. Different from the US, the European banking system carried an 
incomplete monetary union. Furthermore, European countries that adopted the euro were 
unable to print their currency and keep monetary liquidity in case their conditions 
deteriorated. 
Greece abandoned austerity and reforms on its growth model since the launch of the 
euro, using the common currency's interest rate to expand the economy. Nonetheless, the 
country did not converge its economy with other European countries, producing external 
deficits. The euro was not an optimum currency area in the conception of Mundell (1961), but 
the Delors Commission highlighted its economic benefits to proceed with the “One Market-
One Money” program (MCNAMARA, 1998). Greece could stimulate its economy using 
interest rates similar to Northern European countries, but it did not imply that its economy 
was similar to Germany. 
Figure 3 – Eurozone Ten-Year Government Bond Yield 
  
Source: BLYTH (2013); European Central Bank Statistical Data Warehouse. 
According to Nicolas Jabko (2015, p. 73), the “institutional architecture of EMU 
reflected, but did not resolve, the deep tension between those two different concepts of 
monetary union”. As Verdun (2015, p. 222) complements, the euro lacked a supranational 
structure to enhance the role of the ECB within the eurozone. Moreover, the European 
institution framework weakened due to Germany and France’s manoeuvre to avoid the 
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consequences of the SGP breach in 2005. The rule-based governance was thereafter formally 
reinforced, but European smaller countries that initially supported it perceived that strict rules 
were political issues prone to dissuasion.  
The reason for the incomplete integration of the EMU is explained by a combination 
of the main theories of European integration. Finishing the EMU required a banking union 
and a mechanism of economic governance. Nonetheless, as the common currency seemed a 
success, there was no political will to pursue further financial integration. As stated by 
Moravcsik (1993), integration happened only as an agreement of the lowest common 
denominator bargaining among member states, in which each pursued its domestic interests. 
Furthermore, the neofunctionalist would emphasise that spillovers from the monetary union 
would create incentives for member states to strive for deeper integration, as the incremental 
improvements possessed fewer constraints (HAAS, 1958; PARSONS, MATTHIJS, 2015).    
The process of entering the EMU required further reforms after its adoption, but the 
enforcement of those rules weakened after the SGP breach. As the political costs to initiate 
reforms during the first years of the common currency increased, there was no reason to 
continue the process of economic convergence. Besides, economic issues such as risk-sharing 
or banking union could oppose European countries as it already did in the past, so there was 
no political will to continue persisting in divergent European positions as a manner to find a 
solution to the incomplete nature of the EMU. 
The North Atlantic financial crisis rapidly morphed into a eurozone crisis as Greece, 
and other European countries realised that they were unable to resolve it alone. After a brief 
period of resurgent Keynesianism among policy-makers of advanced industrialised countries, 
European politicians started to deal with a crisis within the eurozone. 
Nicolas Sarkozy, the French president and chair of the European Council, made efforts 
to approve a “European action plan” to avoid a crisis in the European banking sector.  In the 4
end, the coordinate response was closer to an accumulation of national action plans, as France 
and Germany used their funds to rescue national banks (TRAYNOR, 2008).  
 The European Council defines the EU’s overall political direction and priorities, setting the EU’s policy agenda 4
by conclusions during European Council meetings. The members of the EC are the heads of state of the 28 EU 
member states. From 1975 to 2009, the President-in-Office of the EC was an unofficial semiannually rotating 
position held by a leader of a member state.
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Eastern and Southern European were not so lucky, as the lack of economic governance 
hardened the burst in these regions of the EU. As credit froze, Eastern European banks were 
forced to stop lending. Eastern European economies, whose mortgage loans were in euro or 
Swiss franc, busted (APPEL; ORENSTEIN, 2018, p. 143). Lacking ECB support, the IMF 
agreed to support the EU to capitalise Hungary, Romania, and Latvia in order to avoid the 
contagion of the Latvian financial sector, strongly intertwined with Nordic countries. Eastern 
Europe entered a deep recession as Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, Armenia, and Lithuania 
contracted over 14 per cent in 2008 (APPEL; ORENSTEIN, 2018, p. 144). 
After Sarkozy’s term, concerted European action seemed distant as Angela Merkel, the 
German chancellor, stressed the importance of debts and responsibility within the eurozone. 
The financial system’s paralysation affected Southern European economies that functioned 
through the expansion of consumer demand, or ‘Mediterranean market economies’ in the 
definition of Peter Hall (2012, 2014, 2017). Without a system of economic governance, the 
imbalances caused by the flawed architecture of the EMU generated a dysfunctional 
democratic system that inflicted the whole cost of the fiscal adjustment to Mediterranean 
market economies (MATTHIJS, 2014, p. 103). 
Around late October, two weeks after the 2009 Greek election, George Papandreou 
prepared an announcement on occasion of the new government’s vote of confidence. The 
Greek prime minister and his minister of finance, George Papaconstantinou, studied the Greek 
economic situation from its predecessor and affirmed that public debt shot up from €160 
billion in 2004 to €300 billion in 2009. The previous administration increased debt and used 
false statistics. Greece’s fiscal deficit of 6.5 per cent of GDP was 13 per cent of GDP.  
George Papaconstantinou (2016, p. 25-26) detailed how he came to discover the 
situation in his biography of the events. Soon after the victory, the new finance minister 
visited his office and could not find any files, correspondence archives nor hard disks on the 
computers. October was the budget month in Greece, and there was no draft budget left by the 
previous administration, solely a previous New Democracy administration report to the 
statistics agency of the European Union explaining that they expected a deficit of 6 per cent of 
GDP. Looking after the never published monthly bulletins on budget execution from the 
previous finance minister, Constantinou discovered that the deficit would be around 10 or 12 
per cent of GDP, almost twice the number previously reported. The markets panicked, soaring 
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the disparity spread between Greece (risky) in comparison to Germany (safe), as displayed in 
figure 4:  
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Figure 4 – Greek-German 10 year Sovereign Yield 
!  
Source: JONES (2015), based on data from IHS Global insight 
George Papandreou won the elections claiming for a leftist economic reform, against 
austerity measures and assuring higher pensions and salaries (AFONSO; ZARTALOUDIS; 
PAPADOPOULOS, 2014, p. 326). However, the crisis that affected Greece also originated 
from political problems (HALL, 2012, p. 361). Greece passed through a period of economic 
growth since its entrance in the EMU, enabling a higher number of imports and increased 
wages. However, Greek wage standards soon outmatched the modest growth that Greece 
experienced during those years, generating economic imbalances because of its persistent 
deficits, high debt, and low productivity. The Greek economy decreased since 2006, ending 
up with -0,33 per cent of GDP in 2008, Karamanlis’ last year in office. After announcing that 
Greek data was unreliable and the economy was dicey, Papandreou and his finance minister 
understood that the Greek economy required parsimony and that diminished growth was, in 
fact, a tendency, not a political choice.     
After announcing the new numbers, Papandreou promised to protect the more 
vulnerable and the middle class. However, the finance minister had no choice. As specified by 
Matthias Matthijs (2014, p. 103), Greece abstained from two national shock absorbers, 
namely external devaluation and domestic fiscal stimulus, in order to adhere to the euro. 
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Without any solidarity mechanism, the Greek government started a program of fiscal 
austerity. 
Greece’s credibility with other European countries sapped. The deficit was worse than 
expected and did not meet the Maastricht criteria. Even though France and Germany avoided 
the SGP, their stance hardened due to the case of Greek fake data.  Contrary to expectations of 
any financial support, the Ecofin and the ECB demanded Greece fix its problem after 
Papandreou announcement that the government debt for 2009 was the triple of the expected 
(FEATHERSTONE, 2011, p. 202). In a press conference, the chair of the Eurogroup, Jean-
Claude Juncker, announced that “the game is over, we need serious statistics” (DEUTSCHE 
WELLE, 2009). In January 2010, EUROSTAT, the European agency of statistics, established 
that Greek data was not reliable to seek verifiable information (FEATHERSTONE, 2011, p. 
199). 
Financial markets panicked about the possibility of a Greek default, provoking a 
European “Lehman moment”. Fear that other European countries also had falsified their data 
pervaded economic analysts, distressing the European bond market. Rating agencies 
downgraded Greek bonds to “junk status”. Juncker pointed out personally to Constantinou the 
existence of economic imbalances within the Eurozone, affirming that the evolution of wage 
costs in Greece was faster than in other European countries, thus the Greek economy 
remained uncompetitive within the bloc (PAPACONSTANTINOU, 2016, p 36).      
Contrarily to the chair of the Eurogroup position, there were reports of Greek 
misconduct with data since 2004, which provoked an infringement procedure against Greece 
by the European Commission. Moreover, Constantinou affirms that the European 
Commission knew that the Greek government faked their economic data. According to the 
Greek finance minister (2016, p. 29), there was a note from the Commission that was never 
made public stating the increasing Greek debts, noting that “Should these trends continue over 
the year the central government deficit would exceed 10% of GDP, which contrasts with the 
[…] of 5% of GDP”. Additionally, Athens had already provided false deficit figures between 
1997 and 2003, so the Commission was conscious about successive breaches of the EU 
budget rules (PARKER; ATKINS, 2004).   
Before the crisis, Greece used cheap credit available to sustain its economic growth. 
The European Union saw Greek efforts to reduce its debt and did not pressure it. The Greek 
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government made a deal with Goldman Sachs, letting Greece swap a small portion of its debt, 
thus reducing its debt immediately in exchange of future payments to the investment bank. 
The credit that appeared as swap was thus dismissed from Greek debt statistics (STORY; 
THOMAS JUNIOR; SCHWARTZ, 2010). The process served to Greece as an incentive to 
borrow more, thus promoting an illusion created by cheap credit. After the crash, the situation 
turned upside down, and Greece was unable to finance itself.       
As Greek politicians needed to combine clientelistic favours and rent-seeking in its 
decisions, it diminished the possibilities of reforms and centred it towards higher government 
spending. George Papandreou faced a dilemma between legitimacy or responsibility to deal 
with the Greek economic crisis. Peter Mair (2009, p. 10) states that parties make 
commitments to win elections, but may not be able to comply with it when in government due 
to responsibilities, thereby undermining their legitimacy with the electorate. Successive Greek 
governments increased public debt since the 1990s, keeping support with the public sector 
and strong unions through high wages and other benefits. In government, they were never 
pressured to choose between pragmatism or their electorate. 
Austerity aside, Greece remained with the final option of default. That measure 
signified an exit from the Euro, reestablishing a devaluated drachma and high inflation. 
However, the flow of capital flight from Greece would heavily damage the country. Besides, 
the possibility of “Grexit” could be devastating to the European banking sector, especially to 
French and German banks, whose debts intertwined with Greek finances (FEATHERSTONE; 
PAPADIMITRIOU, 2017, p. 245-246). It would also entail the precedent of European 
countries leaving the Eurozone, an issue never established in any treaty.  
Accepting austerity measures to decrease deficits, increase competitiveness and 
remain in the euro, Papandreou reunited with European leaders to discuss the crisis on March 
25. Germans were a sceptic that the French approach towards the Euro could lead to a transfer 
union, disrespecting the article 125 of no-bailout to European countries. In the German view, 
support for Eastern European countries did not fit into the rule as the IMF rescued them. To 
guarantee that there would be no risk of burden-sharing, the German Chancellor, Angela 
Merkel, insisted in parliament that a contingency plan would only be accepted if the IMF was 
involved (STRUPCZEWSKI; TOYER, 2010).  
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The possibility of calling the IMF was polemical and encountered resistance among 
European leaders. Jean-Claude Trichet, president of the ECB, opposed the IMF because it 
would hint that European institutions alone could not resolve the Greek crisis. Besides, it 
could serve as a stimulus for other European countries to avoid complying with the 
eurozone’s budget deficit rules. Sarkozy, wary of Dominique Strauss-Kahn political 
ambitions, was reluctant to involve the IMF due to his belief that the principle of “European 
Solidarity” should be enough to halt instability in the European Economic Area, already 
constrained by fears that Greece would default its debts (BLUSTEIN, 2016, p. 98). 
The initial reluctance to involve external actors in the discussions did not impede 
George Papandreou of conversations with Strauss-Kahn about technical issues. 
Papaconstantinou (2016, p. 72) affirms that Papandreou and Strauss-Kahn talked in January 
2010, during the World Economic Forum in Davos about the possibility of IMF aid to Greece. 
The IMF president said that the institution’s mission was to lend money to countries that lost 
access to markets, but Greece depended on the approval of European countries that were 
present at the IMF board of directors, as they could block the Greek bid for help. Besides, the 
ECB would also need to support the IMF, as recommendations made by the Fund usually 
suggested alterations in the currency, but with an independent Central Bank, systemic 
solutions in Greece had to be discarded (BLUSTEIN, 2016, p. 107).  
The European leaders' reunion ended with an assurance that they were willing to assist 
Greece in cooperation with the IMF. In the solution denominated “Ultima Ratio doctrine”, 
Germany and France accepted the IMF involvement in the eurozone to look after Greece’s 
economic and budgetary policies (BLUSTEIN, 2016, p. 98). European countries would 
liberate coordinated bilateral loans complemented with IMF financing. However, Greece 
would be subject to high interest rates to stimulate a return to financial markets in a brief 
period. Additionally, the rescue deal would be valid only if Greece accepted a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MoU), permitting to be subject to regular observation by European 
institutions and the IMF. 
According to Jean Pisani-Ferry (2015, p. 78), markets had already realised that Greece 
needed outside help, but European countries were reluctant to provide it. Northerner European 
countries, led by Germany, were emphatic that “European solidarity” was not in question and 
that Greece should comply with the rules to stabilise itself. Merkel even declared that “a good 
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European is not necessarily one who offers help quickly. A good European is one that respects 
the European treaties and national rights so that stability of the Eurozone is not 
damaged” (MERKEL apud STRUPCZEWSKI; TOYER, 2010, 2010).              
The IMF was hence called to join the European Commission and the European Central 
Bank, configuring a group that would be known as the “Troika”, to oversee Greece. The IMF 
was in a different situation than it used to be, as the Fund would support a central bank to 
monitor a European country, instead of orienting customary changes in monetary policy. As 
stated by Blustein (2016, p. 116), the IMF would hide its preferences to maintain a coherent 
position with the other two institutions. The most divisive topic among them was how fast 
Greece should be required to implement orthodox measures.   
On May 2, the Eurogroup, the eurozone’s finance ministers meeting, declared a 
package of €110 billion to help Greece. Member States of the eurozone would contribute with 
the sum of €80 billion, giving €30 billion in the first year (EUROGROUP, 2010). The 
requirement for the financial aid was strong policy conditionality, based on the program 
negotiated with Greece by the ECB, the Commission, and the IMF.  
Greece faced immense difficulties to raise cash even to refinance itself, as investors 
looked only for German or American bonds to protect themselves from the crisis. Papandreou 
adopted a soft-bargaining strategy, as there was no way to pay the debts and the only option 
that remained was to accept the rescue plan. Zahariadis (2016, p. 9), interviewing one of the 
high-level negotiations Greek participants, registered that “we had no idea what we were 
writing”, assuring that it was merely a cut-and-paste job from other memoranda.           
The reluctant and slow European solution to the Greek situation spread the sensation 
that the economic crisis could disseminate through the eurozone. Irish and Portuguese spreads 
reached the level of the Greek ones, menacing the economic stability within the bloc. Jean 
Pisani-Ferry (2014, p. 79) asserts that fears of the Greek crisis spiralling out of control ended 
up inducing the formulation of agreements. The American administration accompanied the 
Greek crisis with attention, constantly lobbying for the Europeans to act (TOOZE, 2018, p. 
366). Until that moment, European leaders were not prepared to make a systemic set of 
economic policies to forestall the crisis, preferring instead to emphasise the moral hazard of 
macroeconomic imbalances within the eurozone. Put just, European leaders became aware 
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that the economic stability of their own countries depended on small countries within the 
eurozone (JONES, 2012). 
Contrary to what Papandreou promised during the Greek elections of 2009, the Greek 
prime minister raised pay cuts in the public sector, cancelled contract workers, raised the 
minimum pension age, increased taxes, and lifted caps on the private sector. Unable to 
devalue the currency, the Greek government had to cut spending and public investment. The 
compromise with the austerity program proposed by European leaders heavily hit the 
electorate. As Greece implemented the conservative economic program, support for the Greek 
prime minister and PASOK fell.   
In periods of economic activity, the Greek state preferred to increase taxes rather than 
targeted cut spending. The demand-side of the economic adjustment in Greece forced PASOK 
to abandon its ties with interest groups and use the funds that remained to keep the state 
functioning. Without complying with its commitments to public-sector unions and other 
associations, PASOK disarranged the possibility of aligning preferences to soften the 
economic burden of the adjustment, thus increasing political disunity, as coordination 
between groups became challenging to rectify. 
The clientelistic cooptation enforced by PASOK depended on the economic expansion 
and the political capacity of the prime minister to bargain positions and avoided cuts in 
strategic areas. Party patronage in Greek bureaucracy was strong because of the use of 
resources to increase support of the electorate (AFONSO; ZARTALOUDIS; 
PAPADOPOULOS, 2014, p. 320). However, after Greece signed the MoU in 2010, 
establishing the conditions to be met and justify the continued issuance of funding, the 
political mechanisms that kept PASOK’s support in government broke (FEATHERSTONE, 
2015, p. 296). The Greek crisis affected the clientelistic networks because the economic 
adjustment enforced a new paradigm upon the Greek variety of capitalism. 
The bailout program delimited by the troika expected the Greek GDP to decrease by 
14.5 per cent over five years. Deep cuts in social spending such as schools and hospitals also 
accompanied constant monitoring from the European institutions. Kevin Featherstone (2011, 
p. 207) considers the agreement as the beginning of a new form of European economic 
governance within the eurozone. The Greek administration lost control of the reforms agenda 
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to the troika, impeding any political manoeuvring by Papandreou to regain support from the 
electorate. 
There was concern that Greece would be unable to respect the budget discipline 
required to guarantee a satisfactory performance to creditors. Greece had already defaulted 
three times in its history, during the 1830s, the 1890s, and the 1930s (FEATHERSTONE, 
2011, p. 205). Moreover, contrasting agendas between Greece and creditors created 
difficulties to settle any assurance of future mutual compatibility, as PASOK worried about 
the next elections and the troika rested with the timetables (FEATHERSTONE, 2015, p. 303). 
The troika emphasised reforms that altered the whole shape of the Greek economy. 
The Greek government was obliged to comply with the set of administrative reforms required 
to satisfy the terms of the bailout. Additionally, they prescribed enhanced efficiency and 
effectiveness in the public service, working to improve data quality available to the Greek 
government. Changes in financial management affected the budget management, that was 
also responsible for tackling corruption. The troika demanded a change of policies and 
practices, reducing the Greek government’s staff that were protected by the constitution. 
Unable to contain the external capacity to alter policies, PASOK’s bases collapsed without 
expansion of the public sector and the shrank capacity of distributive politics. 
It was not enough to appease markets. Fears of a general sovereign debt crisis emerged 
in Italy, France, and Portugal. European leaders urged the European Central Bank to act, but 
the Germans, the Dutch, and the Finns vetoed. The principle of an independent central bank 
was immune to political quarrels. Accordingly to its primary duty, The ECB was created to act 
against inflation, not to buy government bonds. Trichet wanted European countries to adopt 
austerity policies instead of any possibility that would involve spending the European 
taxpayer money in the bond markets. If the ECB proceeded with that expansionary option, it 
would mutualise European debt among Europeans, promoting the very policy that Germans 
and Dutch were against since the negotiations to establish the EMU. 
The European deadlock faced an impasse in how to finance the bailout fund and the 
legal implications of the agreement. According to Löw and Gamely (2014, p.75), The 
possibility of debt mutualisation was discarded because Germany would not accept any form 
of risk-sharing. The solution developed by European leaders was to create the European 
Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), that would assist eurozone member states in distress. 
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European governments funded it with €440 billion, plus €60 billion of the Commission and 
€250 billion bestowed by the IMF (COPELOVITCH; FRIEDEN; WALTER, 2013, p. 5). The 
ECB was not going to be directly involved. Functioning as a private-sector organisation at the 
tax haven of Luxembourg, the EFSF permitted Eurozone governments to transfer money 
without involving any supranational European institution.   
 On May 9, the Council of Economic and Financial Affairs (Ecofin) announced the 
creation of the EFSF, a rescue mechanism to prevent unsustainable debt, shortly before 
markets opened in Asia in order to appease economic distress that battered the eurozone 
economy. Nonetheless, the EFSF would take months to be completed, and markets needed 
immediate support. Trichet, satisfied with the EFSF agreement, decided to intervene. During 
the same day, Trichet proposed to the ECB Board to purchase Greek government bonds on the 
secondary markets to contain the rise of spreads, which gained the majority approval 
(PISANI-FERRY, 2014, p. 79).    
As a result, the ECB eased the standards for asset-backed securities, thus increasing 
liquidity in the euro area. The combined action of eurozone countries and the ECB to finance 
a Member State with a fund of €250 billion calmed the markets. However, the bailout of the 
eurozone created uncertainty as the ECB abandoned its commitment to the no-bailout clause, 
but indicating that financial aid to Greece was only temporary as the ECB overexposed it to a 
higher pressure to change its model of growth (FEATHERSTONE, 2011, p. 203).    
The European Council eventually transformed the EFSF in December 2010 into a 
treaty-based financial institution. The reformulation of the EFSF into the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), served to function as a permanent crisis resolution operation for the 
countries of the Euro area. It would begin in 2012, replacing the EFSF. Moreover, the 
European institutions discussed the creation of the European semester,  a review of annual 5
budgets made by European states, and altered the SGP’s 60 per cent rule on debt, postponing 
penalties until ensuring that debt was downward and sustainable. 
It was surprising that the Greek economy, corresponding to 2.7 per cent of the EU in 
2010, created such an impact in the eurozone. Prospects for recovery were low, as in 
agreement with Orfeu Fioretos (2012, p. 306), specialists on the political economy of Greece 
were sceptic that the conflictual party system, the culture of clientelism, the rent-seeking 
 Further information of the European Semester can be found in the annex A.5
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public sector unions, and the small export sector could be adapted to satisfy the preferences of 
EU institutions. 
Paralysed by fiscal obligations that kept its economic autonomy in check while the 
public sector resisted abiding by the losses of its benefits, Papandreou transformed the Greek 
political landscape. According to Takis Pappas (2013, p. 43), without the funds to guarantee 
the political order and the collapse of the two-party system, the whole Greek political spectre 
became an extremely multipartidary polarised system. The electoral expectations of the 2012 
elections ignored PASOK and ND’s dominance, pulverising its support and giving space to 
radical movements such as SYRIZA and Golden Dawn, a far-right movement.   
As the Greek political situation worsened, Papandreou saw himself isolated. In the 
creditor’s view, the Greek government was unable to deliver the downsizing promised to the 
Troika. Furthermore, the EU continued pressuring Greece to reduce posts in the public 
administration (FEATHERSTONE, 2015, p. 307).  
Northerner Europeans mistrusted ECB operation, as they interpreted the situation as 
an attempt of sharing transfers from northern Europe to irresponsible southerners. The action 
of the European Central Bank to bailout Greece caused a division among central bankers and 
the board of the ECB.  
The Germans continued sceptic about the possibility of transfers. Axel Weber, the 
president of the Bundesbank, favoured the purchase of government bonds. However, the fear 
of German hostility to the proposal forced him to change his opinion, consequently opposing 
the ECB operation together with the German board member of the ECB, Jürgen Stark 
(TOOZE, 2018, p. 375). The German government was in an awkward position, as it had to 
choose between bailout Greece or the German banking system that lent irresponsibly, as it 
exported credit dependence to other European countries (FEATHERSTONE, 2011, p. 203). 
In March 2011, after negotiations to strengthen the SGP, the European Commission 
presented the “Six-Pack”, a combination of six legislative proposals that would monitor and 
prevent economic imbalances and excessive deficits. Composed of five EU regulations and 
one EU directive, the package did not require treaty changes and could be implemented in the 
SGP, reorienting the economic governance of the euro area towards a strong rule-based 
framework. Establishing stronger macroeconomic surveillance, the “Six-Pact” meant 
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guarantees from the ECB that it would buy sovereign debt on markets under the Securities 
Market Program (SPM).  
The necessity to enforce surveillance mechanisms happened because the crisis 
worsened, interweaving other European countries besides Greece. After a sequence of 
localised crisis, Ireland (fall 2010), Italy (summer 2011), Portugal (spring 2011), and Spain 
(summer 2011) accepted the conditions and agreed to implement orthodox economic policies 
in their economies, commonly denominated as GIIPS. In addition to the purchase of Greek 
bonds, the SPM also acted on Irish, Italian, Portuguese, and Spanish bonds. Portugal and 
Ireland received bailouts from the European Union and the IMF. The ECB purchased Italian 
and Spanish sovereign bonds.  
Even though the ECB and Germany carried on the fiscal stimulus necessarily to rescue 
Greece, there was its dissatisfaction about Keynesian policies to bail out European countries 
that were in distress. Senior officials at the ECB expressed in interviews to Henry Farrell and 
John Quiggin (2017, p. 274) that it was necessary to “stress financial confidence, EU rules on 
deficit reduction, and the need to return to fiscal consolidation”.     
German policymakers and voters were consonant in opposing any activist fiscal 
policy. Notwithstanding pressure for a stronger stimulus from other European countries, the 
United States, and even German large firms and unions, Germany resisted and recapitulated 
that “markets would brutally punish states that did not move towards fiscal 
austerity" (FARRELL; QUIGGIN; 2017, p. 278). The lack of formal international institutions 
to coordinate macroeconomic governance permitted Germany not to assume any compromise, 
only taking part in a G20 informal calling for fiscal stimulus until global signs of recovery 
appeared.     
The German interpretation of Greek SGP breach did not mean an equivalence with the 
German and French transgression of the pact in 2005. The large economies breach of the rules 
did not render sanctions, indicating that it lacked enough credibility to be accepted by 
Member States (FIORETOS, 2013, p. 313). Nevertheless, in the German view and contrary to 
other European leaders calls for flexibility, breaking the SGP rules meant that it should be 
stricter, as Friedrich Merz, the CDU leader, recalled in 2003 (MATTHIJS; BLYTH; 2017, p. 
5). 
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 In place of giving financial flexibility under the principle of solidarity to European 
countries embroiled in crisis, Germany and Trichet made the political decision to allow the 
ECB solely pursue price stability while the crisis menaced the European banking system 
(MATTHIJS; BLYTH; 2017, p. 7). In sum, the rules established by the Brussels-Frankfurt 
consensus continued influencing the economic governance of the eurozone. 
2.3 Austerity, “Grexit” and the eurozone crisis 
Disagreements over the decisions taken by the European Central Bank in February 
2011 resulted at the resignation of Axel Weber, president of the Bundesbank president. One of 
the favourites to succeed Trichet, Weber defended sternly that the ECB had the sole 
responsibility of defending price stability. In his view, the ECB was insulated from the 
economic welfare of its member states or of the eurozone at all (TOOZE, 2018, p. 389). 
There were clear signs that Greece was insolvent. Unable to command its monetary 
policy to improve competitiveness, as devaluation was under the full responsibility of the 
ECB, Papandreou continued the budgetary adjustment proposed by the Troika. However, 
there was constant complains of the reforms due to the reluctance of the Greek administration 
to target sectors sensible to its electoral interest (FEATHERSTONE, 2015, p. 303).   
From May to June, upheaval against fiscal austerity emerged. Hundreds of thousands 
of participants protested at Syntagma square against the cuts in pensions, salaries, and social 
services. Disillusioned with PASOK, Greeks campaigned for SYRIZA, a far-left party that 
interlaced elements of antiglobalisation with ideas from the Communist party. Denouncing a 
supposed “diktat” derived from German imperialism in Europe, SYRIZA supporters divided 
the streets with radicals from the neofascist Golden Dawn, that clashed against the police and 
menaced leftists.  
According to Kevin Featherstone (2017, p. 245), Greece was bailed out assuming that 
its economy would shrink 5.5 per cent, but economic growth would appear in two years. In 
reality, there was no growth, and the economy plummeted 17 per cent. It was clear that 
Greece would not be able to access capital markets in 2012, requiring new loans from the 
Troika or the reduction of Greece’s obligations with its creditors. Furthermore, debt 
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restructuring was out of the question to the ECB and Germany, refusing the extension of 
payments and the interest rate owned in April 2011 (CONSTANTINOU, 2016, p. 202).  
Trichet wanted European countries taking over the process of bond market 
stabilisation that the ECB initiated. The EFSF began operating in 2010, but “its legal status 
was frail, funding was voluntary, bilateral, and should be used only in emergencies to buy 
new debt from states shut out of the market” (TOOZE, 2018, p. 401). On the other hand, the 
possibility of establishing a European fund for bond market stabilisation could appeal to some 
European countries such as France but was declined by Merkel due to the political cost of 
such measure. Domestic factors in Germany such as the coalition between the CDU (Christian 
Democratic Union) and the FDP (Free Democratic Parties) made any scale of burden-sharing 
too politically costly for Merkel to bear. Therefore, Merkel pressured Trichet to continue the 
ECB policy of bond purchases. However, the ECB asserted its independence from European 
governments when it decided to raise interest rates because of higher inflation in Germany 
and other (Northern) European countries. Figure 5 displays the capital flow from Greece and 
transfers to Germany through TARGET2 (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross 
Settlement Express Transfer System). 
Figure 5 – Net TARGET2 Balance within the Eurosystem (Euro Billions) 
  
Source: Author’s elaboration, based on data from the Euro Crisis Monitor. 
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The result of Trichet’s decision caused a massive money flow from the GIIPS to 
Northern European countries.  While Northern countries stocked a massive amount of credit, 6
Greece entered into an economic crisis because it had no substitute source of cash to recover 
from the capital flight that exited its banks. In 2010, Strauss-Kahn had already advocated for a 
“European Resolution Authority”, which was a jointly funded bank to fix the disequilibrium 
that afflicted the eurozone (BLUSTEIN, 2016, p. 332). Privately, the IMF grew increasingly 
dissatisfied with solutions proposed by European institutions to individual cases without 
considering the crisis as a systemic problem in the EU (BAN, 2015; CLIFT, 2018).   
In June 2011, rating agencies downgraded Greece one more time to the lowest score 
attributed to a sovereign borrower. Over July, markets questioned that if the Eurozone could 
not fund Greece, it certainly would not be able to bail bigger states, such as Spain or Italy. The 
reluctance of European leaders to settle an agreement created further mistrust in the markets, 
thus capital continued flowing from Southern European countries.    
Nicolas Sarkozy, worried that contagion from Greece and others could affect France, 
encountered Merkel on July 21 to end the impasse over the economic crisis in Europe. After 
the meeting, they decided that Greece would receive a second bailout of €109 billion, interest 
rates lowered to 3.5 per cent, and maturities would extend from 15 to 30 years. Moreover, 
Private Sector Involvement (PSI) would be accepted in Greece voluntarily, the ECB would be 
indemnified in case of losses, and the recapitalisation of Greek banks would come out of 
Troika funds. Talks about reducing Greece’s debt burden would happen if it achieved primary 
surpluses. In terms of economic governance, Merkel and Sarkozy emphasised that PSI applied 
only to Greece. The EFSF would be strengthened (becoming the ESM) to create credit lines 
for Italy and Spain. It would no longer function as an “ultima ratio” solution, but as an agency 
to stabilise markets and anticipate economic distress in European countries.  
The Greek situation remained difficult as debt targeted 143 per cent of GDP in 2011. It 
became politically burdensome for Papandreou to defend a new Memorandum of 
Understanding in Greece as there was no assurance that orthodoxy would imply discussions 
on debt relief (FEATHERSTONE, 2017, p. 245). Furthermore, the recession that appalled the 
 TARGET2 is the real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system owned and operated by the Eurosystem. Central 6
Banks and commercial banks can submit payment orders in euro to TARGET2, where they are processed and 
settled in central bank money. It settles payments related to the Eurosystem’s monetary policy operations, as well 
as bank-to-bank and commercial transactions. (EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, 2019).
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Greek electorate distorted the image of the troika, becoming extremely difficult to justify a 
political narrative that legitimised the European institutions in Greece. With plummeting 
popularity, other mainstream parties distanced themselves from PASOK to avoid electoral 
losses. Even New Democracy left its fiscal orthodoxy to oppose PASOK, refusing to form a 
coalition in 2011 due to the political cost of austerity.       
Papandreou, dissatisfied that the recession was deeper than expected, affirmed that it 
was also increasingly difficult for him to continue with conservative measures. Adopting 
revised targets to comply under the Medium Term Fiscal Strategy (MTFS), the Greek prime 
minister started negotiations for a second bailout. As Zahariadis points out (2016, p. 11), 
Papandreou abandoned the soft stance adopted in order to negotiate the first bailout and 
pursued a hard bargaining strategy because of his low domestic support.  
Papandreou renegotiated the bailout terms with creditors in October 2011, obtaining a 
haircut of 50 per cent of its private debt, so that Greek debt could lower to levels below 120 
per cent of GDP. Nevertheless, the terms determining more orthodox measures suffered strong 
criticism from all other parties. The rejection of austerity in Greece elevated fringe parties and 
made ND more stringent. Conscious that assumptions that it was possible to remain in the 
euro and refuse the agreements influenced the opposition to PASOK, the Greek prime 
minister proposed a referendum on the bailout terms. That measure would force the 
opposition to change its discourse and surge PASOK’s support along the Greek electorate. 
However, the referendum proposal received a strong backlash. 
Domestically, his party rebelled against him for complying with the MoU and 
demanded his resignation. Nonetheless, Antonis Samaras, leader of ND, abandoned the 
pragmatism and supported the referendum defending the bailout terms. Externally, Europeans 
leaders expressed disapproval when they called Papandreou to explain himself during the G20 
Summit in Cannes on November 2. Nicolas Sarkozy frowningly criticised Papandreou, who 
saw the operation as a gamble that could cost the whole stabilisation plan. Furthermore, 
European leaders reiterated that the referendum should pose a clear question on Greece’s 
permanence in the eurozone instead of accepting the MoU terms (PAPACONSTANTINOU, 
2016, p. 225). 
The possibility of “Grexit” also appeared in the news after Papandreou called for the 
referendum on the Greek bailout in November. Even though European leaders pressured the 
  96
Greek minister to back off, they could not make any convincing intimidation as “there was no 
legal base in the EU treaties for the eviction of a eurozone member” (FEATHERSTONE, 
2017, p. 245). Embedded in the “Ever-Closer Union” logic, which meant that European 
integration is irreversible to European member states, leaving was an option up to the Greek 
government. When Wolfgang Schäuble—the German finance minister—recommended the 
idea after the referendum announcement, he was swiftly rebuked by Merkel in such a manner 
that the proposal never turned into an official European statement.  
What dismounted the idea of the referendum was Samara’s suddenly agreement with 
the troika program after attacking PASOK’s economic policies. Papandreou was not isolated 
in his defence of the bailout deal anymore, so European leaders felt assured that other Greek 
politicians would continue the proposals set by the troika. Back in Athens, the Greek prime 
minister cancelled the referendum and gained the vote of confidence with the support of his 
party, but stepped down afterwards, liberating the premiership to a technocratic government 
that would lead the country to elections after signing the bailout terms. 
Meanwhile, Nicolas Sarkozy convened European leaders during the G20 Summit in 
Cannes to discuss the Italian crisis on November 4. However, they became astonished when 
realised that Barack Obama, the president of the United States, was present in the room as 
chairman. Through Sarkozy’s invitation, Obama demanded Merkel to cede on political and 
legal issues and attain an agreement relative to the eurozone crisis (SPIEGEL, 2014). The 
French and American president were convinced that the EFSF was insufficient to guarantee a 
flexible program of bond-buying. However, Merkel refused any prospect of a proposal. 
The Bundesbank mistrusted any plan that would transfer influence to the EFSF, as it 
had already caused an entrenchment among German political actors. After Weber’s 
resignation, Jürgen Stark, the German member of the ECB’s board, stepped down as well in 
September 2011 due to differences over the ECB’s program of sovereign bonds purchases. 
Notwithstanding German economists objection to any form of economic burden-sharing, the 
German Constitutional Court (GCC) in Karlsruhe took up the question, judging that the 
economic programs agreed thus far did not violate the German constitution. The GCC defined 
that the German government should seek prior approval of the Bundestag for all future EFSF 
programs and ruled out in advance the creation of Eurobonds.  
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The purchase of sovereign bonds from European countries in crisis was debated in the 
European Commission and by academics for a long time as a solution to harmonise the 
structural divergence within the eurozone. Think tanks in Europe had already developed the 
idea between 2009 and 2010 (MATTHIJS; MCNAMARA, 2015, p. 236). The European 
Commission worked on the idea in a Green Paper, but instead of using the term ‘Eurobonds’, 
negatively associated with money transfer in rich countries, they called them ‘Stability bonds’ 
(MATTHIJS; MCNAMARA, 2015, p. 238). The Commission’s effort was not praised in 
Germany, where newspapers, tabloids and politicians from centre parties were in opposition 
to any form of debt socialisation (MATTHIJS; MCNAMARA, 2015, p. 240). 
 As specified by Johnston and Regan (2017, p. 7), free movement of capital and the 
removal of adjustment mechanisms that controlled inflation privileged export-oriented growth 
models such as the German and the Dutch. On the other hand, Eurobonds could redistribute 
the gains obtained by some models and socialise the costs among the eurozone. However, 
German resistance to the idea of Eurobonds stemmed from social processes - in this case, the 
German cultural disposition to view the crisis in solely one framework. 
German public opinion saw the crisis as a classic balance-of-payment misbalance that 
affected European countries that had become far dependent on foreign lending 
(COPELOVITCH; FRIEDEN; WALTER, 2013, p. 5). Systemic approaches, such as 
sovereign debt purchases, were translated as money transfers from creditor European 
countries to poor ones. The argument of moral hazard in Germany was too strong to consider 
a systemic approach to the Eurozone crisis instead of national economic ones. Thus, it was 
not feasible for the German chancellor to acquiesce in American and French demands. 
The crisis would not be solved by individual economic measures, because the EMU is 
not an optimal monetary area. As Peter Hall (2012, p. 356) clarifies, the single currency was a 
political project designed to bind a unified Germany to Europe. However, the euro was in 
charge of an independent central bank without the capacity to co-ordinate policy over the 
medium-term (HALL, 2012, p. 357). The lack of a coordinated strategy would inevitably 
cause shocks of preferences inside the EMU. In the eurozone, the GIIPS would prefer the 
ECB to buy sovereign bonds and devaluate the Euro. However, Northerner European 
countries would lose competitiveness in the international markets, hence entailing a deadlock 
between nations. The solution adopted by the troika was to give financial bailouts to the 
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GIIPS in case they accepted the MoU that fixed fiscal orthodoxy. As currency manipulation 
was not possible, European countries had no alternative. Nevertheless, the bailouts eroded the 
northern public opinion towards Southern European countries. Under a problematic domestic 
coalition that was wary of sharing economic risk, Merkel preferred to achieve solutions by 
fiscal adjustments in countries that accepted the MoU instead of proposing systemic reforms 
that would menace her hegemony within the German political landscape.  
After the G20 summit reunion, there was no satisfying solution in sight to both sides. 
The European Commission proposed in November two new regulations to improve budgetary 
surveillance and monitoring of member states facing financial instability, receiving financial 
assistance, or exiting a financial assistance program (MATTHIJS; BLYTH, 2017, p. 9). 
Termed as “Two-Pack”, it would serve to underpin the “Six-Pack”.  
On December 1, Mario Draghi—the former governor of the Banca d’Italia that 
succeeded Jean-Claude Trichet as the new president of the European Central Bank—proposed 
the “Fiscal Compact” —or Treaty on Stability, Coordination, and Governance (TSCG)—an 
intergovernmental agreement. Although it was outside of the framework of the Lisbon Treaty, 
hence not a European Law, the TSCG would enforce fiscal rules in the same way that an 
independent central bank ensures price stability as its fundamental monetary policy.  
As a cover for French, American, and other Europeans bids to increase the size of the 
EFSF or permit debt mutualisation, Germany proceeded only with the alteration of the EFSF 
into the permanent ESM in July 2012. On the other hand, the TSCG consolidated the 
institutional design that German envisioned for the eurozone. The fiscal compact established 
that European budgets should make a surplus or remain balanced. Deficits would be restricted 
to 0.5 per cent of GDP. The European Court of Justice was to oversee those rules at a national 
level, ruling that states with deficit superior to 3 per cent of GDP would be subject to 
sanctions unless a qualified majority of states opposed the measure. 
Furthermore, it could require that countries with debt levels above 60 per cent of GDP 
adopted debt reduction policies (TOOZE, 2018, p. 468). Amid dramatic tensions resulted 
from clashes between Greeks and the riot police during the end of October, Greek leaders of 
PASOK, ND, and LAOS agreed to declare joint support for the appointment of Lucas 
Papademos as the new prime minister. A former governor of the Bank of Greece and ECB 
vice-president, Papademos was sworn minister on November 11 and would lead a coalition 
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composed by the three parties in a transition government to ensure the negotiations of the new 
bailout.  
The manifestations in Greece that happened during 2011 intensified when compared to 
the ones in 2010 (KARYOTIS; RÜDIG, 2016, p. 2). The occupation of central squares by a 
new movement called “Aganaktismeni”, inspired by similar actions done by the Spanish 
“Indignados”, evinced the importance of social media and the presence of different positions 
through the political spectrum to strengthen Greek protests against the government. Due to the 
protests, anti-austerity parties displayed new forms to show their dissatisfaction of Greek 
mainstream politicians to the electorate. Inspiring a new group of protesters that was older 
and politically alienated, differing from the social protest culture that dominated Greek 
politics until 2010, the Aganaktismeni represented a change in Greek politics (KARYOTIS; 
RÜDIG, 2016, p. 7). 
The Greek crisis continued to conjure fears in Europe in 2012. Papademos scheduled 
the Greek elections to April 2012. The new prime minister pretended to run, but his lack of 
legitimacy as a technocratic governor denoted that New Democracy would obtain the 
premiership in the next election. Apprehension for the results summoned shadowy discussions 
among European leaders about Greece’s fate in the euro. European governments developed a 
“Grexit” plan of last resort until August 2012, concluding that Greece would be forced either 
way to attain to fiscal responsibility outside the eurozone (TOOZE, 2018, p. 475). Schäuble, 
the German finance minister, even proposed to suspend the Greek elections to avoid risk the 
key measures settled with the troika be scrapped by the new Greek government 
(WEISMANN; PEEL, 2012).  
Papademos implemented the restructuring program and negotiated the terms of private 
creditors haircut before the Greek elections. Nonetheless, the reduction of debt resulted in its 
further concentration to public creditors. Ergo, public debt replaced private ones (BLYTH, 
2013). Concerns of German and French universal banks exposition to a Greek default 
dwindled as Greece became dependent on the European Central Bank, the EFSF, and the IMF.   
On May 6, a significant cataclysm ensued the Greek elections. PASOK and ND gained 
cumulatively only 42 per cent of total votes, a minor number compared with the 77 per cent 
that they obtained in 2009. PASOK and New Democracy lost their bases of support, which 
scattered through new parties, so there was no coalition. PASOK was decimated, and ND 
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weakened, became the main party. The elections of 2012 turned the populist bipartidarism that 
reigned in Greek politics into a dysfunctional system, unleashing an extreme pluralism as a 
wave of parties such as SYRIZA, ANEL, KKE, DIMAR, LAOS, Golden Dawn (AX), and 
DAOS entered parliament (PAPPAS, 2013, p. 41).  
Trying to establish a new coalition that would comply with the agreement that 
Papademos settled with the troika, ND invited all parties to take part of the government 
except AX but still failed to form a cabinet, prompting a new election in June 2012. After 
numerous remarks of European politicians that the Greek election result was a referendum on 
the euro, Antonis Samaras was nominated prime minister in June after contriving a new 
coalition composed by PASOK, ND, and DIMAS. The far-left party SYRIZA appeared as a 
significant force in Greek politics, almost beating New Democracy in the new round of 
elections.  
With a dispersed Greek parliament, Samaras started his premiership with new cuts to 
meet the targets set by the troika programme (PISANI-FERRY, 2014, p. 95). However, the 
three-party coalition engaged in intra-government disagreements, representing difficulties for 
the troika to arrange a consensus that could align the institutions' interests with the Greek 
cabinet (FEATHERSTONE, 2015, p. 296).  
The pulverised Greek party-system still revealed a definite polarisation. According to 
Fioretos (2013, p. 306), the elections of May and June showed that the political environment 
divided parties between the ones that agreed to the terms of the bailout and the ones against 
the troika. Former main parties, such as PASOK and ND, continued to approve austerity, even 
if meant causing disillusionment with the electorate, as Samaras did when he was against 
austerity reforms - only to implement them when he entered government in order to keep 
Greece in the euro. New parties that entered in the political scene, such as Golden Dawn and 
SYRIZA, got support due to resentment against Northern European countries, claiming that 
the crisis was caused by mainstream political parties that were disinterested in the agonies of 
the Greek people (VASILOPOULOU; HALIKIOPOULOU; 2015, p. 46).  
The suicide of Dimitris Christoulas in April 2012, was a symptom of the electorate 
revolt against the conservative measures that Greek leadership implemented. Rising 
unemployment, mass foreclosures, and higher personal debt stimulated riots and clashes with 
the police. The collapse of public health, derived from cuts in health spending that ranged 
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from €10.6 billion in 2009 to €7 billion in 2012, impacted a society that was ramped by the 
only HIV upsurge in Europe in decades; a malaria outbreak in the southern Greek regions of 
Lakonia and East Attica; a massive increase in homelessness; and rise in suicide rates 
(STUCKLER; BASU; 2013, p. 90-91). Nonetheless, Greek representatives of the Ministry of 
Health were dismissive of such questions, accusing the statistics of taking into account North 
Africans or Eastern Europeans that travelled to Greece with HIV. The Greek Ministry also 
disregarded the surge of 17 per cent in overall suicide rates as “premature 
overinterpretation” (STUCKLER; BASU; 2013, p. 88). 
Negotiations between the Greek government and the troika continued as the IMF 
refused to continue in the negotiations unless Greece agreed to reduce public debt to 120 per 
cent of GDP by 2020. The discussions reached an agreement on November 27, when 
European leaders accepted to lower interest rates, maturity extension, interest payment 
deferrals, the passing on to Greece of profits made by the ECB on its Greek bonds portfolio, 
and a buyback operation by Greece to acquire Greek bonds at a discount, resulting in a 
disbursement of €49 billions on December 13. Nevertheless, the IMF remained dissatisfied 
with the operation, as it questioned in a World Economic Outlook report if Greek debt 
continued to be sustainable due to underestimations of fiscal multipliers that measure the 
effects of fiscal consolidation on the growth of budgetary programs by national governments 
(IMF, 2013).  
Institutionalised by the Fiscal Compact Treaty, constitutionalization of supply-side 
economics intermingled with the mainstream Greek political parties disposition to continue 
with the reforms created the ‘embedded orthodox regime’ in Greece (FIORETOS, 2013, p. 
315). In order to restructure the Greek economy with the Brussels-Frankfurt consensus, Greek 
elites created effective coordination instruments to held different societal segments 
accountable to European common fiscal and budgetary goals. The Greek economic 
adjustment had important implications in the Greek economy, as lower growth plummeted the 
capacity to recover from the clash, as figure 6 shows: 
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Figure 6 – Exports of goods and services (annual % growth)  7
!  
Source: Author’s elaboration, based on data from the World Bank, 2018. 
The 2010-2012 protests in Greece revealed a fracture in the euro architecture that was 
ignored by Greek mainstream parties. Although corruption and clientelism should be curbed, 
the scale of austerity brought new groups to protest alongside social movements. The result of 
the drastic program of fiscal orthodoxy that forecasted the reduction of the budget deficit was 
the rise in unemployment and income declines (HALL, 2012, p. 363). The continuity of the 
programme and the rise of a technocratic government in Greece unravelled the demand for 
democratic legitimacy in the troika proposals, an aspect that the EU ignored while the euro 
boomed (SHARPF, 1999). The successful agreements with the Troika notwithstanding, ND 
and PASOK, ignored the electorate, allowing the success of fringe parties such as SYRIZA 
that emerged from the 2011-2012 protests as the main political opposition to austerity.  
2.4 SYRIZA and the limits of legitimacy within the Eurozone Crisis 
 For detailed data, see Appendix A – table 37
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The Greek legislative elections of 2015 happened on January 25. In political terms, the 
elections represented a strong backlash against New Democracy and PASOK. The polls 
ousted ND from power and ended PASOK’s hegemony on the left. SYRIZA, a far-left 
populist party, won in a landslide, obtaining 36.3 per cent of the electorate, accumulating 149 
parliamentary seats in the 300-seat parliament. PASOK ended up with 4.7 per cent of Greek 
votes, far away from the 43.9 per cent that received in the 2009 legislative elections. 
Notwithstanding New Democracy promising a stricter stance against austerity in the 
campaign, Samaras’ conservative commitments contaminated the party.  
Alexis Tsipras, a charismatic 40-year-old that ascended from the youth wing of the 
Greek Communist Party (KKE) to major of Athens in 2006, became the new prime minister 
(BBC, 2015). Tsipras decided to form a coalition with ANEL, a radical anti-bailout right-wing 
party, to promote the idea that the EU’s economic governance would change (BLUSTEIN, 
2016, p. 391). Rising from the fringes of the political spectrum, SYRIZA gained supporters 
through identification in anti-austerity protests, growing from a small party with only 3 per 
cent of support in 2010 to 39 per cent in 2015 (KARYOTIS; RÜDIG, 2016, p. 9).  
Promising wages and pension increases, tax repeals, renegotiation of the primary 
surpluses imposed, and debt relief, SYRIZA adjusted its discourse to appeal to the Greek 
electorate. Adopting a favourable stance to the European Union and the euro while criticised 
mainstream parties that followed unnecessary economic demands, SYRIZA attracted the 
electorate that was against orthodoxy but afraid of other extremist parties, such as Golden 
Dawn. Furthermore, SYRIZA’s symbols and slogans during the campaign targeted 
specifically the democratic deficit in Greece, thus exploring the position of an outsider 
representing the people hit by austerity (STAVRAKAKIS; KATSAMBECKIS; 2014, p. 130). 
It is important to cite that Tsipras skillfully adapted his discourse internally and externally, 
taking an aggressive stance in the EU level, as he accused the bloc of harshening austerity 
under the banner of “neoliberalism”. 
The lack of democratic alternatives transformed the far-left party into a viable option. 
Tsipras attacked the troika, the elites, and the main parties in order to channel the feeling of 
powerlessness of Greek citizens towards EU policies and against mainstream national parties, 
such as ND and PASOK. However, support for ‘Golden Dawn’ increased, showing that the 
lack of democratic alternatives had also effective against the whole Greek political system. 
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The decision to cobble together a coalition with ANEL, a far-right party, stirred controversy, 
but SYRIZA was not able to settle an alliance with the Greek communist party (KKE), and it 
refused to engage with ’Golden Dawn’ (ASLANIDIS; KALTWASSER, 2016, p. 5). 
SYRIZA’s victory and the witting discourse against the troika exposed a problem 
within the eurozone that European politicians detached from themselves. Denouncing what 
Vivien Schmidt (2015, p. 93) denominates “governing by the rules and ruling by the 
numbers”, or the rigid system of packs, pacts and compacts, the Greek left party used the 
economic anxiety to its advantage. The Greek result envisioned to be a punishment against 
the unresponsiveness of the Greek parties and the troika, or in the words of Mudde and 
Kaltwasser (2017, p. 116), a menacing illiberal democratic response to undemocratic 
liberalism. Notwithstanding Greek discontent with austerity measures, mainstream parties 
persisted with orthodox discipline. 
Even though SYRIZA assumed itself as a turning point to European politics for 
renovation, it was hailed by outsiders and extremists parties through the eurozone, such as the 
Spanish Podemos and the French Front National. Moreover, it still had to comply with the 
MoU made by previous Greek administrations to stall the crisis. Tsipras caused an uproar 
among Northern European countries when showed intentions to renegotiate the agreements. 
In their view, the supposed Greek renovation was nonetheless an excuse to default its debts.  
German media accused Tsipras proposals to alleviate austerity in Greece as a warning 
to the eurozone. As Der Spiegel (2012) indicated, the Greek prime minister was selected as 
one of “Europe’s Ten Most Dangerous Politicians” due to his ‘extremist’ rhetoric against any 
form of continuing the reforms programme settled in Greece. Moreover, European media 
exhibited SYRIZA as a dangerous populist party, anti-EU and anti-NATO, close to ultra-
leftism terrorism and hostile to political stability and democratic values (STAVRAKAKIS; 
KATSAMBECKIS, 2014, p. 134).  
European politicians charged SYRIZA of being extreme-left populists, therefore 
diametrically similar to ‘Golden Dawn’ because both were a sceptic of EU policies. However, 
the representation of the “Greek people” diverges between ‘Golden Dawn’ and SYRIZA, as 
both parties have specific representations of the people. ’Golden Dawn’ aims to use violence 
as a purpose to transcend social cleavages internally and cleanse the nation ethnically, thus 
preserving the “true Greeks” (VASILOPOULOU; HALIKIOPOULOU, 2015, p. 8). That 
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position is not only an exclusionary view of Greek society but a chauvinistic and fascist 
position (STAVRAKAKIS; KATSAMBECKIS, 2014, p. 136). Contrarily, SYRIZA was a 
populist left party due to Tsipras’ successful discourse separating the “pure people” as the 
greeks that felt vulnerable to austerity against the “elites” represented by the troika and 
mainstream political parties (MUDDE, 2017). Moreover, SYRIZA was able to portray its 
position against conservative measures as a dispute between “conservatives forces that 
favoured austerity and neoliberalism” and those against it, framing Greece as popular 
resistance against European technocrats (ASLANIDIS; KALTWASSER, 2016, p. 5). 
Tsipras appointed Yanis Varoufakis, an academic from the University of Texas 
specialised in game theory, to be his finance minister. Negotiations with Greece caused 
apprehension, as Varoufakis was resolute to dismiss the troika and engage negotiations 
directly with creditors (HOPE; WAGSTYL, 2015). The situation caused outrage among 
European leaders that in turn became adamantly resistant to negotiating with SYRIZA and 
rejected proposals made by Varoufakis to restructure Greek debt, which reached 179 per cent 
of its GDP in 2014. Wolfgang Schäuble accused Greece of blackmailing the ones that bailed 
Greece twice before and Jeroen Dijsselbloem, chairman of the Eurogroup, warned that the 
Greek economic problems would not disappear overnight. Therefore, the polarisation between 
SYRIZA and international lenders grew. 
Greece had received two bailouts and soon would need a third one. With few resources 
to negotiate with the EU, SYRIZA tried to diversity negotiators to obtain a higher bargain 
with the troika. Thereby, Athens looked for the US, China, and Russia. China manifested 
interest for the Port of Piraeus but was unwilling to assist. Negotiations with Russia failed due 
to fears that tension with Germany achieved its apex in the Ukrainian crisis, so Putin was 
disinterested in causing further conflict in European territory. Lastly, Tsipras looked for the 
US. Although sympathetic to SYRIZA’s cause, Obama advised Tsipras to stand down to 
Berlin and comply with the rules (TSEBELIS, 2016, p. 29; ZAHARIADIS, 2016, p. 13). 
Different from the previous Greek administrations, SYRIZA though that under a 
democratic vote they were able to guarantee a better margin of the bargain to negotiate its 
debts with the troika. Nonetheless, as Zahariadis (2016, p. 1-2) discusses, the result of 
bargaining depends on strategies that take into account the perception of success or failure in 
previous bargainings and the structural features that shape them. After a soft-strategy due to 
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financial constraints in 2010 and a second hard-strategy defined by electoral ambitions in 
2011, SYRIZA decided to adopt a hard-bargaining position evoking its stance against 
austerity and bailouts. However, Tsipras ignored the fact that Europeans isolated Greece 
economically, so any threat of crisis contagion by a hard-strategy would imply in costs solely 
for Greece.  
Tsipras and Varoufakis argued with creditors over the fact that their democratic 
legitimacy rested in ending austerity and reducing the debt burden. They tried to convince 
Schäuble and Dijsselbloem that technocratic options were not viable, but were reluctant to 
accept that both also had a democratic mandate for their austerity policies within their own 
countries (MUDDE, 2017, p. 33). Attempting to reverse the decision in higher European 
stances, Greek leaders had to obtain collective decision-making from Eurozone leaders, which 
ultimately worked against the Greek government.  Germany did not want to pay, Southern 
European countries would not accept Greece to avoid the Memorandum of Understanding 
while they were obliged to comply, and Eastern European countries saw no reason to bail out 
a country that had a higher per capita income than them (TSEBELIS, 2016, p. 30). 
As a safety measure, since the last bailout in 2012, the troika managed to isolate the 
Greek debt from other European countries and keep it among European institutions and the 
IMF. Therefore, the Greek banking sector liquidity depended directly on financing by the 
ECB. Working against the possibility of drying out of capital, the Greek Ministry of Finance 
secretly authorised a plan for a parallel monetary system in case of a sudden exit from the 
eurozone (VAROUFAKIS, 2017, p. 650).   
SYRIZA refrained from its electoral promises in February, stalling talks about 
pensions and wages in exchange of a four months extension from its debts with creditors. 
Consequently, Greece had to pay loans to the IMF in early June. However, the hard-
bargaining position adopted by SYRIZA backfired, as the EU also kept a hard-bargaining 
position to Varoufakis and Tsipras. Greece could obtain capital through privatisations, but that 
measure would severely damage one of SYRIZA’s central positions against austerity, so it was 
dismissed. In March 2015, Greece ran out of cash, thereby creating a run against time to pay 
its loans to the IMF and to keep its balance sheet. The situation worsened to the point that the 
Greek government took control over cash of public services to pay pensions (ZAHARIADIS, 
2016, p. 12). 
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The alternative that rested for the Greek government was to threaten default, as 
SYRIZA supposed that Germany and the EU would capitulate because both had too much to 
lose, as consequences of “Grexit” to the eurozone were unpredictable. Nonetheless, the ECB 
under Draghi was better equipped to parry a potential Greek crisis. With contagion contained 
because of the haircut operations and the bond purchasing program that he started in 2012, the 
European banking sector would not suffer from a Greek default. 
SYRIZA and the troika continued negotiations without significant results until June 
2015. During that month, Greece delayed a series of payments. The Greek government had no 
money to pay pensions anymore (BLUSTEIN, 2015, p. 428). The lack of payments to the 
IMF or the ECB raised questions over Greece’s permanence in the euro, a possibility avoided 
by Tsipras at all costs (Blustein, 2015, pp. 434). 
Cornered by the strong left-wing opposition within his party, Tsipras felt impeded to 
comply with the Memorandum of Understanding made by the troika and Germany. Even 
though EU negotiators softened, as France and Italy backed off from forcing Greece to sign 
the agreement and the IMF’s scepticism with debt sustainability grew over time, Tsipras 
wanted an unswerving commitment to debt forgiveness and restructuring. In previous bailout 
agreements, Germany hinted that forgiveness was an issue to be discussed in the future, but 
Merkel refused to formally settle anything without a Greek commitment to the Memorandum 
of Understanding. 
Greece’s unemployment rate was 25.7 per cent in the first quarter of 2015. Even 
worse, youth unemployment peaked at 50.5 per cent (OECD 2015). As the graph shows, 
unemployment peaked in 2013 and decreased mildly since then.    
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Figure 7 – Unemployment, total (% of total labor force)  8
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Source: Author’s elaboration, based on data from the IMF Database, 2018. 
Emigration reached the peak number of 400,000 Greeks since the beginning of the 
crisis to avoid unemployment. Trying to preserve his legitimacy, without money and refusing 
to make the IMF payment, Tsipras decided to call a snap referendum on the acceptance of a 
bailout accord on June 27 (SMITH 2015). 
2.5 The Greek referendum between Democratic Legitimacy and Economic Governance 
European politicians disapproved the referendum, declaring that negotiations could 
not proceed without a prior commitment from the Greek administration. Media coverage in 
Greece and Germany tried to explore every lousy behaviour committed by those countries. 
The deadlock between Greece and Northern Europeans escalated, reinforcing stereotypes of 
“lazy Greeks” through the eurozone. German media condemned Greece for being a poor 
country benevolent to wealthy people, portraying German taxpayers as the ones bailing out 
wealthy Greeks with generous pensions and low retirement age (RONZHEIMER, 2011). That 
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image strengthened populist movements, as they accused their respective country of being 
subservient to the interests of others (STERNBERG; GARTZOU-KATSOUYANNI; 
NICOLAÏDIS; 2018, p. 35). 
Mutual recrimination aggravated due to the feeling of ‘othering’ that afflicted both 
countries. Tsipras directly confronted the idea, claiming that the poor suffered most in the 
Greek crisis. Although Greece altered numbers to remain in the Euro, Greeks refused to be 
seen as the profligate people of the European Union. In their view, the high unemployment 
rate and low per capita income showed that Greeks were more miserable than the standards 
portrayed by the media and the irresponsibility of political elites caused the crisis. 
The Greek media also attacked Germany, insisting that the rigorous treatment on debt 
payment was hypocritical, as Germany never paid back the forced loans that Greece had been 
forced to give in 1944. Additionally, German rigour with deficits on the SGP did not sustain 
itself. It did not escape to Greece’s notice that Germany was constantly ‘adjusting the rules’ to 
its benefit, lobbying in favour of higher debt ceilings when necessary to avoid punishment by 
breaking the SGP (STERNBERG; GARTZOU-KATSOUYANNI; NICOLAÏDIS; 2018, p. 
34).   
European governments kept requiring SYRIZA to comply with the rules as a sign of 
trust that Greece wanted to recover from other European nations due to the case of falsified 
data, but Tsipras bellicose stance against austerity compromised any agreement. The prime 
minister decided to assemble a referendum created a stalemate between Greece and Germany. 
Tsipras argued that the referendum served to give a final say on the matter to the Greek 
electorate, but he used the height of his popularity to campaign for the “No” vote against the 
agreements, invoking concepts such as the dignity and prosperity of the Greek people to 
oppose the creditors’ demands.  
New Democracy and Antonis Samaras campaigned for a “Yes” vote, attaching the 
campaign for “positive” austerity to Greece’s permanence in the euro. Creditors declared their 
wish that the Greeks voted to remain in the euro, therefore reiterating the “Yes” vote, as the 
continuity of the reforms were a requirement to stay in the euro. One day after Tsipras 
announcement of the referendum, the ECB stalled the liquid emergency support for Greek 
banks, thus forcing those institutions to limit cash withdrawals to 60 euros per day and install 
capital controls.  
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Refusing to accept that a referendum entailed an exit from the euro, Tsipras expressed 
that he only wanted to hear a people’s vote about what to do before negotiating a final deal 
with the troika, although he considered the terms established by the Memorandum of 
Understanding as a ‘blackmail’ (CONNOLY, 2015).  
The referendum happened on July 5 without serious discussions or proper evaluation 
of the facts and consequences that each choice would entail. SYRIZA’s use of the referendum 
against austerity was doomed from the start because the country would soon require a third 
bailout and run out of money. There were even talks between Schäuble and Varoufakis of 
humanitarian aid in case Greece was thrown out from the euro (VAROUFAKIS, 2017, p. 
582). Contrary to the political calculus made by Tsipras, a ‘No’ vote did not mean a change of 
position from the troika, Germany or the UE. 
Under a simple question that asked: “Do you agree with the documents of the 
European Union?”, The Greeks went to vote. Later, the polls revealed that the “No” won with 
61 per cent of votes, showing the existence of a democratic preference over the end of 
austerity. On the other hand, creditors needed an assurance from Greece that it would pay its 
debts to the IMF in order to receive a third bailout. Therefore, Greece faced a conundrum. If 
the country failed to reach a deal in the new round of conversations, there were real risks that 
it would be jettisoned from the euro, which was not acceptable to the Greek electorate, 
meaning a loss to Tsipras (TSEBELIS, 2016, p. 31). 
Yanis Varoufakis stepped down one day after the referendum. Euclid Tsakalotos, a 
moderate economist, became the new finance minister and took part in the talks with the EU. 
Backed by SYRIZA, Tsipras tried to negotiate again with the troika and Germany using the 
referendum as a free demonstration that he had legitimacy in his claims against the 
agreements. After a distressing period of discussions, Alexis Tsipras agreed on a new plan of 
austerity that was harsher than the ones offered previously in the referendum. The possibility 
of being jettisoned from the euro was stronger than the referendum’s result. 
The European response outmatched the strategy pursued by Tsipras to force a bargain. 
Greece refused to comply with the demands imposed by the troika, but instead of attracting 
allies within the eurozone, Tsipras and Varoufakis alienated them. According to Zahariadis 
(2016, p. 30), a sequence of political miscalculations worsened Greece situation instead of 
improving it. When Greece perceived that European leaders would not back off, Tsipras 
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visited Putin in the middle of the Ukrainian crisis to talk about financial assistance, 
threatening the EU through geopolitical action. Regardless, it did not work out and isolated 
Tsipras further from other European leaders that were sympathetic to Greece’s cause. The 
move resulted in a loss of credibility and put Greece’s loyalty to Europe in question, as 
SYRIZA ignored other Europeans countries preferences and decided to act preemptively. 
Distancing itself from potential allies, Greece accidentally committed a gross error. 
SYRIZA failed to understand the institutional profile of the EU. Decisions made by European 
institutions are hard to achieve and even more difficult to shift because they require 
unanimous decision-making. Therefore, quarrelling with politicians about a narrative of 
Greek submission to the troika and Germany proved to be a disadvantage as Tsipras ignored 
that assistance to Greece inevitably needed the approval of hawkish European members. 
Furthermore, the chances of success decreased considerably because the unanimity rules 
involved veto players such as the European Commission and the ECB (TSEBELIS, 2016, p. 
38). 
The argument portrayed by Tsipras in the final round of negotiations also had a 
problem. SYRIZA did not have many options available, as they needed the bailout. Its sole 
commitment was to represent the people against European demands which were not fair to the 
Greeks, but Greece was the sole member state that wanted to argue with the troika and 
remains in the euro.  
Varoufakis (2017) explores the question in his memoir, pointing out that Germany was 
deciding on behalf of other countries in the agreement discussions. However, as Dijsselbloem 
(2018) registers in his biography of the events, at the moment that Greece affirmed that it 
desired to remain in the euro, Tsipras and Varoufakis had no choice but to accept the terms 
established by the troika. The German electorate alongside other Northern European countries 
would never accept debt forgiveness from the sole country that wanted to avoid it while 
enjoying euro membership. Even though Varoufakis (2017, p. 650) was disposed to deploy 
Plan “X”, the parallel currency plan, as a guarantee to remain in the euro, Tsipras withdrew 
because he knew that it would slay his image with the Greek electorate. The hard-bargaining 
position dismounted in the talks, when all 18 financial ministers rejected the Greek bids for a 
new agreement and demanded terms that were harsher than the previous ones offered, 
showing the EU preference towards strict regulation.  
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The refusal to comply with any demand made by the troika since February 2015 
worsened the situation. SYRIZA and ANEL agreed with a new Memorandum of 
Understanding, permitting a new set of cuts on social spending and reforms to reduce public 
debt. Debt restructuring was out of the terms, briefly stated to be discussed in the future if 
SYRIZA complied with the terms (BLUSTEIN, 2015, p. 441). In exchange, Greece would 
receive €80 billion from its creditors.  
Under accusations of a punitive financial “Coup” settled with the European Union, 
Tsipras returned to Greece to approve the bailout in parliament. Domestically, he faced stern 
opposition from his party, as SYRIZA’s far-left faction rebelled and voiced a strong 
disagreement against the Memorandum of Understanding’s terms. The majority of the Central 
Committee also preferred a “Grexit” over the MoU, so he brought the question at the Greek 
parliament, where SYRIZA was split. Receiving support from other Europeans, including 
Germans and the Finnish, the Greek electorate denounced the agreement as a coup.  
Even though half of SYRIZA’s Central Committee was in parliament, they were a 
minority. Conscious that SYRIZA’s radical ideology was a barrier to compromise and would 
accuse him of capitulation, Tsipras embraced help from the opposition while removed 
mutineers from his party that were in power. Initially, with a minority government of 130 
seats from 300, the Greek prime minister aggregated support of pro-European parties such as 
ND, PASOK, and POTAMI. The new coalition served to approve the MoU proposals and sign 
the third bailout on August 18, obtaining access to European funds, therefore guaranteeing 
Greece’s permanence in the euro. 
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3 THE ORDER-KEEPER 
3.1. Harmony of Dissonance or the Divergence of European Capitalism(s) 
After the referendum’s result, Greece’s commitment to the Memorandum of 
Understanding represented a crash of beliefs in Europe. As Harry Milonas (2015) describes, 
eurosceptics such as United Kingdom Independence Party’s Nigel Farage and Jobbik’s Gábor 
Vona accused the European Union of condemning Greece and other Southern countries into a 
European “prison of nations”. Even though Alexis Tsipras was critical of the euro, he was far 
from a eurosceptic as the Greek prime minister envisioned less austerity for Greece and 
democratic EU institutions. The euro’s primary purpose was to ensure prosperity and union in 
the continent but was continually cratering a schism between Northern and Southern 
European countries. 
The “agreekment” settled on July 13 yielded tensions in the eurozone, but its 
consequences are far from that. Greece possessed the freedom to choose its government as 
long it did not change its economic policies, a sign of embeddedness into “undemocratic 
liberalism” (MOUNK 2018). The fiscal rigour agreed between Greece, Germany, and the 
troika broke the principle of “ever closer union” that promised peace, prosperity, and 
democratic governance within the eurozone. As Matthijs and Jones (2015, p. 7) stated, 
“democracy without solidarity is dysfunctional because its participants no longer view their 
institutions as representative or even open to reform”. Even though Greece had to comply 
with austerity, the harshness of European leaders’ agreement fortified the arguments of 
eurosceptics and critics. 
Dani Rodrik (2011, p. 200) creatively developed the conflict among markets and 
democracy arguing that it is impossible to "have hyperglobalization, democracy, and national 
self-determination all at once. We can have at most two out of the three”. So, to keep 
‘hyperglobalization’ and democracy, it is necessary to abandon the nation-state; otherwise, the 
blend of democracy and the nation-state constrains the possibility of financial globalization. 
Economic integration can be compared with ‘hyperglobalization’ if: 
“transactions costs have been eliminated and national borders do not interfere with 
the exchange of goods, services, or capital. […] Domestic regulations and tax 
policies would be then either brought into alignment with international standards, or 
structured so that they pose the least amount of hindrance to international economic 
integration” (RODRIK, 2011, p. 200). 
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During the gold standard period, the inflow of capital was immune to external 
constraints and governments could separate social demands from economic issues. Rodrik 
(2011, p. 202) states that contemporary politics are far from having economic rules “enforced 
by chartered trading companies or imperial powers […], but the demands of 
‘hyperglobalization' require a similar crowding out of domestic politics.”. Figure 8 shows that 
to contain the ‘Golden Straitjacket’ of ‘hyperglobalization’ outdoing democracy, a political 
compromise between nations (like the Bretton Woods system) or a political union (democratic 
politics) are crucial. 
Figure 8 – The Political Trilemma of the World Economy 
!  
Source: RODRIK (2011) 
However, the Bretton Woods system experience ended with a drive for economic 
competition to allure investments through "sound finance", low inflation, flexible labour 
markets, and supply-side economic reforms that envisioned to set stringent monetary rules in 
order to gain "investors confidence". The breakdown of the economic paradigm that reigned 
until the 1970s shifted towards the supervision of monetary stability, raising the duty of 
central banks as responsible for inflation-targets and monetary policy. As Blyth and Matthijs 
(2017, p. 210) stress, the contrast between the institution's configuration before the End of 
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Bretton Woods and during the Great Moderation sets different regimes (and choices in the 
Trilemma):  
Figure 9 – The macroeconomic regimes of the 1970s and today compared. 
  
Source: BLYTH; MATTHIJS (2017) 
The transition from Macro-Regime I to II resonates with a new configuration of the 
Trilemma of the World Economy. Concomitantly to this process, the European integration 
advanced in economic and institutional matters. The integration process guaranteed that 
"National governments would not disappear, but their powers would be severely 
circumscribed by supranational rulemaking and enforcing bodies empowered (and 
constrained) by democratic legitimacy." (RODRIK, 2011, p. 203). The European Union 
would fit in the Trilemma somewhere between the “Golden Straitjacket” or a compromise 
similar to Bretton Woods (a multilateral agreement on monetary, tariffs and trade issues). 
However, Matthias Matthijs (2017, p. 277) argues that “Europe’s single market and single 
currency were major exercises in dis-embedding markets from their nationally ‘embedded’ 
policies, protections and traditions”. Therefore, the single currency pressured ‘globalisation’ 
or intense liberalisation. Without devaluing the currency due to the ECB’s autonomy, Greece 
had to compete with European goods and services through cuts in investment and social 
spending in order to raise competitiveness. As European leaders fortified the SGP’s 
surveillance during the crisis, Greece had no option but to carry on strict structural economic 
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reforms. The choice for austerity in Greece plummeted satisfaction with Greek democracy 
after Greece accepted the MoU terms, as Figure 10 reveal: 
Figure 10 – Satisfaction with Greek Democracy 
  
Source: EUROBAROMETER (2019) 
The lack of alternative for structural reforms increased scepticism from member states 
that accepted the European bailouts and the troika. Consequently, Greece remained with only 
one option of the Trilemma, as it abstained from the nation-state in order to accept European 
institutions and had to pursue strict orthodox policies without domestic support.  
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Figure 11 – Rodrik’s Trilemma Applied to the Eurozone: Core vs. Periphery 
!  
Source: MATTHIJS (2017); Based on RODRIK (2011) 
As European member states agreed to hand over their monetary policies in order to 
accept the euro, they abandoned the ‘Europe of States’ (EEC) model to adopt a step closer 
towards a United States of Europe. However, Germany voted a fiscal union and France 
refuses to cede further sovereignty, so the European Union stays somewhere between these 
two branches. Matthijs (2017, p. 279) underlines that European creditors have “shaped the 
rules that govern the euro based on their domestic preferences and framed with their national 
economic interest in mind […] kept[ing] signifiers room to manoeuvre in their economics 
when it came to making fiscal market choices.”. Therefore, Germany could have all the 
options of the Trilemma while Greece had to comply with ‘hyperglobalization’.        
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Figure 12 – Satisfaction with German democracy 
!  
Source: EUROBAROMETER (2019) 
   
Wolfgang Streeck (2014) argued that Europe became a “consolidation state” as a 
response to the fiscal crisis. Consisting of a “supranational system of institutions insulated 
from electoral pressure”, the consolidation state can “neutralise domestic policies by locking 
nation-states into supranational agreements and regulatory regimes that limit their 
sovereignty” (STREECK, 2014, p. 116). Therefore, European governance is capable of 
controlling democracy while unleashing market forces. 
The rise of the “consolidation state” was an evidence of Polanyi’s (1944) premise that 
although capitalism was a social construction developed by society, capitalism was capable of 
supplanting social relations through politics and create new forms of association when 
incorporated with market forces. The EMU thus represents a return to an international gold 
standard as diverse European countries renounced their international political economy in 
favor of the ECB (ELSÄSSER; STREECK, 2015; MATTHIJS, 2015). 
Convergent with Susan Strange’s (1988) definition of “Structural Power”, the 
‘consolidation state’ dominates its members through financial commitments similar to the 
gold standard obligations that kept currencies pegged to the gold. Consequently, the variance 
of European growth models within the euro is similar to interregional domestic conflicts that 
existed (and persist) between Northern and Southern Italy or West and East Germany. 
However, differently from the US, the euro is not a fiscal union, so the EU cannot bailout 
countries without financial guarantees that ensure austerity. Adjustment happens through 
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austerity or default. Therefore, European member states have to adjust their economies in 
order to harmonise different Varieties of Capitalism. 
Similar to the impossibility of expansionary politics the gold standard period without 
leaving it, Matthijs (2014, p. 104) highlights that the ECB lacks lender-of-last-resort 
obligations or a common debt instrument function, so “European elites disembedded the 
component of the Bretton Woods compromise that gave national democratic political control 
over economic policy”. Thereby, economic orthodoxy became politicised as the main burden 
of the adjustment during the eurozone crisis fell on debtor countries, and there was nothing 
that Southern European voters could do to avoid it. The euro “possessed all the disadvantages 
of the interwar gold standard, without enjoying any of the advantages” (MATTHIJS, 2015, p. 
478). The main drawback of the single currency was the impossibility of devaluation. As the 
euro did not qualify as an optimum currency area, it needed a fiscal union to resolve the 
macroeconomic imbalance caused by a “balance of payment” shared by a myriad of different 
economies (MUNDELL, 1961).  
The adoption of the euro in Europe intertwined Northern coordinate economies with 
the Mediterranean state economies. However, both types presented different characteristics, as 
the Northern model focused on export-led policies and the Mediterranean functioned through 
demand and high inflation.  The structural divergence of European economies was exposed 9
since the adoption of the EMU, as Southern European countries grew with demand-side 
economic policies while Northern economies entered in recession (COPELOVITCH; 
FRIEDEN; WALTER, 2016, p. 8).  
In the late 1990s, the German economy was stagnant. Because of the reunification, the 
end of the Cold War, and Eastern Europe adoption of capitalism, German industries had an 
ample supply of places to invest and cheap German-speaking qualified workers from Eastern 
Europe. The intensive European labour market interweaved with the costs of German 
reunification, thus permitting German firms to negotiate the high costs of union wages 
(DUSTMANN et al., 2014, p. 132). The coordination of the German market economy hence 
 Initial studies by Hall and Soskice (2001, p. 20-21) determine that “among the large OECD nations, six can be 9
classified as liberal market economies (The USA, Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Ireland) and another 
ten as coordinated market economies (Germany, Japan, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Austria) leaving six in more ambiguous positions (France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, 
Greece, and Turkey). […] They may constitute another type of capitalism, sometimes described as 
‘Mediterranean’.”. Later, Molina and Rhodes (2007) defined Greece, Italy, and Spain as ‘mixed market 
economies’. The discussion still continues, with Eastern European an own definition and France somewhere 
between a coordinated market economy and a mediterranean market economy.
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aligned the interests of trade unions and employer associations, reducing unit labour costs and 
increasing productivity relative to real wages. The unique characteristics of coordinate market 
economies allowed that strategic interactions with supportive institutions could ensure 
bargaining across the economy to limit inflationary effects (HALL; SOSKICE, 2001, p. 25). 
Structural reforms such as wage restraint enhanced German productivity along other Northern 
European countries that shared similar capacities of market coordination, such as Austria and 
the Netherlands. As productivity in Coordinate market economies increased, Greece halted its 
productivity due to the euro artificial interest rates. 
Divergent varieties of capitalism within the eurozone developed asymmetries that 
persisted in the long-run. Southern European countries expanded credit and wages. As the 
interest rates continued stabilised due to the common currency, inflation was not causing 
unemployment. Without controlling monetary policy, Southern European countries could not 
raise productivity through inflation and accordingly interest rates. Thereby, the asymmetry 
between both groups created a massive flow of capital from Northern Europeans to Southern 
Europeans.  
The banking system of Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium lent massively 
to Southern European countries due to its preference to finance unsustainable financial 
bubbles in the periphery. As previously discussed, the lack of supranational banking 
regulation impeded that correction of the structural imbalance that stalled productivity in 
Southern countries while Northern banks expanded financial activities overseas. As a result, 
banks could overextend their lending (HALL, 2012, p. 362). As Southern countries used 
credit liquidity to expand its economy while Northern ones exported products to the South, 
both growth models fed each other. 
Before the common currency, Mediterranean European economies models grew 
through high inflation, thus improving competition. The introduction of the euro meant a shift 
in European growth models. The euro’s first decade signified not only excessive borrowing 
from Southern countries but also imprudent lending from Northern European banks that 
avoided national supervisory regulation. Northern countries exported products globally due to 
an artificially devalued currency caused by Southern European countries, whence boosting 
competitiveness in the global markets.  
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The myriad of European models of growth meant the existence of different varieties of 
capitalism within the Eurozone. Under the Maastricht criteria and the SGP, European leaders 
expected that the EMU would converge those growth models through a minimalist 
institutional structure that all member states could agree (HALL, 2014, p. 1225). Sharing a 
single market, rigid fiscal rules, and an independent central bank, European leaders expected 
the harmonisation of the European economies, transforming the eurozone into an efficient 
export-oriented bloc. The system worked for the good times, but the North Atlantic Financial 
crisis exposed the structural imbalances sustained by different varieties of capitalism that 
shared the eurozone, showing that the common currency architecture was unprepared for 
global financial instabilities. However, the euro was not responsible for the crisis, but the 
political constraints of European leaders that left the common currency frail to significant 
economic crashes. Supervisory instruments, such as European banking supervision or the 
procedural sanctions from the SGP, were refused or weakened.  
After gaining the responsibility to supervise reforms carried by countries that accepted 
financial aid, the troika proposed conditionalities to demand-oriented economies that altered 
their political, social, and economic models. The structural reforms adopted by Southern 
European countries aimed to change those countries’ growth model. They would enable the 
transformation of demand-based economies into an export-led growth model, resembling 
Northern European countries. Without the possibility of devaluating their currency or default, 
Southern European countries accepted the troika proposals to improve cost-competitiveness 
through austerity. Consequently, a rule-based economic growth model pervaded demand-led 
economies, determining one solution to different problems that affected the eurozone 
countries in crisis (JOHNSTON; REGAN, 2017, p. 11). 
Like when Southern European leaders desired to adopt the MCU in order to improve 
fiscal discipline, Southern European leaders permitted the exposition of large Southern 
European sectors to international competition and downward inflation envisioning to 
converge Southern economies with Northerner ones. However, the successive cuts in 
spending and investment created another problem. The troika demanded European member 
states that signed the MoU to open their economies to develop the export sector, but that 
created long-term distributional consequences. As Southern European countries opened their 
economies concomitantly, they competed with each other. Consequently, prospects of growth 
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plummeted. The intensity of the structural reforms forced Greece to increase exports, even 
though values are significantly lower than German products and services, as Figure 13 
displays: 
Figure 13 – Export of goods and services (% of GDP)  10
  
Source: Author’s elaboration, World Bank national accounts data, 2018. 
As Southern European countries adopted structural reforms that satisfied the German 
view of stable money, sound finances, and efficient local-factor markets, the ECB remained 
attached to its principle of assuring price stability and refused to act as lender-of-last-resort. 
The diversity of European growth models moulded into a model similar to the German 
(JONES, 2013; BLYTH 2013; RYDER 2015; SCHARPF, 2016). To secure the stability of the 
“Brussels-Frankfurt consensus”, rules that maintained economic governance were reinforced. 
The rigidity of the forced structural convergence entailed the polarisation of the eurozone, 
conflicting “Northerner Saints” against “Southern Sinners” in the democratic sphere 
(MATTHIJS; MCNAMARA, 2015). 
However, the agreement to bail out Southern European economies fractured the 
electorate trust in European institutions and Southern European mainstream politicians. The 
Mediterranean electorate felt that their countries had to pay for the entire economic 
 For detailed data, see Appendix A – table 5.10
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adjustment while European institutions bailed out Northerner European banks (HALL, 2014, 
p. 1231; MATTHIJS, 2017). Hall (2013, p. 435) elucidates that the EU capacity to “distribute 
gains and losses across the European electorates without the institutional mechanisms that 
would make it accountable for doing so” denoted a European decision to punish Southern 
European countries in the electorate's view, thus increasing disputes between the core and the 
periphery of the eurozone. As tensions escalated, eurosceptic parties and critics continually 
raised discussions about the whole purpose of the EU due to its irresponsive reaction to the 
crisis, hijacking trust from the electorate and even obtaining relative success in the 2014 
European elections. 
The investment and spending cuts assumed by Mediterranean market economies also 
signified an impasse to the European Union. As austerity retained Southern Europeans access 
to import goods, demand plummeted, thus neutralising the altered euro exchange rates that 
benefit German growth model (SHARPF, 2017, p. 22). Therefore, the export-led model needs 
Southern European expansion to compete globally. Both models act as a complement to each 
other. However, as Johnston and Regan (2017, p. 7) pointed out, “the EU has privileged 
export-oriented growth models”. Comparing GDP growth between Greece and German, the 
trends diverge spectacularly.   
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Figure 14 – GDP Growth (Annual %)  11
  
Source: Author’s elaboration, World Bank national accounts data, 2018. 
The creation of a single European variety of capitalism that reflected Northern 
European preferences would thus reduce the efficiency of the German growth model. As 
coordinate market economies would face higher European competition in the international 
markets and sell less to Southern European markets, European economic surplus would 
diminish. Therefore, the vast German surpluses rest on mixed European varieties of 
capitalism in the eurozone. Similar to demand-led economies that benefited from the euro’s 
artificial interest rates, Northern export-oriented countries thrived in Europe due to an 
artificial devaluated single currency. So, the development of the euro economic area through 
demand-led models of growth permitted enhanced exports competition from Northern 
European countries in global markets. The binary view of efficient and laggard models in the 
Eurozone ignores that fact that European countries depended on each other more than their 
willingness to reform the eurozone. Thus, Greece demand-led economy intertwines with 
Germany’s high surpluses.   
The expectation of the European Union that all European countries would converge 
into a single growth model that would bring prosperity to the whole continent is an illusion. 
Peter Hall and David Soskice (2001, p. 13) advance that Varieties of Capitalism relies on "the 
   For detailed data, see Appendix A – table 6.11
  125
importance of informal rules and understandings to securing the equilibria in the many 
strategic interactions of the political economy". Moreover, Peter Hall (2014, p. 1229) asserts 
that convergence is unachievable, as demand-led countries lack the institutional structures to 
converge their economies with Northern European growth models.  
Forcing structural convergence through harmonisation of different European VoC 
means destabilisation to Southern European countries and escalated political conflicts to 
determine the share of the economic adjustment cost. By considering that Mediterranean 
market economies are a market anomaly because of the lack of economic reforms after 
adopting the euro, so is Germany and other European export-oriented countries. The North 
Atlantic Financial froze repo capital inflows, causing multiple credit crunches in Southern 
Europe. However, Germany and other European leaders that bailed out those countries 
decided to correct the eurozone macroeconomic imbalances instead of financially stabilising 
Greece and other Southern European countries. Without the ECB to soft the crash, these 
countries had to make an adjustment that was electorally undefendable, therefore 
transforming an economic crisis into a political disaster.  
The German growth model cannot be provided without Southern European countries 
keeping the euro devaluated. If Mediterranean market economies must find a ‘sustainable’ 
model of growth, so does Germany. For that reason, the asymmetries within the bloc should 
be addressed by independent supranational institutions, capable of developing politics to 
improve the common currency’s architecture. Thus, the euro should function as an engine that 
serves no one’s interests. 
During the first years of the EMU, Germany and France had already cooperated 
pragmatically to improve supranational economic governance that suited their interests. In 
2003, both countries broke the obligations delimited by the SGP because of an economic 
recession. Without complying with the rule of 3 per cent GDP deficit, Germany and France 
reformed the rigid deficit procedure, strengthening the European Council -where those 
countries have stronger influence-to rule out the sanctions derived from the EDP (MATTHIJS, 
2015, p. 7). Germany’s behaviour during the SGP breach contradicts its role in the eurozone 
crisis, enforcing the GIIPS to comply with the SGP strengthened rules. However, Germany 
did not shift suddenly from a maverick in 2005 to a rule-enforcer during the eurozone crisis. 
Reluctant to assume economic sanctions from the European Commission during a sturdy 
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economic recession, Germany and France appealed to institutional reforms to weaken the 
European Commission and nullify the SGP penalties in 2005. Schröder and Chirac responded 
pragmatically to sanctions that seemed to worsen the economic situation of their countries, 
which could strengthen a nascent eurosceptic complaint, at the time still restrained to parties 
in opposition that targeted the EU opportunistically. Notwithstanding German commitment to 
the rules, Schröder and Chirac revoked "EU bodies and small member states that were the 
strongest advocates of rule-based rather than discretionary economic governance at the EU 
level." (JABKO, 2015, p. 74). Nevertheless, Germany accidentally created incentives to 
European countries breach the SGP and still not bear the sanctions. 
After that, Berlin’s decision to fortify the SGP restrictions during the eurozone crisis 
was a mechanism to ensure the stability of the euro after the frailty of the SGP after the 2005 
reform. Rather than bending the rules to its convenience, Germany protected itself supporting 
further institutional change and appeasing the domestic opposition from the CDU. In German 
policy-makers’ view, the pragmatic solution to fix ineffective rules was to reinforce them, so 
Germany remained a stern defender of the SGP and the ECB focus on price stability, not 
interfering with the bank’s autonomy. 
Compared with the structural dynamics of the eurozone crisis, the breach of the SGP 
was a simple issue. As the German growth model made the country’s manufacturing sector 
competitive due to low inflation and wage restraint in the medium-term, artificial interest 
rates continued influencing the decline of productivity in Mixed Market Economies. Although 
Northern European countries and the ECB shared responsibility for the crisis, Northerner 
voters’ hostility to bailouts and the ECB’s independence from European economies impeded 
effective countermeasures to reform the eurozone adequately. 
The structural asymmetries that concerned creditors did not result in the crisis, 
whereas the solutions adopted by the troika focused on those imbalances. Sharpf (2016, p. 19) 
reiterates the argument affirming that European economies within the Eurozone were 
vulnerable to financial disturbances before the crisis. European leaders pragmatic approach to 
diminish problems domestically and avoid contagion in the EU was to standardise anomalies 
generated by the performance of Europe’s monetary union through orthodoxy (JONES, 2013, 
p. 146). Under the idea of “moral hazard” that pervaded the economic debate, fiscal austerity 
hindered medium-term growth of Mediterranean market economies.  
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To ensure that Mediterranean countries would comply with the troika, the EU 
supported technocratic governments such as Papademos in Greece. In order to achieve the 
terms of the MoU, European leaders of the core enshrined the role of experts in the eurozone 
crisis as the best outcome possible to improve the economic situation in MME. 
However, Southern voters perceived technocrats as impositions made by Northerner 
Europeans and the troika. As specified by Braun and Hüpner (2017, p. 17), technocrats pursue 
their own goals under the image of “benevolent problem solvers”. Furthermore, the idea that 
it is imperative to bypass excessive deficits and debts as a moral question is treacherous since 
this very thought is political (JONES, 2013, p. 163). The capture of the state by a rule-based 
regime creates a system in which elected parties no say in economic decisions, protecting 
rigid financial and legal rules immune to popular acceptance (MÜLLER, 2012). As Greeks 
perceived the EU’s “complexity of the co-decision procedure” functioning distant from 
national politics, the image of technocrats 'is not associated' with neutral actors but as 
European bureaucrats indifferent to political accountability (HALL, 2013, p. 434). 
The Greek stance toward the troika cratered the prevailing view in the Euro’s core 
purpose, which was to substitute the European financial dependence on the German exchange 
rate for a common currency nonaligned with the Bundesbank's interests. Before the euro, 
monetary turbulences in European countries depended ultimately on the Bundesbank's 
reaction and Germany. Italy and France relied on Germany to circumvent leaving the EMS, 
but Italy eventually forsook the system, and France received German support to maintain the 
EMS. Europeans acknowledged that the Deutsche Mark was prominent in Europe. Thereby, a 
European central bank was an optimum outcome as it could redistribute gains and losses 
without prioritising German concerns. 
In order to ensure that the European central bank was immune to political pressure, 
European leaders supported the creation of a rules-based regime that would fundamentally 
ensure the stability of the euro. Nevertheless, "rules had been reinforced on paper [to reform 
the SGP in 2005]", the EMU did not move towards fiscal union and Germans forbidden the 
possibility of Eurobonds, paralysing the European institutional framework (JABKO, 2015, p. 
75). Consequently, Germany and the ECB assumed the critical roles in the eurozone crisis as 
other European institutions lacked governing resources of capacity to supervise and 
coordinate macroeconomic competencies.  
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The structural asymmetries within the eurozone continued widening the gap between 
opposite European growth models, thereby pressurising the ECB to stall the eurozone crisis. 
Distanced from both models, the ECB stayed neutral, but Trichet’s decision to raise taxes in 
2011 indirectly benefited Northerner European countries imports while punished 
Mediterranean economies to the point that menaced the stability of the eurozone's periphery 
through TARGET2 transactions. While massives amounts of euros flowed from risky 
European economies towards, Germany proved to be the safest place because the country 
hosted the most significant amount of that capital in the eurozone during that period. As the 
ECB decided temporarily to emphasise its independence rather than protect fragile member 
states, Germany shifted its stance in Europe towards the position of a “reluctant hegemon” to 
ensure the Euro’s stability (BULMER; PATERSON, 2017 p. 213). 
After a brief period of permissive Keynesianism in 2008-2009, Berlin highlighted the 
importance of collective discipline and economic reforms in Europe. According to Woll and 
Schmidt (2013, p. 133), "the fact that most of the Eurozone governments were conservative 
between 2010 and 2012, and that the Northern Europeans backed Germany, meant that 
[leaders influenced by] these ideas have enshrined the criteria set". The state, responsible for 
acting as an authority and advocating domestic questions in the international realm, is 
compelled by European institutions whose visions are compatible with Germany’s stance to 
austerity. Entrenched in a national coalition that constrained further Keynesianism in Europe, 
Germany refrained from its initial position and urged that European countries should solve its 
internal problems. 
The German stance on the eurozone crisis gradually changed to ensure that member 
states remain in the eurozone and preserve the euro. Although the European Central Bank 
refused mutual financing of sovereign debt, Trichet purchased debt bonds temporarily to 
protect the Euro when the EFSF was not ready. The proposal of financial aid to member states 
received a swift rebuke from German hawkish economists and politicians, who invoked the 
GCC to condemn the EU, hence constrain European action. As the court amplified the 
parliament’s power after each decision, Merkel parsimoniously meddled in European 
financial affairs while maintaining stable its national coalition with the Liberal party 
(BULMER; PATERSON, 2017, p. 217). 
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As the German chancellor stepped into the crisis, the consequences of inaction have 
emerged. The effect of ideas in the Eurozone crisis had pernicious effects in populist 
movements, catalysing the rise of their popularity. As clarified by Kriesi (2017, p. 16), 
economic dissatisfaction in Southern Europe increased support for democratic principles that 
not necessarily embraced liberal democracy. Moreover, as noted by Erik Jones (2013, p. 149), 
the idea of fiscal responsibility was socially embedded in different national contexts. 
Therefore, the appeal for populists such as SYRIZA stems from how the EU currently works, 
so democracy deficit caused increasing demands for social democracy (KRIESI, 2017, p. 20). 
The political consequences of austerity, such as the Greek referendum, exposed populist 
democracy as an answer to undemocratic liberalism (MUDDE; KALTWASSER, 2017, p. 
117). Meanwhile, in Northern Europe, disagreement with financial solutions to Southern 
Europe caused a political uprising against mainstream parties, thus raising support for far-
right parties that showed discontentment against the EU’s complacency to Mediterranean 
economies.  
Peter Hall (2017, p. 19) clarified that the EU faced a dilemma between legitimacy with 
popular aspirations or governments that adopt technocratic economic policies. However, as 
asserted by Jan Werner-Müller (2016, p. 65), technocracy and populism “mirror each other” 
because both are apolitical and “legitimises the belief that there is no real room for 
disagreement”. Any option of policymaking would feed populist movements in Northern or 
Southern Europe, depending on who would receive the negatives or positives outcomes 
within the EU. The transformations of economic ideas into populist forces are thus anomalies 
strengthened by economic morality and polarisation between individual member states within 
the Eurozone (MATTHIJS; MCNAMARA, 2015).  
Merkel’s advancement in the eurozone crisis underwent intense resistance inside her 
own country. Alongside the troika, Germany supported the Fiscal Pact in 2011, framing out 
the crisis solely as a problem of Southern European profligacy and low productivity. The 
economic policies proposed resembled an ordoliberal view, reinforcing national budget rules 
and disciplining members that violated the limited tax of debt and deficit with EDP sanctions 
stemmed from the SGP (MATTHIJS, 2015, p. 8). Notwithstanding the rising of extremist and 
anti-system parties in the European political mainstream, economic ideas that were accepted 
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and entrenched into the national sphere before the crisis morphed into movements that 
threatened the project of European Monetary Integration.  
Therefore, the economic orthodoxy advocated by Germany to adjust the eurozone 
heavily resonate with ordoliberal concepts. In that case, Germans and Greeks represent the 
extreme of divergent models. Greece was the opposite of Germany in terms of stable money, 
sound finances, and efficient local-factor markets. German Ordoliberalism values moral 
hazard, asserting that crisis is easily avoidable because they happen due to financial 
profligacy. Ordoliberalism stress on economic rules caused different reactions among 
European countries that either accepted (Portugal) or rebelled (Greece). However, the 
preconceptions of virtue and vice within the crisis reestablish a mercantilist view that praised 
coordinate market economies due to its consecutive surpluses. Ignoring its dependency on 
demand-led economies, Northern European countries’ insistence on austerity as a solution to 
the crisis increased the ratio of debt-to-GDP in Southern Europe. Consequently, worsening the 
crisis in the short-term and transforming the problem into a real high-sovereign debt crisis, as 
figure 15 displays.  
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Figure 15 – General government gross debt (Percent of GDP)  12
!  
Source: Author’s elaboration, based on data from the IMF Database, 2018 
3.2 The uneven nature of German liberalism: The Freiburg School, Ur-ordoliberalism, 
the Geneva School, Alt-ordoliberalism or what? 
The division between the European core and its periphery within the eurozone 
renewed the image of different blocs within the EU. European leaders created the euro as a 
political catalyser to further political unity, but it created distributive conflicts. The clash of 
“Southern Sinners” and “Northern Saints” was a powerful signal of the disputes happening 
inside the Eurozone (MATTHIJS; MCNAMARA, 2015, p. 230). Divergent ideas that existed 
within the bloc escalated through the crisis and intermingled with stereotypes emphasised by 
the media, which perpetrated the image of “lazy Greeks” contrasted with “hard-working 
Germans” (STERNBERG; GARTZOU-KATSOUYANNI; NICOLAÏDIS, 2018, p. 25). 
Germany’s position in the crisis mirrored the interests of Northern European countries, while 
the reactions of the countries severely affected by the crisis – represented by Greece, Spain, 
 For detailed data, see Appendix A – table 712
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Portugal, Italy and Ireland, or the GIIPS – were attributed to the profligacy of Southern 
Europe.  13
After the GIIPS signed the MoU to halt the economic instability in Europe, the 
eurozone passed through a paradoxical situation. While the GIIPS had to approve an austerity 
program, creditor countries had to convince their electorate that the EU would not become a 
transfer union. If debtor countries refrained from austerity, populist parties in creditor 
countries would gain strength. On the other hand, severe pressure for orthodoxy could fortify 
left-wing movements in debtor countries. The deadlock kept both blocs dissatisfied, as each 
side demanded further concessions from the other.      
The polarisation between creditors and debtors was constructed based on moral 
hazard. Germany’s insistence on austerity derives from its vision concerning the roots of the 
crisis, caused by European states’ profligacy. European countries should be responsible for 
their own domestic political and economic problems, assuring that individual action would 
impede financial contagion in the eurozone. Invoking the cultural archetype of the Swabian 
hausfrau (Swabian housewife) in 2008, Merkel emphasised the frugality of Southern 
Bavarians as a model to be followed by banks and countries to deal with money (THE 
ECONOMIST, 2014). 
German preference towards austerity was inspired by Northern European countries’ 
wariness that sovereign bonds purchases by the ECB or debt restructure would stimulate 
countries to keep spending and maintaining high levels of debt. Moreover, quantitative easing 
could generate inflation within the eurozone and affect export-led economies, so creditors 
continued demanding conservative economic measures. As the eurozone crisis unfolded in 
2012 and menaced the stability of the euro, Germany abandoned its conservative position 
towards Europe and embraced the role of a “reluctant hegemon” in the eurozone. Likewise, 
Merkel’s policy shift informally supported the enhancement of the ECB’s functions, which 
obtained supervisory powers to coordinate the banking union and start a program of sovereign 
debt purchase of MME countries.  
Analysts yet discuss the reasons for that induced Merkel to change its stance towards 
Europe. While some argue that she was unwillingly to disrupt Kohl’s legacy of a united 
 France is geographically a Southern European Country. However, the French model of capitalism mingles 13
unique features of CME and MME. Furthermore, France sided with Germany during the Eurozone crisis. As 
Vivien Schmidt (2015, p. 107) puts, the "relationship between Germany and France went from one of bilateral 
leadership to a bilateral directoire between 2009-2012 [...] dominated by Germany.”
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Europe (MODY, 2018; TOOZE 2018), others claim that she was dominating European states 
in a neoliberal cage (STREECK, 2013). This dissertation follows Mark Blyth (2013) 
explanation that ideas represented an essential aspect of the eurozone crisis, as Germany 
prescribed an orthodox “one-size-fits-all” model that caused a schism between different 
growth models in the eurozone. Furthermore, it will argue that domestic and external 
constraints played a role in European crisis-management, impeding improper decisions and 
securing the stability of the euro, but was not enough to suppress far-right and far-left 
movements.  
As the eurozone crisis worsened, the impasse between export-led countries and MME 
undermined the chance of a satisfying consent for both. Without settling an intergovernmental 
agreement, Merkel decided to support Mario Draghi's policies in order to guarantee the 
stability of the euro. Likewise, Merkel was determined to shatter a political consensus that 
kept its national coalition at the fray.  
Ideas from the Freiburg School still influence German decision making. German 
economics overlaps the centre-left and the centre-right. According to Wolfgang Münchau 
(2014), "the only party with some Keynesian leanings are the former communists". Besides, 
Farrell and Quiggin (2018, p. 275) elucidated that “economists play an unusually prominent 
and independent role in German policy debates - public statements by the Council of 
Economic Experts receive extensive coverage”. Ordoliberalism success in the postwar period 
remained attached so strongly to German economic framework that Münchau (2014) 
concludes by affirming that "Today, the government is ordoliberal. The opposition is 
ordoliberal. The university teaches ordoliberal economics. In the meantime, macroeconomics 
in Germany and elsewhere are tantamount to parallel universes". Even though left-oriented 
parties such as the SPD were inclined to contribute with fiscal stimulus to Greece, they were 
irreducible to maintain strict rules for austerity. Dullien and Guérot (2012, p. 2) underline that 
orthodox economics gained ground in Germany due to the lack of influential Keynesian 
economists. As ministries and the Bundesbank hires chiefly from German universities, 
heterogeneity diminishes, thus retaining “a consensus around basic principles that is 
predominant among the German economic elite” (DULLIEN, GHÉROT, 2012, p. 3). 
One of the five members of the Council of Economic Experts, Peter Bofinger, even 
exclaimed that "No matter the topic, it is four to one against me  [...] I am the last Keynesian
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—and I feel like the last Mohican." (BOFINGER apud THE ECONOMIST, 2015). Bofinger 
calls attention to the fact that the Council considers increasing deficits and debt a mistaken 
option, oppose the ECB quantitative easing and ensure that austerity is the solution to the 
eurozone crisis. German economic policymakers were a sceptic of the Keynesianism 
consensus that emerged in 2008-2010, insisting on individual risk sharing and dismissing 
European initiatives. After resigning from their positions at the Bundesbank and the ECB 
board, Axel Weber and Jürgen Stark declared their scepticism of heterodox policies in Europe 
and joined the mainstream view of ordoliberal economists that alleviating countries in crisis 
would spur moral hazard (SINN, 2014). The domestic political hesitation notwithstanding, 
American and European commitment to end the crisis persuaded Merkel to liberate an EU-
wide stimulus package in 2008 (NEWMAN, 2010; FARRELL; QUIGGIN, 2018, p. 276). 
The German economic community interpreted the crisis as a consequence of flawed 
economic rules (BLYTH, 2013, p. 57). Therefore, ordoliberal ideas pervaded German 
preference toward fiscal conservatism, emphasising moral hazard. Reiterating that each 
European country should sort itself out of the crisis, German economists kept their anti-
inflation consensus to oppose heterodox fiscal policy (FARRELL; QUIGGIN, 2018, p. 275). 
Through the political spectrum, not only the fiscal conservative FDP (Liberal Democratic 
party) but also the grand coalition formed by the conservative CDU (Christian Democratic 
Union) and the centre-left SPD (Social Democratic Party) were committed to anti-inflationary 
policies. 
Few economists yet manifest themselves as ordoliberals (BRUNNERMEIER; 
JAMES; LANDAU, 2016, p. 63). However, ordoliberal ideas resonate in contemporary 
German politics. Since the German miracle (wirtschaftswunder), fiscal conservative 
newspapers such as the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) and the Süddeutscher Zeitung 
kept an ordoliberal leaning in editorials. Moreover, Bundesbank presidents habitually refer to 
ordoliberal authors or books to highlight Ordnungspolitik in European crisis-management 
(BUNDESBANK, 2005; BUNDESBANK, 2013). 
Ordoliberalism central premise is to safeguard price stability. Even though ordoliberals 
did not regard European governance as a significant issue in their writings, their ideas are 
present in the eurozone crisis because of their compromise with policy questions that 
highlight moral hazard. It was created as an engine to hasten a political objective – namely, 
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development and fair competition. The similarities to other schools of liberalism 
notwithstanding, ordoliberalism strongly emphasises regulation of cartels and monopolies. It 
also differs from Anglo-Saxon liberalism as it permits that “governments should regulate 
markets in such a way that market outcome approximates the theoretical outcome in a 
perfectly competitive market” (DULLIEN; GUÉROT, 2012, p. 3). 
In order to ensure a regulated market that works similarly as a theoretical competitive 
model, ordoliberalism stresses the importance of a rule-based set of policies. Therefore, 
Merkel’s rigour with rules indicated compromise with ordoliberal principles. During the 
eurozone crisis, German leaders like Jens Weidmann, the Bundesbank president, and 
Wolfgang Schäuble, the finance minister, invoked ordoliberalism as a rule of norms capable 
of fastening an abstract ideal of the European economy. Nevertheless, ordoliberalism pledges 
in law to pursue current account surpluses without considering other countries deficits. 
Thereby, when considering the eurozone heterogeneity, an economic idea compatible with the 
German context is inconsistent with the myriad of European varieties of capitalism that 
coexist in the EU. 
Developed by German scholars from the University of Freiburg during the second half 
of the 1930s, Ordoliberalism was as a response to the deficiencies of the Nazi German 
economy. Hjalmar Schacht, the finance minister of Nazi Germany, induced growth through 
expansionary economic policies that were strangling the German economy in the long-term 
(TOOZE, 2006). When Germany commenced World War II, scholars from Freiburg decided 
to circumvent the risk of censorship by planning an economic idea that would ensure 
economic stability in the postwar period.  
Led by Walter Eucken and Franz Böhm, German scholars in Freiburg discussed 
economic ideas envisioning to eventually shape the future of the German economy after the 
war. Based at Freiburg University, they released a series of articles in a magazine called 
ORDO (derivate from the Latin “Order”) to diffuse their ideas. Soon, the Freiburg School 
designed a set of ideas to refute the planned economic activity of Nazi Germany. Moreover, 
they were wary of the extreme economic rigidity imposed by the Weimar Republic to appease 
markets. 
German economists were distant from Anglo-Saxon liberalism because of the German 
hyperinflation of 1923, caused by World War I’ indemnities interwoven with an undervalued 
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Deutschmark. Also, the German government adopted by decree harsh austerity measures after 
capital flow from the United States halted because of the Great Depression. The instability of 
the German economy in the interwar period thus served as a cautionary tale against the gold 
standard and unfettered markets.  
Attentive to the defects of the absolute control of the state during Schacht’s term as 
finance minister and the instability of the Weimar Republic during the Great Depression, the 
Freiburg School focused on price stability as the leading indicator of the economy. The 
genocidal disaster provoked by Schacht’s planned economy became an antithesis of the 
Freiburg School’s thought, but criticism to the former finance minister did not exclude the 
state’s role in the economy. In their view, the Nazi economy corrupted the state’s role in the 
economy. Thereby, German inclination towards liberalism stressed that governments should 
improve markets in the economy, interfering only when market failures appeared in order to 
secure market equilibrium. 
The series of essays published in the “ORDO” magazine aimed to conciliate the 
actions of markets and state harmoniously through strict antitrust standards. As the magazine 
gained an audience, it drew scholars and policymakers to the Freiburg school. Contrasting 
with liberal economists concerning the state’s role in markets, members sympathetic to the 
Freiburg thought became known as “ordoliberals” due to the magazine.   
Members of the Freiburg school wanted to coordinate the relations between law and 
economics to adjust the role of the state in the economy. Walter Eucken advocated six 
constitutive principles that ruled ordoliberalism, denoted as the functioning of the price 
system, the primacy of currency policy, open markets, private property, freedom of contract, 
liability, and the constancy of economic policy (EUCKEN, 1952). In their view, the rule of 
norms was capable of adapting the state to supervise the existence of market anomalies to 
ensure perfect competition. Ordoliberals strived for the ordering of the institutional 
framework (Ordnungspolitik), improving the state’s supervisory role to systematise an ideal 
social order of capitalism that allowed a harmonious relationship between the state and the 
economy (PTAK, 2009, p. 101). 
The Freiburg school developed ordoliberal ideas to safeguard price stability and mend 
market failures, but fundamental anxieties continued influencing the school. Eucken analysed 
the state as too apart from society to function with legitimacy, so he envisioned the economic 
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order as a theoretical underpinning to maintain the German state laced with society. Eucken 
understood that social forces, interest groups, and mass movements were in constant stress to 
control the state, intending to influence it towards their political projects. Consequently, 
Eucken (1932, p. 316) affirms that the state must free itself from the power of the masses and 
the economy to circumvent individual interests, securing the freedom of the markets. Instead 
of arguing in economic terms, Eucken preferred to analyse the economy using tools from 
"world history, international politics, the state, and society" (BIEBRICHER; VOGELMANN, 
2017, p. 42). Those views on liberty relate with Friedrich von Hayek's, who "wanted to limit 
democracy in order to end government intervention in the economy." (IRVING, 2017, p. 7).  
Walter Eucken (1932, p. 306) feared the intensity of democratic participation in 
government because it could alter the liberal state into a redistributive, social-democratic 
state. As Eucken worried about the historical and political context, he imagined that 
democratic pressures would increase, surging further redistribution. For that reason, the 
Freiburg economist thought that the "end of the European political order" and the breach of 
the "international equilibrium on the democratisation of the world" undeniably rifted the 
global economic order. Eucken considered the emergence of democracy as a fissure in 
economics, shackling economics with democracy. Nevertheless, other ordoliberals such as 
Wilhelm Röpke, Alexander Rüstow, and Alfred Müller-Armack wrote intensely about the 
issue, shaping the nascent ordoliberal thinking (PTAK, 2009, p. 109). 
Unbeknownst to one another, they reflected on the transformation of liberal ideas in 
the German culture as a reaction to economic structures that entrenched Germany between the 
Anglo-Saxon gold standard and the Nazism's planned economy (JAMES, 2017, p. 27). The 
turbulence of post-war Germany gave further prominence to ordoliberal ideas among elites in 
economics, politics, and academia (PTAK, 2009, p. 120). The Freiburg school entered the 
economic mainstream as members from universities engaged with the public debate during 
post-war planning. Moreover, politicians like Franz Böhm and Ludwig Erhard gave 
prominence to the idea. 
As ordoliberalism gained adepts within the German government after World War II, 
the miscellany of Freiburg school’s epistemic reflections engendered specificities in the 
ordoliberal though. Therefore, ordoliberalism interweaved theoretical science, dogma, and 
practical economic policymaking. Furthermore, Eucken's theoretical work was not the sole 
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basis for the development of ordoliberal thought; other theorists who emphasised their 
primary objective as the establishment of a socially embedded and rule-centered order 
convened an inclination towards a cultural turn that emphasised the role of the state. As 
argued by Brigitte Young (2017, p. 32), many independent intellectuals who developed their 
branches of ordoliberalism not necessarily developed strong ties with Freiburg. 
There was no such thing as a single ordoliberal school. Ideas from Freiburg School’s 
members changed significantly after the Second World War. The ordoliberal classical view 
portrayed by Eucken is thus a facet of a conjunct of different 'ordoliberalisms'.  Thus, theorists 
such as Alexander Rüstow, Alfred Müller-Armack, Wolfgang Röpcke, and Franz Böhm 
deepened different inclinations of the Freiburg School. That group represents a contrast 
between the classical view of Ordnungspolitik with the cultural turn that reflected the social 
and cultural transformations of German society. 
Franz Böhm was one of the founders of the CDU. Even though Erhard became the 
finance minister that liberalised the German economy, Böhm worked as an expert on the 
Scientific Advisory Council of the Ministry of Economics. Thereby, he elaborated the 
restrictions on monopolies and cartels throughout the elaboration of the 'Restriction of 
Competition Act' (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen) in 1957 (BIEBRICHER; 
VOGELMANN, 2017, p. 109). According to the CDU politician's view, monopolies were a 
manifestation of concentrated economic power that twisted the price system, threatening the 
stability of the currency in its normative and practical designs (BÖHM, 1947, p. 498). Like 
Erhard, Böhm became known as an economic policymaker that praised a rules-based system 
that ensured fair competition and the stability of prices. 
Young (2017) stated that ordoliberalism’s purposes differ according to different 
members that socialised with the Freiburg School without belonging to it. Likewise, their 
contexts influenced their methods, practices, and research. Alfred Müller-Armack, Wilhelm 
Röpke, and Alexander Rüstow imbued economic liberalism from a sociological view that 
outlined German moral standards.         
Alfred Müller-Armack joined the Nazi Party in 1933, believing that the planned 
economy was capable of sustaining the German economy better than the Weimar Republic 
did. Interested in the history of capitalism, he juxtaposed it with Marxism, and later with 
religious sociology, to develop the theory that voluntarism would suppress the crisis of 
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capitalism (PTAK, 2009, p. 116). During his time as a professor of economics at the 
University of Münster, Müller-Armack researched the "Third Reich iteration of European 
integration to seek economic solutions for the Nazi Empire in Eastern 
Europe" (SLOBODIAN, 2018, p. 189). Nevertheless, Müller-Armack's connection with 
Erhard during the war pushed him from the position of professor at the University of Köln to 
leader of the policy department in Erhard's Economics Ministry in 1952. His active role in the 
German administration and his ability to conciliate with others conceived the term 'social 
market economy' (SLOBODIAN, 2018, p. 190). During that time, Müller-Armack abandoned 
his strong fascination for Italian fascism, becoming a faithful supporter of (Protestant) 
Christianity alongside his "search for a philosophical foundation and additional legitimacy in 
social theory for the economic orientation of ordoliberalism" (PTAK, 2009, p. 116). The 
influence of Christian moral standards leaned ordoliberalism towards the belief of moral 
hazard, as Christian values enabled individuals to resist the temptation of planning. Thus, 
Alfred Müller-Armack weaved ordoliberal thought with the Christian inclination of economic 
morality. 
Oppositely to Müller-Armack, Alexander Rüstow was in exile during the Nazi 
Germany period. Living in Istanbul, Rüstow returned to Germany, becoming a professor of 
social sciences at Heidelberg. Before Nazi Germany, Rüstow worked as a researcher at an 
industry devoted to pushing against cartels and antitrust measures called VDMA (Verein 
deutscher Maschinenbauanstalten). During his time at VDMA, Rüstow had contact with 
"political circles close to Van Papen and others who formed one of the last democratically 
elected governments in Weimar Germany" (BIEBRICHER; VOGELMANN, 2017, p. 138). 
Rüstow contact with lobbying infused him with suspicion about the role of unfettered markets 
in the German economy. As a matter of fact, he defended a robust state that surpassed political 
parties and the economy (RÜSTOW, 1963, p. 258). Rüstow's severe criticism of liberalism 
deviates from his complex ambivalence towards the state. He supported welfare assistance to 
inject workers in the labour market through enhanced qualification or education, emphasizing 
solidarity between workers and industries, similar to wage negotiation of CME. Moreover, 
Rüstow's faith in an organic society contrasts with his wariness with urban life, as he put it as 
an adverse social effect that separated humans from connection with the rural land, raising 
accusations from Ludwig von Mises that he "romanticised rural life." (SLOBODIAN, 2018, 
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p. 85). Converging with Müller-Armack and Wilhelm Röpke, he had a genuine interest in 
religion, interpreting the 'crisis of capitalism' that appalled ordoliberals as "an encompassing 
cultural crisis that engulfs modern man not only as an economic actor [...] but as a being 
whose holistically understood organic situation is deficient." (BIEBRICHER; 
VOGELMANN, 2017, p. 141).   
Rüstow concerns over the conditions of workers combined economic, societal, and 
cultural issues.  He designed the idea of organic policies (Vitalpolitik) to improve the living 
standards of workers in order to restore attachment to the German community (RÜSTOW, 
1951, p. 457). Rüstow focused on welfare inclusion in order to raise satisfaction, improving 
economics as conflict diminishes. Therefore, he "championed the idea of Vitalpolitik as a 
state instrument to create ethical conditions of self-reliance in society, thus countering the 
ethics of state dependency that he associated with socialism" (IRVING, 2017, p.8). His view 
of an organic society incorporated a nostalgic idea of German nostalgia, labour relations, and 
economics. Nevertheless, his deep contempt for Anglo-Saxon liberalism engendered his 
support for Carl Schmitt's theory of a semi-authoritarian state (Obrigkeitstaat) as a solution to 
the risks of democracy (KELLY, 2016, p. 236). Rüstow was extremely critic of liberalism and 
pluralist democracy due to his view that a "weak state was the result of welfare state 
interventionism legitimated by parliamentarian democracy", therefore "at the mercy of the 
interest groups of the plural society" (PTAK, 2009, p. 116). 
Rüstow and Wilhelm Röpke envisioned to "translate the metaphysic of Ordo into a 
concrete political program [...] complementing the normative framework of the ordoliberal 
economy with an analysis of the transition from the present to the ideal future" (PTAK, 2009, 
p. 105). Moreover, Müller-Armack’s attention to the Christian tradition converges with 
Wilhelm Röpke's conservative critique of culture. Rüstow, Müller-Armack, and Röpke shaped 
ordoliberalism into a sociological perspective that became "an undercurrent of ordoliberalism, 
namely, sociological liberalism, which is distinct from the Freiburg School narrowly speaking 
with its focus on political economy and law", labelled as the cultural turn of ordoliberalism 
(BIEBRICHER; VOGELMANN, 2017, p. 139). They mainly underlined the "importance of 
sociopolitical integration, which was intended to mitigate the centrifugal forces of a market-
oriented organisation of society, by offering all and sundry alternatives to the proposals of 
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social liberals and socialists" (PTAK, 2009, p. 107). They were fundamentally "against 
Marxism [...], but also against the Keynesian economic theory"  (PTAK, 2009, p. 112). 
Röpke was a German economist who fled Germany because of his opposition to 
Hitler's government in 1933. After a period as professor of economics at the University of 
Istanbul, Röpke settled in Geneva. The economist was consonant with Eucken that "economic 
nationalism was [...] a rational attempt by the diverse groups within a nation to use their 
political influence to secure the maximum economic advantages from the 
state." (SLOBODIAN, 2018, p. 115). Likewise, Röpke's mistrust of democracy highlighted 
the support for authoritarian forms of government to "counteract the degeneration of 
economic policy produced by mass democracy". (SLOBODIAN, 2018, p. 116). He condoned 
the fact that a 'democratic dictatorship' was necessary to evade the perils of the masses, 
calling for a plebiscitary model similar to the one defended by Carl Schmitt (RÖPKE, 1942, 
p. 256). Röpke defended that markets could reduce humans to an 'unnatural being', so states 
should draw a firm economic framework that controlled markets. His perception of the crisis 
of modern capitalist society approached him with sociological stances of economics, embuing 
his thoughts in 'religious-conservatism' (RÖPKE, 1948, p. 226). Nevertheless, Röpke 
vigorously defended an independent central bank that protected price stability and resisted 
short-term political influences (RÖPKE, 1960, p. 196).  
Röpke's regard to institutions led his beliefs towards ordoliberalism. He advanced to 
members of the Walter Lippman Colloquium that liberals should learn with conservatism to 
concern over other elements besides economics because they influenced all other instances 
(SLOBODIAN, 2018, p. 84). While ordoliberals though on the specific German context, 
Röpke proposed a strong state situated in a global federation that would ensure the world 
economic order (SLOBODIAN, 2018, p. 115). Röpke was close to Eucken and other 
ordoliberals in his support the separation of the state from the economy. That influence 
pervaded the German economist when he elaborated legal concepts that emphasised the 
political sphere (imperium) containing economic nationalism (dominium). Therefore, "A 
strong state--resistant to the pressures of democratic influence--would be necessary to 
safeguard the economic constitution of the world" (SLOBODIAN, 2018, p. 117-118). Röpke 
tried to entice figures of Mont Pèlerin such as Hayek and Mises to Geneva, demonstrating a 
project about the economic benefits of a world federation that restrained governments from 
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economics, as "governing a territory did not mean owning the property within 
it" (SLOBODIAN, 2018, p. 138). However, liberals from the Mont Pèlerin society followed 
the innovative ideas of the United States, leaving Röpke with his disciples in the so-called 
"Geneva School". They advocated that international organisations should restrain nations 
from reining global capitalism, allowing economic autonomy to leave free markets regulating 
the free flow of capital and investment over borders" (SLOBODIAN, 2018, p. 154). 
Meanwhile, CDU politicians were the first to adapt ordoliberal ideas to their political 
programs. The Christian values that inspired the party resonated with the sociological heritage 
that was inherent to the Freiburg school thought. Likewise, CDU politicians contributed to the 
evolution of the theoretical economic liberalism into a social market economy by executing 
ordoliberal ideas in public policy. 
The efforts made by the Freiburg school to think of solutions to German economic 
challenges enthralled Ludwig Erhard, the director of the German bi-zonal administration in 
1948. Erhard obtained his PhD in microeconomics during Nazi Germany and was one of the 
Mont Pèlerin Society’s founders, engaging in prolific debates with its members (BURGIN, 
2012, p. 134). Erhard had a genuine interest in liberal ideas, but he was a politician, inclined 
to negotiate more than ordoliberal scholars. His economic orientation leaning towards 
liberalism evolved from constant contact with famous economists such as Hayek and Röpke. 
When Konrad Adenauer from the CDU became German Chancellor in 1949, he 
invited Ludwig Erhard to assume the ministry of economic affairs. Close to the group, Erhard 
hired Müller-Armack to work in the policy department of the Economic ministry while kept 
Röpke as a close adviser to him and Adenauer (PTAK, 2009, p. 121). As a minister, Erhard 
had the chance to “adopt a series of nearly irreversible framework decisions that shaped and 
constrained all subsequent political and economic options.” (SCHARPF, 2018, p. 8). The 
minister of economic affairs planned to politically maneuverer Germany in the direction of a 
‘social market economy’. With Adenauer’s blessing, the CDU government worked to liberate 
markets without supporting domestic industries. Recurring to continuous financial aid from 
the Marshall Plan, Adenauer and Erhard safeguarded stability to the working class to soften 
the impact of unfettered markets in the German economy. 
The minister of economic affairs removed post-war rationing, price regulations, 
eliminated the tax on imports and liberalised capital exchanges along with currency 
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convertibility (SCHARPF, 2018, p. 8). To guarantee price stability, the Bundesbank raised 
minimum capital requirements to keep the Deutsche Mark undervalued, but capital flow 
continued pushing wages higher as the German economy moved toward full employment 
(SCHARPF, 2018, p. 9). The result of those policies became known as the “German 
miracle” (Wirtschaftswunder) of the 1950s, alluring the attention of Western governments. 
American and British observers described the innovative role of the state in creating the 
necessary framework for a market economy (JONES, 2012, p. 291).  
The “German miracle” permitted Erhard to succeed Adenauer as German chancellor. 
The autonomy of the Bundesbank to protect price stability combined with Erhard policies to 
eliminate wages and price controls permitted the innovation of the state’s role in the economy, 
as the German minister of economic affairs liberalised the economy ahead of other European 
economies (SCHARPF, 2018, p. 10). Opening markets without protection to domestic 
industries and showing a secure attachment to fiscal-rules, the adoption of ordoliberalism was 
possible due to a social pact between the political elites and the people. 
The “German version” of liberalism” was so successful that transformed the meaning 
of ordoliberalism into a specific case of economic formula instead of a theoretical concept. 
The ‘social market economy’ influenced think tanks, universities, and economic newspapers, 
forging a consensus of state economic coordination as an utmost requisite for an adequate 
growth model. According to Farrell and Quiggin (2017, p. 272), the German federal 
government “set the agenda on international macroeconomic coordination”. However: 
“Germany’s economics “knowledge regime” involves a variety of federal and 
private actors, but the crucial intermediary body is the Council of Economic Experts 
(Sachsverständigenrat), a highly influential body of well-respected economists, 
which provides economists with formal input into German policy debates. Unlike 
the Council of Economic Advisors, the German Council is not formally a part of 
government, is non-partisan, and has considerable independent political 
clout.” (FARRELL; QUIGGIN, 2017, p. 272)  
Because of its “knowledge regime" that valorised consensus among economists and 
policymakers, ordoliberal ideas that emphasised the ‘social market economy' pervaded 
German economic policymaking since efforts to state reconstruction after WWII. The 
execution of the Freiburg school’s thought intertwined economic orthodoxy with “advantages 
for the working class that secured the market economy” different “from left-wing calls for 
egalitarian redistribution” under stringent rules that coordinated the market economy 
(BUGIN, 2012, p. 292). Erhard’s economic reforms, therefore, hijacked left-wing and 
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Keynesian demands before the end of the Bretton Woods regime, consolidating 
ordoliberalism as the economic mainstream among German policymakers.  
The German commitment to trade liberalisation aggravated the balance-of-payments 
situation, pressuring further reforms in the labour market. Changing conditions for economic 
growth pressured CDU leaders to adjust the German economy while safeguarding protection 
for workers without resorting to redistribution. The economic impact of Erhard’s reforms 
plummeted employment in the primary sector, forcing workers to search for opportunities in 
the public and private sectors, which increased at a slow rate (SCHARPF, 2018, p. 10). The 
expansion of German industries drawn unoccupied Germans to their ranks. However, 
structural changes carried by incessant trade liberalisation impelled industries to raise 
productivity, lowering wages with workers as a manner to remain economically competitive. 
Ordoliberalism represented a branch of the economic thought that interwoven the 
social transformations of Germany with a conciliatory vision of liberalism in order to 
maintain stability during the troubled times of the reconstruction. Policymakers hence reduced 
the ordoliberal ideas as an economic strategy to reduce social distress within German society. 
Ralf Ptak (2009, p. 125) points out that ordoliberalism was used by German policymakers to 
underpin the market economy as a permanent dynamic order, suppressing societal conflicts 
through the preservation of moral community values while secured economic growth because 
of rule-based competition.  
However, Ptak (2009, p. 126) concludes that the Freiburg school’ ideas failed to 
accomplish its normative ideals. Ordoliberals were a product of Nazi Germany’s historical 
context. Those thinkers conceived their ideas as a solution to ceaseless “crisis of capitalism”, 
planning a harmonic order amid an unstable period. Contemptuous of laissez-faire capitalism 
that brought the Great Depression and the catastrophic consequences of Schlacht’s planned 
economy, ordoliberals envisaged ‘moral’ markets and a stratified society that could not mature 
without unsparing authoritarian elements. The dogmatic and normative attributes of 
ordoliberalism were thus unsuitable with a plural society. The assumptions of ordoliberals 
such as Röpcke and Müller-Armack that a set of ideas could permanently resolve social, 
political, and economic affairs missed societal transformations. Nonetheless, their influence 
did not halt. 
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‘Social market economy’ was adopted by German political parties in order to obtain 
votes from the CDU, standardising its principles through the political spectrum. Furthermore, 
different schools of economic thought such as the Austrians used the particularities of 
‘German liberalism’ to sophisticate their arguments about the state’s role in the economy. As 
ordoliberals like Walter Eucken and Ludwig Erhard constituted with other liberal economists 
an epistemic community that interacted through the Mont Pèlerin Society, they took part of 
discussions about liberalism’s variation in Europe and the United States. As analysed by 
Brigitte Young (2017, p 36), the evolution of ordoliberalism in Germany strongly contrasted 
with the Anglo-Saxon branch of liberalism due to its German negative inclination towards 
unfettered neoliberalism. 
The “programmatic” beliefs of German parties continued providing “guidelines for 
practical activity and the formulation of solutions to everyday problems” (BERMAN, 1998, p. 
21). Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard thus became one of the “ideational entrepreneurs 
who actively modify agents’ beliefs about what their interests are” (BLYTH, 2003, p. 698).  
After the German elections of 1969, the CDU remained the largest party in the 
Bundestag but was obliged to form a new coalition due to FDP’s decision to abandon Erhard’s 
government. The SPD’s ascension in the elections of 1969 settled the formation of a grand 
coalition with the CDU. Using the Marxist legacy of the party to pressure for further social 
traces in economic policy, the Social Democratic Party continued shaping ordoliberalism 
towards a ‘social market’ growth model. Nevertheless, the decline of Bretton Woods 
pressured wage policies against the Bundesbank stability stance, but the German central bank 
was resolute to constrain monetary policy in order to defend price stability (SCHARPF, 2018, 
p. 12-13). As the institutional paradigm shifted, ordoliberal appeals for price stability and the 
independence of the central bank gained ground. The ordoliberal rule-based order that 
monitored economic policy was adamant to subdue democratic control, bequeathing to the 
German government the role of social supervision due to the instabilities of the global 
economic order.     
Economic policymaking assumed a profound technocratic profile in Germany. 
Economists received a significant and independent role in German policy debates, beguiling 
considerable media attraction. According to Farrell and Quiggin (2017, p. 275), the Council of 
Economic Experts became “vehemently anti-Keynesian” from the early 1970s on. That shift 
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indicated a more significant trend within the German economics profession, as the Council 
mirrored the position of German academic economists. 
The autonomy of the Bundesbank interlaced with German orthodoxy had a paramount 
impact in contemporary European politics. German economists were sceptical of a 
progressive monetary union because of French ambitions to use the future European currency 
as a policy instrument. 
Erhard mistrusted France's interest. The German finance minister strongly opposed the 
European common market, fearing that "a European customs union would hinder a worldwide 
liberalisation of trade" (MAES, 2004, p. 26). However, Adenauer bypassed the finance 
minister stance, making an approximation with the French his priority. While Röpke was 
intensely against integration that could restrain free markets in Germany, Müller-Armack 
changed his negative leaning gradually changing. 
Ordoliberals were not interested in European integration. Only Wilhelm Röpke 
defended a global view of trade. However, he was against French influence in German 
economic policymaking, pervading French Dirigisme through Europe. Müller-Armack, 
working in Erhard's cabinet, bound together economic elements that ensured restriction of 
competition and prioritised the "four freedoms": goods, capital, services, and labour. 
(SLOBODIAN, 2018, p. 190). Müller-Armack participation in pushing the accord above the 
Coal and Steel Community, focusing on liberalisation and antitrust policy, kept him as a 
member of the Committee on the Common Market that eventually designed the Spaak report. 
As Slobodian (2018, p. 202) notes, "the very Austrians and Germans who had proposed 
federal and supranational solutions through the 1930s and 1940s opposed European 
integration."    
Nevertheless, conscious that global economic forces compelled minimum monetary 
consensus among European member states, the Germans embraced EMU (MORAVCSIK, 
1998). The fateful decision did not hinder German economists and politicians to push for an 
orthodox consensus that favoured anti-inflationary policies (MCNAMARA, 1998). Using the 
Bundesbank as a model for the ECB, Germany embedded its economic policy in the 
European Union. The “Brussels-Frankfurt consensus” was therefore structured to restrain 
states irresponsible fiscal policy and guarantee price stability.  
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The insulation of European monetary policy in order to secure sound finance and price 
stability had cost to the German economy. Nicolas Jabko (2010, p. 324) highlights that 
globalisation combined with the ubiquitous perception that German unification could engage 
into “major imbalance of power at the heart of Europe” induced Europeans to push for the 
EMU. Europeans knew that their economies depended intrinsically on the Bundesbank, so the 
best option was to negotiate flexible exceptions of the Maastricht criteria. On the other hand, 
German involvement in regional integration (Einbidungspolitik) shouldered multilateral 
policies that weakened the economy.  
German reunification was the opposite of Germany’s stance of caution and 
incrementalism to the EMU. Abraham Newman (2010, p. 152) affirms that the disorderly and 
radical process to reunify the country shifted German foreign economic policy towards 
regional cooperation. The costs of reunification and modernisation of the East German 
economy resulted in a deep recession that appealed the country at the beginning of the 2000s. 
The consequences of German reunification contrasted the European multilateralism with its 
wary isolationist conservatism. In the face of economic uncertainty, Germans emphasised 
regional identity to expose dissatisfaction against further economic integration.    
The high numbers of unemployment and economic deficits during the end-90s 
diminished German political will “to support a solidaristic policy path” (NEWMAN, 2015, p. 
120). Consequently, German leaders interpreted the eurozone crisis as the direct result of 
ineffective rules. In their view, Germany had no reason to be directly involved in other 
countries’ politics or to manage European problems. 
3.3 Germany between Rules and Dis(order) or the influence of Ordoliberalism 
The lack of formal European institutions specialised in crisis management forced 
Mediterranean, Baltic and Eastern countries to seek financial aid to core members of the 
eurozone. However, discussions about fiscal stimulus soon became arguments between 
European states in which some counted for more than others (DREZNER, 2014). The 
eurozone crisis exposed the difference in economic power between the core and the periphery 
of Europe. Moreover, the polarisation of the crisis aggravated due to the asymmetrical 
economic power between Germany and France. Notwithstanding Sarkozy’s efforts to unleash 
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economic stimulus under “European solidarity”, Merkel was the European leader managing 
the crisis. The reunion of the German chancellor and Sarkozy at Deauville on 18th October 
2010 revealed their divergent views. Even though both leaders reached a modest agreement 
against the crisis in Europe, divergent worldviews of France and Germany impeded an 
effective coordinate policy (BRUNNERMEIER; JAMES; LANDAU, 2016). 
Functioning as the core of European integration, the development of the Franco-
German relationship ceased. Sarkozy jilted bargaining policies to side with Merkel, hoping to 
convince her to change Germany’s support for austerity and adopt alternative measures 
(VAIL, 2015, p. 148). However, the political fragility of Sarkozy and Merkel’s national 
coalition with the FDP impeded further commitments. As the crisis continued, the German 
commitment with Europe focused on enforcing the stability of the euro.  
The hawkish economic FDP obstructed talks about financial burden-sharing, 
disregarding European solidarity as an excuse to incentive Mediterranean profligacy. Liberals 
in the Bundestag rejected proposals of Eurobonds or debt-restructuring, emphasising moral 
responsibility as the leading cause of the crisis. Sebastian Düllien and Ulrike Guérot (2012) 
uttered the influence of moral hazard and currency stability as primary drivers of 
ordoliberalism, asserting the FDP’s entirely fiscal conservatism based on the Freiburg School 
principles. 
Germany’s persistence in austerity measures to European countries highlighted the 
importance that ordoliberal ideas possess among German political elites. Wolfgang Schäuble, 
Merkel’s finance minister from the CDU, reiterated continually that his origins from Freiburg 
strongly influenced his economic vision. Moreover, Schäuble cited frequently Walter 
Eucken’s arguments defending constitutional principles for a working economic order 
(BUNDESFINANZMINISTERIUM, 2012). Likewise, Jens Weidmann, the Bundesbank 
president, emphatically called for ordoliberal concepts to endorse liabilities and financial rules 
(BUNDESBANK, 2012; BUNDESBANK 2015).    
Merkel’s stance towards austerity is ambiguous in comparison to other main German 
leaders involved in the eurozone crisis. Receiving severe pressure from the United States and 
China, the German chancellor stressed the importance of fiscal stimulus to avoid a global 
depression in financial markets. Nonetheless, Merkel emphasised moral hazard and the 
importance of rigid financial rules to fix the eurozone, declaring that “rules must be adhered 
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to, adherence must be monitored, non-adherence must have consequences” (DIE 
BUNDESREGIERUNG, 2011). Supporting European countries in trouble to hew to structural 
reforms, the chancellor ignored European particularities and backed up the creation of 
rigorous financial rules to ensure that containment of the financial crisis. As the table shows, 
constitutional principals became the framework for European economic governance: 
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Table 2 - EU Fiscal Crisis Measures  14
Source: EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2019 
France’s pragmatic approach with Germany did not hamper German hegemonic 
position within the eurozone (ERLANGER, 2011). As a result, Sarkozy’s intention to use 
French support as a manoeuvre to change German’s European policy failed to advance. 
Responsible for a weak French economic performance and seen as subservient to Merkel’s 
decisions, Sarkozy saw his popularity’s deterioration dangerously close to the 2012 French 
elections. Suspicious of Strauss-Kahn’s electoral ambitions in France, Sarkozy vehemently 
opposed the IMF involvement in the eurozone. However, his reluctance was ruled out by 
Merkel, who declared that Germany would not be involved in the crisis unless the IMF took 
part in the program.    
Unable to distance himself from Merkel, Sarkozy’s period as president ended without 
giving him the opportunity to approve reforms that emphasised “European solidarity”. 
Germany’s commitment to austerity in Mediterranean Europe continued questioned during the 
2012 French elections. Throughout the campaign, the socialist François Hollande and Front 
National’s Marine Le Pen obtained votes attacking Germany. While Hollande promised a 
changed role of Europe in European countries affected by the crisis, Le Pen used eurosceptic 
rhetoric that rejected France’s responsibility in the EU. Emphasising the end of austerity and 
the principle of European solidarity, Hollande became the French president. Merkel and 
Schäuble, who did not support the new French president during the campaign, expressed that 
the Fiscal Compact was non-negotiable (TRAYNOR; CONNOLY, 2012). 
Measure Entry into Force
The Stability and Growth Pact January 1999
The "Six-Pack" (5 regulations + 1 
directive)
December 2011
The "Fiscal Compact" or Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and 
Governance (TSCG)
January 2013 (for the 16 EU members 
with early ratification); April 2014 (all, 
except UK and Czech Republic)
The "Two-Pack" May 2013
 To see a more detailed summary of measures taken by the EU institutions and EU countries to better 14
coordinate their economic policies, see Annex B 
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Avoiding a clash with Merkel, Hollande chose a cautious approach in his European 
foreign policy to the crisis. The French president promised to stabilise France’s ratio of debt 
to GDP by the end of 2015 in order to soften orthodoxy at the European level. However, he 
recognised later that financial stabilisation in the short-time was impossible. The French 
president infused a domestic version of austerity while defended an alternative view of 
development that stimulates economic growth, showing that France could disagree with 
Germany only if allowed with conservative measures at home (VAIL, 2015, p. 155).  
Hollande’s disagreement with Merkel over European issues, defending a less harsh 
economic policy, was endorsed by Portugal, Spain, and Italy. Defending the use of 
Eurobonds, policy coordination among European states and involvement of the European 
Investment Banks to stimulate development, Hollande pretended to disrupt the “Brussels-
Frankfurt consensus”. Nonetheless, he was unable to alleviate the structural reforms that 
Mediterranean Europe countries implemented in their economies. Sarkozy and Hollande’s 
endeavours to contain ordoliberalism in Europe was thus unrealistic. The top-down domestic 
economic reforms in France weakened the presidency, leaving it incapacitated to manage the 
crisis at the European-level (VAIL, 2015, p. 140).  
However, Hollande and other Southern European leaders continued emphasising 
solidaristic arguments to promote economic equality. Northerner leaders continued defending 
a regime of strict economic rules that led to a technocratic government in Greece without 
considering electoral consequences. Even though austerity was carried on by governments; 
voters did not accept it; hence they regarded mainstream parties as illegitimate. Consequently, 
Southern European countries started to suffer democratic backlashes because of austerity 
(MATTHIJS, 2016). The disillusionment with Greek political elites that supported 
Papademos’ government caused the rise of fringe parties such as the far-right Golden Dawn 
and left-populist SYRIZA. As Jan-Werner Müller (2016, p. 65) elucidated, technocrats and 
populists, therefore, pave the way for the other, because each legitimises the belief that there 
is no room for disagreement. […] Each holds that there is only one correct policy and only 
one authentic popular will respectively. When Alexis Tsipras convened European leaders and 
the troika to discuss the Greek referendum’s result, disagreements between Northerner and 
Southern European countries bloomed. Emmanuel Macron, France’s economy minister, 
related that “Greece was provoking a veritable European civil war, a war of religion, with the 
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Nordics, the East Europeans, Germany and the Netherlands in one camp, and France, Italy, 
Spain and the rest in the other” (MACRON apud TOOZE, 2018, p. 568). Southern European 
leaders regarded Greece as a symbolic case of undemocratic governance that was 
disintegrating the EU. Merkel was unwilling to assume the domestic political cost of letting 
Greece go, so the chancellor sidelined Macron and other European leaders sympathetic to 
Greece in the final phase of the negotiations with Tsipras. 
Merkel refused to cede to Greek demands. Facing the prospect of a German 
parliament tired of further bailouts, the chancellor wanted Greece to assume all of its financial 
commitments. Dissensus between Merkel and Tsipras increased when the chancellor 
demanded Greece to earn €50 billion in assets to privatise and to surrender it to a trust fund in 
Luxembourg. 
The privatisation fund was the most controversial subject (BLUSTEIN, 2016, p. 439). 
However, Merkel and Tsipras did not want to relinquish their stance. Tsipras refused the fund 
for a question of ‘sovereignty’, disposed to accept the fund if it stayed in Greece instead of 
Luxembourg, which was granted by Merkel. Moreover, the Greek prime minister bided half 
the fund for investment in Greece, which was intensely rebuffed by Merkel, remarking that 
Greece should divert only €10 billion of the fund. 
Merkel, Tsipras, Tusk, Holland, and Tsakalotos faced the prospected of a no-deal as 
the negotiations could not conclude. European leaders texted Tusk proposing to raise the €10 
billion offer to €12.5 billion. Against Hollande’s pleas to accept the fund’s raise, the German 
chancellor rejected the proposal. Visibly frustrated, Tsipras and the Merkel wanted to suspend 
the talks. At that point Tusk intervened, appealing to Merkel’s sense of her legacy. Tusk 
affirmed that both parties could cease to continue the negotiations, but if that happened, he 
would declare to everyone that they let the EU disintegrate over a ‘negligible’ amount of 
money. The political repercussion’s prospect of “breaking Europe” altered Merkel’s posture. 
The ultimate goal was to preserve the unity of the EU. That was far more important than 
settling Greek debt. In the end, Merkel and Tsipras decided to share the difference. The Greek 
economy, in shambles, would receive the third bailout, but recovery was still far from view. 
The feasibility of breaking the European Union and destabilising the Euro induced 
Germany to protect the common currency. However, the severity of the fiscal-rules 
framework of economic governance created a schism among Southern European countries. 
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The Greek election of 2015 signalled that structural reforms were not admissible. The fact 
that there was no other option to Greece aside from leaving the euro notwithstanding, the 
draconian requirements proposed by Northerner leaders were questioned even by members of 
the troika.       
The flawed structured of the euro menaced the Brussels-Frankfurt consensus. Aiming 
to establish a strict regime of fiscal rules and competition in order to ensure sound public 
finance, Germany and other Northern European countries moralised technocracy. As a result, 
creditors approved the deposition of democratic-elected leaders in Greece and Italy, thus 
imposing technocratic governments that would comply with the reforms of the MoU 
(CULPEPPER, 2014). Even though the command of Italy under Mario Monti and Papademos 
in Greece did not mean an authoritarian-model of liberalism, economic policymaking had to 
be resonant with the MoU.   
The euro’s reckoning signified, in Historical Institutionalism terms, a ‘critical 
juncture’. In the words of Amy Verdun (2015, p. 222), “a critical juncture is a period in which 
there is a transition and there are various alternative options from which to choose. The 
institutional structure chosen affects the future for a considerable time to come”. The 
eurozone crisis represented the rupture of European elites’ belief that the common currency 
was immune to the financial crisis. However, Germany’s decision to involve the IMF in the 
crisis, form the Troika and coordinate the negotiations with the GIIPS to set the terms of the 
MoU triggered off the evolution of the crisis instead of controlling it. By that means, the 
decisions of European leaders that led to the events of the Greek spring in July 2015 are such 
a moment. Nevertheless, Merkel was careful enough to control disarray that could result in 
the break-up of the euro even if it meant raising opposition at home. 
The fiscal rules that Germany backed, later enshrined at the European constitution, at 
the beginning of the eurozone crisis rebuffed the asymmetrical differences within the bloc. 
Under the dogma of moral hazard, economic conditionalities showed strong convergences 
with ordoliberal policies. According to Thomas Biebricher (2019, p. 199), the economic 
governance of structures of the EU and the EMU […] increasingly performed the functions 
that ordoliberals and Eucken, in particular, had envisioned for the state […] an impartial 
enforcer of the, ideally, quasi-automatic rules of the competition game.”. Interpreting 
ordoliberalism as a set of ideas that praises rules and norms, Germany used an ordoliberal 
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framework for developing a renewed European fiscal governance. However, Trichet 
abandoned his initial stance of allowing the ECB to adopt expansionary policies, interweaving 
governments and national banks. As the president of the European central bank subdued 
leader's efforts to stabilise the euro area in 2011, the eurozone entered in another crisis. 
Consequently, Merkel risked the cohesion of her national coalition to assume leadership in 
European economic statecraft.  
The German shift in European politics was a reaction against the instability of the euro 
in 2012. Peter Hall (2012, p. 367) argued that German economists dovetailed ordoliberal ideas 
with the institutional structures that underpinned Northern Europe's growth. The ordoliberal 
rule of protecting the stability of the currency swayed Germany to harden fiscal rules and 
coordinate discipline among European state to uphold the eurozone (MÜLLER, 2012; 
JOHNSTON; REGAN, 2017). Therefore, ordoliberalism became intrinsically weaved with 
technocratic Europe, which inevitably enticed left-wing populist uprisings. 
European leaders compared the emergence of movements critics of austerity with the 
fringes of Euroscepticism. Even though demands for less austerity received brutal rebuttals 
from the troika, the image of profligacy in Southern Europe pervaded the EU. Consequently, 
far-right populists in Northern Europe obtained support due to rejection against the EU’s 
immobilism to Southern Europe permanence in the bloc. Trying to weaken such parties, 
European leaders compelled the continuation of economic reforms in Southern Europe. 
Nevertheless, the ramification of the rigidity in economic reforms were democratic backlashes 
such as the Greek referendum of July 2015. Thus, the EU inevitably engendered instability 
among its member states. 
The successive crisis in the eurozone required changes that protected its unity, as it 
catalysed the limits of European efforts to maintain the single currency. Expecting the 
transformation of the eurozone into an export powerhouse, Germany emphasised an 
ordoliberal framework of rules that dovetails economic governance and cost-based 
competitiveness (JOHNSTON; REGAN, 2017, p. 11). However, the assumptions that German 
coordinate market economy is averse to risk increased the support for a “one-size-fits-all” 
model of European fiscal governance. Doubling down on pragmatism to reshape the EU and 
preserve the Brussels-Frankfurt consensus, Germany pushed Southern European countries 
into a “one-size-fits-none” model (SCHMIDT, 2015). 
  155
The transition from the eurozone crisis to the forced structural convergence of 
European capitalisms triggered a critical juncture to reform the flaws of the EMU. 
Nevertheless, the European deadlock strengthened the position of the Franco-German 
relationship within the EU, but France’s decreasing economic influence bolstered Germany’s 
position to restructure the eurozone. The asymmetric crescent relationship between France 
and Germany allowed the latter to undertake a hegemonic position within the bloc. 
Nonetheless, impasses about the future of integration hampered European progress towards a 
solution to the crisis. The situational riskiness created by Germany and the supranational 
institutions will keep requiring a new architecture of rules. As Fritz Sharpf (2018, p. 74) 
notes, the divergence of European varieties of capitalism will either promote the further 
transformation of the Eurozone into a transfer union or will destabilise it.   
Merkel reiterated the necessity of fiscal rules and structural reforms in Southern 
European countries in order to fix the eurozone. The German chancellor ruled out shared 
financial responsibility with profligate countries, leaving the troika as supervisor of economic 
programs. However, the German “coercive diplomacy” caused hesitation among European 
institutions and the IMF (BULMER; PATERSON, 2017, p. 213). As national answers to the 
eurozone proved ineffective, Germany shifted its policy to endorse fiscal conservatism and a 
framework of economic rules in order to stabilise the euro. 
The German commitment to moral hazard and rules in order to avoid contagion in the 
eurozone strongly reverberate ordoliberal ideas. As ordoliberalism highlights the juridical 
ordering of an austere economic framework, it was the perfect outcome to protect the 
eurozone from profligacy and electoral uprisings. The fact that one of its founders advanced 
moral hazard as an ultimate issue notwithstanding, Walter Eucken stressed the stability of 
prices as the primary purpose of ordoliberalism. For that reason, Merkel embodied the 
resistance against any possibility of financial contagion in the eurozone. 
However, German politicians had different or even contrasting, priorities in the role of 
Germany in the EU. As Young (2017) argues, there is not only one form of ordoliberalism. 
Influenced by the myriad of economists that adapted different typologies into the Freiburg 
School, ordoliberal ideas varied from religious sociology to economic policymaking. 
Likewise, Merkel's determined effort to protect the EMU from destabilising is consonant with 
Eucken's ordoliberalism. Moreover, Merkel differed from other German policymakers due to 
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her pragmatism to maintain the euro, operating in common ground with Mario Draghi, 
Trichet’s successor as the president of the ECB. 
Merkel’s strategy to support the ECB president was useful to domain criticism in her 
own country without risking her hegemonic position. Differing from prominent ordoliberals, 
the German chancellor pursued a European policy guided by domestic constraints and 
commitment to a European rule-based economic governance. Furthermore, Merkel stimulated 
the ECB to continue the programs of debt purchase previously carried by Trichet and assented 
to Draghi's formulation of a banking union in 2012. Thereby, the conciliation of German 
orthodoxy with the ECB’s expansionary policies remained coherent. Even though the 
Bundesbank president, conservative politicians, and German economists opposed Draghi's 
measures, they respected the independence of the ECB. 
The ECB’s strengthened powers and turnaround of policies were crucial to ending the 
economic crisis in the eurozone. As Germany was not prepared to handle the financial 
obligations that a hegemonic system entails, Merkel skillfully used the ECB’s autonomy to 
constrain internal barriers against heterodox monetary politics. German politicians supported 
the relinquishment of monetary policy to an independent supranational institution and not 
allow national politics to interfere with its duty. Nonetheless, Germany’s consent was 
necessary to back up the new version of the Eurobonds program and the creation of a banking 
union. Furiously criticised by Jens Weidmann, the Bundesbank president, Merkel and Draghi 
worked together to shift the ECB’ economic policies towards monetary stability. Thus, the 
lack of institutional hegemony within the EU permitted Germany to enforce European 
economic governance, acting as the guardian of the euro’s stability. 
In contrast with Wolfgang Schäuble and other hawkish policymakers, Merkel was 
determined to avoid the likelihood of a “Grexit” in order to safeguard the Euro. Likewise, her 
attitude towards Greece never swayed in favour of its expulsion from the eurozone, but her 
insistence on European countries complying with the rules transformed austerity in an 
“irritant German idea” (YOUNG, 2017). Therefore, Merkel’s pragmatist was critical to ensure 
that Germany and supranational institutions managed the eurozone crisis. Conscious that an 
extreme ordoliberal stance could spark a political crisis capable of breaking the euro, the 
German chancellor arbitrated creditors and debtors to reach a covenant that kept the eurozone 
stable. 
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However, the initial reluctance to adopt systemic solutions pave the way for the acute 
phase, polarising the eurozone and creating electoral consequences later on. Although Merkel 
and Schäuble continued extolling economic conservatism, German economists and politicians 
criticised them for not being hawkish enough with other European countries. The logic of the 
EMU did not follow strict ordoliberal ideas, but the consequences of the eurozone crises 
converge with it. Ordoliberalism envisions the creation of a rules-based order that efficiently 
coordinate society. The fiscal-rules governance induced the opposition of Southern European 
electorate, increasing popular demand for social democracy instead of liberal democracy 
(KRIESI, 2017, p. 20). Otherwise, Northern Europeans mistrusted crisis-management as 
manoeuvres to create a transfer union and accelerate the integration process, burden-sharing 
Northern funds with Souther profligate countries. Balancing the equilibrium within the 
eurozone, the ECB operated the necessary expansionary measures while emphasised 
orthodoxy within the troika to enable the end of the eurozone economic crisis. However, the 
consequences of the Eurozone crisis are political, not economic. 
3.4 “Whatever it Takes” or the ECB unravelled  
The European Central Bank changed its policies when its president, Jean-Claude 
Trichet, left the seat in October 2011. On November 1, the Italian Mario Draghi became the 
new ECB president. Draghi was determined to protect the Euro, using the bank’s independent 
position to change its politics and initiate a program of sovereign bonds purchase. Trichet had 
already released the Securities Market Programme (SMP) in May 2010 to preserve “financial 
stability and allow efficient implementation of monetary policy in all parts of the euro 
area” (BRUNNERMEIER; JAMES; LANDAU, 2016, p. 345). Even though the SMP was not 
strictly a quantitative easing programme to the euro area, it caused public dissent from 
German economic policymakers in the ECB board and in the Bundesbank. 
In December 2011, the ECB announced an enhanced credit support mechanism to 
support bank lending and liquidity in the eurozone. The extended LTRO (long-term 
refinancing operation) licensed banks to finance collateral in extended maturity of 36 months 
instead of the three months permitted initially (EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, 2011). 
However, the paralysation of European governments bond markets and the perception of risk 
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in the periphery of the eurozone raised caution of European banks, as there was no sign of 
safe guarantees from the ECB.  
European member states accepted the EFSF/ESM and the “fiscal compact” to 
compensate the lack of ECB measures' progress, afterwards demanding a robust banking 
supervisory mechanism to ensure stability in the euro area (JABKO, 2015, p. 81-82). As risk 
aversion from Greece was deteriorating the European bond markets in 2012, Draghi 
employed a strategy of activism to raise trust in the economic conditions of the eurozone. 
Nevertheless, capital continued flying from risky countries to Germany and other Northern 
economies. Gambling on his insights into the psychology of markets that he matured during 
his time at Goldman Sachs, Draghi decided to act (RANDOW; SPECIALE, 2018).  
On July 26, the Global Investment Conference, designed to promote England as a 
business centre, happened at Lancaster House, a luxurious mansion close to Buckingham 
Palace and St. Jame’s Palace in London. During the morning panel, Mario Draghi discussed 
with Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England, about the challenges to the global 
economy. At one moment, seldom looking to his notes, Draghi folded his hands and 
announced: “There is a message I want to tell you, within our mandate, the ECB is ready to 
do whatever it takes to preserve the euro.”, prompting a quick pause, then continuing to leave 
no doubt: “Believe me, it will be enough.” (EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, 2012). 
After the speech, Draghi called Jens Weidmann and Wolfgang Schäuble to ask for help 
and a public defence of the ECB (BRUNNERMEIER; JAMES; LANDAU, 2016, p. 354). 
The German finance minister, whose harshness towards financial responsibility caused 
several arguments with Draghi, assented to the ECB president’s appeal, contrary to his 
advisors, who counselled Schäuble to not comment on the ECB’s decisions (RANDOW; 
SPECIALE, 2018). Weidmann posture was a severe reaction. Furthermore, Merkel agreed to 
issue a joint statement with François Hollande defending the integrity of the eurozone 
(BRUNNERMEIER; JAMES; LANDAU, 2016, p. 354).  
The ECB announced in September that it was starting a program of Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT), aiming at safeguarding an appropriate monetary policy transmission and 
the singleness of the monetary policy under strict conditionalities (EUROPEAN CENTRAL 
BANK, 2012). The OMT signified that the European Central Bank could “purchase 
unprecedented quantities of peripheral countries’ treasury bolds in case of an emergency”, 
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therefore strengthening the monetary emission mechanism “by making private sector credit 
more affordable in peripheral countries” (JABKO, 2015, p. 82). Consequently, the GIIPS’ 
borrowing costs would lower as risk decreased. 
Draghi understood that the euro was a political project and was determined to assure 
the inviolability of the euro. However, the consensus of his speech was short-lived. Jens 
Weidmann expressed his discontentment against Draghi comparing him to the Devil of 
Goethe’s “Faust” when Mephistopheles persuades the heavily indebted Holy Roman Emperor 
to print paper money (STEEN, 2012). Likewise, tensions between Weidmann and Draghi 
increased when the Bundesbank president was “the only member of the 22-strong governing 
council of the ECB to have voted against a plan put forward by Mario Draghi, […] to cut 
unsustainable borrowing costs for countries such as Spain and Italy” (STEEN, 2012).  
Weidmann assured that the ECB president violated his jurisdiction when he announced 
the OMT, arguing that it funded national budgets of crisis-ridden countries (REIERMANN; 
SAUGA; SEITH, 2012). German taxpayers mobilised against the OMT, demanding the 
German Constitutional Court (GCC) in Karlsruhe to condemn the ECB operation and inquire 
about the limits of the fiscal stimulus. However, the GCC consulted the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) due to the political and economic aspect of the question. The ECJ response gave 
“clear ruling that the ECB had not exceeded its powers” concerning monetary policy and “the 
O M T p r o g r a m d i d n o t c o n t r a v e n e t h e p r o h i b i t i o n o n m o n e t a r y 
financing” (BRUNNERMEIER; JAMES; LANDAU, 2016, p. 358).          
To improve banking supervision, Draghi pushed for significant reform in European 
fiscal governance. Using the breach left by Jacques Delors and Tommaso Padoa-Schippa in 
the Delors Report, Draghi and European leaders agreed to make governance arrangements to 
permit single European supervision. Germany was particularly against reforms due to the 
political timing, as German elections would happen in September 2013. German position 
against banking reunion resembled the discussions of the Delors Report in 1990. Hans 
Tietmeyer, a former disciple of Müller-Armack, was sceptic that the Bundesbank should 
engage with other central banks in a banking union, as he feared that it would imply “an 
implicit commitment to rescue banks should be there bad developments that it had 
overlooked” (BRUNNERMEIER; JAMES; LANDAU, 2016, p. 369). Invoking his 
ordoliberal sympathies, Tietmeyer rejected any form of shared moral hazard and emphasised 
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regulation as a manner to uphold financial stability. Nevertheless, the ECB eventually gained 
the responsibility for “all supervisory tasks related to the financial stability of all eurozone 
banks”, representing a considerable victory for Draghi (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2012). 
The European compromise towards the banking union established the creation of the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), and joint 
deposit insurance as its pillars (EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, 2019). The SSM, created in 
December 2012, would supervise banks considered systemically significant, set capital 
requirements, observe banking licenses, and ensure compliance with EU prudential rules 
(EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, 2019). The SRM would ensure the orderly restructuring of 
a bank likely to fail, guaranteeing that the bank failure would not harm the economy or cause 
financial instability (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2019). Moreover, the SRM manages the 
single resolution fund, but Schäuble vetoed arguing that deposit insurance should not be under 
control of European institutions. 
German opposition to any form of the fiscal union did not change since negotiations of 
the Delors Report. Nonetheless, the question of European solidarity poses a challenge to 
politicians of creditor countries, as the transformation of the euro into an OCA depends on 
further economic integration. The ECB decision to act against the crisis consolidated 
sovereign debt purchases and the process of the banking union. Northern Europeans were 
initially against both because of the electorate hostility to burden-sharing. Moreover, German 
resistance to deposit insurance continued stark even after the separation of national and 
European caused the North Atlantic Financial Crisis. 
However, Waltraud Shelkle (2017, p. 11) examines the problem of the EMU as the 
lack of coordination among member states without any authority to enforce cooperation, 
which raises imbalances. The setting of a risk-sharing mechanism within the eurozone could 
appease conflicts between member states and establish winners and losers of different 
moments of the world economy, reducing the advantages of export-led economies in the EU. 
Therefore, solidarity as a degree of instrumental rationality upon politicians allows as “the 
practice of maintaining the common resource and managing it for long-term use, […] 
requiring collective action with each member having a stake in it” (SHELKLE, 2017, p. 19). 
Draghi’s decision to ensure the stability of the euro gained Merkel’s support. The ECB 
president position, divergent from Trichet, to protect the euro was necessary to secure the 
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single currency existence, calming markets and leading the economic crisis to an end. 
Although German opposition remained fierce against any expansionary measure, Mario 
Draghi's objective was consonant with whole ordoliberal ideas. However, the German 
opposition distanced Merkel from Draghi’s European common fiscal policy because of the 
German elections of 2013. Otherwise, Schäuble refused the joint insurance mechanism, and 
Weidmann tried to sabotage Draghi’s OMT operation. Despite German reluctance to further 
fiscal integration, “all member states remain reluctant to envision the dramatic transfer of 
significant powers to the EU level.” (JABKO, 2015, p. 85).    
The ECB measures to aid Southern European countries and avoid breaking the euro 
did not mean that Draghi alleviated economic orthodoxy. Strict conditionalities continued as a 
prerequisite to every agreement of fiscal stimulus. Notwithstanding the electorate’s will 
against austerity in Southern Europe, the rise of anti-EU parties in the core of the eurozone 
represented a menace to the EMU. Therefore, SYRIZA and AfD  (Alternativ für Deutschland) 
are different movements that obtained support from the same chain of events.  
Draghi's declaration to protect the euro can be interpreted as an ordoliberal stance. 
However, ordoliberal ideas emphasised moral hazard, which individualised the crisis and 
forced the GIIPS to comply with an austerity program unacceptable even to the IMF (LIM; 
MOUTSELOS; MCKENNA, 2018, p. 13). The ordoliberal vision that preserved the euro 
against strict hawkish stances inevitable created the AfD, as both represented views 
compatible with the German “irritating idea” (YOUNG, 2017, p. 30). Likewise, the 
authoritarian elements of ordoliberalism are in the economic scepticism that created the 
Wahlalternativ and the AfD. 
3.5 The rise of the Altparteien or the political consequences of the Brussels-Frankfurt 
consensus 
Populism has been present in European elections since after the Second World War. 
According to Jan Werner-Müller (2016, p. 92), the European solution to the German and 
Italian totalitarianism in the 1930s and 1940s was the fragmentation of the political power. 
Thereby, the establishment of the European political system constrained populist parties, 
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which gained some degree of representation but not enough to represent the extreme margin 
of the electorate in parliaments. 
However, the eurozone crisis transformed populist movements in Europe. The German 
press furiously attacked the Greeks and supported the idea of profligacy as the cause of 
Greece’s problems. The emphasis on moral hazard created a strictly economic view shared by 
conservative Germans that the euro should be extinct. The technocratic profile of Angela 
Merkel’s crisis-management particularly bothered German economists. 
The negotiations to establish the banking union and the BCE measures to guarantee 
the stability of the euro provoked a counter-insurgency in Germany. Accusing Merkel and 
European institutions of breaching the Maastricht clause of “no bailout”, a movement of 
economists, university professors, and economic journalists founded a political group called 
Wahlalternativ 2013 in September 2012 (REHER, 2017, p 40). Attentive to the German 
elections in September 2013, the creation of the Wahlalternativ was a direct inquiry to the 
German political establishment refusal to discuss the German approach to the eurozone crisis.  
Demanding the dissolution of the euro, Bern Lucke, an economist, and two former 
CDU members created the Wahlalternativ 2013. The movement presented itself as a strictly 
economic conservative, expressing no position to social or cultural issues. Likewise, 
Wahlalternativ 2013 did not share any radical view against the EU or German’s presence in 
the bloc, focusing only on economics. In its conception, the Wahlaternativ 2013 was, 
according to its leaders, neither to the left nor the right, aiming solely to attract voters 
frustrated with the political elites. 
David Bebnowski and Lisa Förster (2014, p. 1) affirm that “among the 64 initial 
supporters, there were 18 economics professors.”. Wahlaternativ 2013 supporters used 
economics to sustain a “straight, solely rational and seemingly ideological-free line against 
the other parties.” (BEBNOWSKI; FÖRSTER, 2014, p. 11).  The movement used their 
supposedly economic rationality as a central argument against the euro, alluring voters from 
other parties that did not feel represented by Germany’s stance in Europe. In April 2013, 
Wahlaternativ 2013 became a new party, the Alternative for Germany (Alternativ für 
Deutschland, or AfD), to dispute the legislative elections in September. 
Reher (2017, p. 43) points out that AfD supporters initially attached more relevance to 
European integration than other issues. The influence of economists in the party legitimized a 
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rational conservative justification to German retrenchment from European questions. 
Germany should not be involved in the crisis of European member states nor ‘dictate’ 
economic measures of a specific group within the eurozone.  
The strong inclination of moral hazard in the party envisaged a geopolitical position. 
As long the EU cont inued to suppor t Germany as an “Expor t -wor ld-
champion” (Exportweltmeister), the bloc was not a hindrance to AfD (BEBNOWSKI; 
FÖRSTER, 2014, p. 13). The conservative party condemned indebtedness, emphasizing 
cultural remarks to justify German frugality and its moral superiority to the MME. 
Ordoliberal ideas strongly influenced initial AfD ideas. However, different from Merkel’s 
pragmatism or Weidmann and Schäuble’s stances, economic conservatives reproduced the 
strong distrust of protectionist influences from Southern European countries in German 
markets. The economists of AfD condemned burden-sharing and praised Germany’s 
competitive advantage in Europe. Furthermore, like ordoliberals, AfD outlined that the 
relationship between economics and politics should fortify a constitutional framework to 
dismantle market anomalies (ALTERNATIV FÜR DEUTSCHLAND, 2015). 
The economic conservatism of AfD distinguished it from the German mainstream 
parties. Nevertheless, the conservative party’s stance against the euro attracted radical voters, 
pushing the AfD further to the Eurosceptic right. Consequently, the AfD shifted gradually, 
abandoning its initial stance on simple economic questions to radical views against 
immigrants and refugees. Afterward, members of the far-right gained strength within the 
movement, capturing the party and transforming into a populist far-right party. As 
manifestations against immigrants, popularized by the Patriotic Europeans Against the 
Islamisation of the Occident (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des 
Abendlandes, or PEGIDA), thrived in Germany, the AfD embraced radical positions to 
become a natural pole for them (HOCKENOS, 2015).  
Bern Lucke, the founder of Wahlaternativ 2013, eventually dropped out of the party 
due to irreconcilable positions with the far-right faction of AfD. Likewise, Hans-Olaf Henkel, 
a former director of the Federation of German Industries and member of the FDP, also 
abandoned the party (HOCKENOS, 2014). Even though founding members distanced 
themselves from the party, the economic position AfD continued in favor of free markets and 
advocating fair competition. Far-right leaders from AfD such as Alice Weidel and Alexander 
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Gauland continued pushing for orthodoxy in Germany and refusing the ECB expansionist 
policies, differing from other European populist parties that dispute blue-collar votes 
(BRÖNING, 2017). 
The notable performance of the AfD in the elections of 2013 highlighted growing 
dissatisfaction of the main parties. The far-right party gained only 4.7 percent of votes, below 
the minimum of 5 percent to enter the Bundestag. Even though AfD continued gaining 
support, the myth of Germany as immune to far-right politics influenced German politicians' 
beliefs. Moreover, analysts claimed Germany as the last defender of the International Liberal 
Order after the American elections of 2016 (BENNER, 2016a; BENNER, 2016b; 
FRÖHLICH, 2016). 
AfD gained momentum through polemics and against immigrants, capitalizing on 
Merkel’s policy of ‘Willkommenskultur’ that embraced thousands of refugees in 2015. 
Furthermore, members of the AfD tried to breach the German consensus of the Holocaust in 
January 2017. Björn Höcke, leader of the far-right faction within AfD, demanded a “180-
degree about-face in the politics of memory”, causing controversy even within the AfD 
(EVANS, 2018). Analysts continued firm that the centre, specifically in Germany, would hold 
because of the party’s radical assumptions, out of touch with contemporary German politics 
(BRÖNING, 2016).  
Hopes endured until the German elections of 2017, when the AfD obtained 12.6 
percent of the votes, becoming the first far-right party to enter the Bundestag (BENNER, 
2017). As Jan Werner-Müller (2016, p. 92) asserted, the parliamentary model efficiently 
impeded fringe parties to enter parliament due to the minimum quota. In 1965, the far-right 
National Democratic Party (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, or NPD) concurred 
in the elections but obtained only 1.8 percent of votes.  
The AfD’s rise in the Bundestag marked the poor performance of the CDU and SPD, 
whose share combined made up 53 percent of votes, their lowest ever percentage. Prominent 
parties promised to not engage with the AfD, but German conservatism entered in a crisis due 
to a hollowing of ideas, torn between centrism and the preservation of traditional values 
(DIEZ, 2018). 
The shift of AfD displays the transformation of economic ideas in Europe. The far-
right party is a unique populist phenomenon with particular German characteristics. A 
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populist party concerning the euro could only thrive in Germany (BEBNOWSKI; FÖRSTER, 
2014, p. 13). Nevertheless, as ordoliberal thinking in Germany gave form to the AfD, it also 
was used as a compromise with the stability of the euro.  
The evolution of protests against austerity created challenges to the EU that 
circumvented the economic crisis. Greece elected SYRIZA, a far-left party that demanded 
renegotiations with the bloc without any bargaining power. Moreover, SYRIZA’s mistaken 
strategy polarised the crisis, hindering Greek debt restructure (LIM; MOUTSELOS; 
MCKENNA, 2018, p. 14). Merkel and Draghi efforts to safeguard the euro enticed the rise of 
AfD, a movement that later morphed into a far-right populist party. In Germany, AfD obtained 
support from discontentment against the crisis-management of the German political 
mainstream. The far-right party increasingly weaponized conservatives against immigrants, 
accusing politicians as technocratic and deaf to German values. Therefore, an economic crisis 
paved the way for a democratic crisis that pervades European politics.  
Eurosceptic parties weaponized the ordoliberal institutional framework to denounce 
the EU’s democratic deficit as governing by numbers through enshrined economic laws. 
Waltraud Shelkle (2017, p. 145) highlighted that Germany tried to legitimise European 
institutions in the economic crisis, but could not influence it without other member states. 
Notwithstanding Merkel and Draghi’s pragmatism, criticism against the European economic 
governance is valid.  
SYRIZA and AfD are opposite cases that express dissatisfaction with the manner 
national politics interweaves with the EU. Strengthened European institutions are critical to 
establishing the reforms to fix the eurozone, but political and distributive conflicts prevent 
voters from giving more powers to the EU. Even though the European institutional framework 
resonates with ordoliberal ideas, it is still constrained by national politics. Consequently, the 
political deadlock intertwined with the adoption of systemic measures against the crisis 
caused long-term deflation and economic stagnation (MATTHIJS, 2015, p. 13).  
The solution of the economic crisis in the eurozone pressured European leaders to 
support technocratic governments and enforce reforms in unwillingly Southern European 
economies. Therefore, ordoliberalism resonates with technocracy in its emphasis on a unique 
possible solution, dismissing electoral accountability. Like populism, ordoliberalism is 
notoriously apolitical, attaching their actions to coherence above all. Idealizing the figure of 
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the benevolent technocrat that governs without opposition, ordoliberalism spurns pluralism. 
However, conflict is a form of transforming the EU positively. 
Erik Jones (2018) analyzed that pressure against the EU’s current form initiated 
discussions about theories of disintegration. Decisive consequences of economic 
policymaking continue under a technocratic rule in the eurozone. Therefore, the political 
consequences of the clash between ordoliberalism and democracy continue destabilizing the 
EU. As long as the harmonization of European varieties of capitalism is not achieved, German 
leadership should convene the bloc towards a political union instead of supporting palliative 
measures to national problems. Initiatives like the banking union may pave the way for the 
formation of a transfer system based on “European solidarity”. However, Solidarity would not 
mean carefree transfers, but a long-term rational commitment on accountability to national 
parliaments and domestic public opinion (SHELKLE, 2017, p. 12). 
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CONCLUSION 
This dissertation was an endeavor to, summing up to an already strenuous collective 
effort, understand the eurozone crisis. Likewise, this research grew from the initial intention 
of understanding how ordoliberalism influenced German policymaking within the eurozone to 
comprehend how it shaped polarization in European monetary governance. Therefore, this 
work sets a contribution to the literature that stress how ideas influence varieties of 
capitalism, particularly in Germany, thus changing the nature of macroeconomic 
policymaking in the eurozone. 
The core argument of the research is an adequate explanation to understand how the 
crisis unravelled European monetary governance into fierce divisions among member states. 
Consequently, creditor countries supported technocratic governments in countries that were 
unable to comply with the MoU, engendering popular discontentment and the rise of left 
movements that polarised austerity. However, that formula can obtain a moreover reach. As 
ordoliberalism is not a static idea, it evolved into different, if divergent, policymaking. 
European agreements to curb the crisis in Southern Europe intensified accusations by far-right 
parties in Northern Europe that taxpayers bailed out profligacy states like Greece. European 
crisis-management thus exacerbated divergences and the rise of fringe parties in Southern and 
Northern Europe. In the German case, economists and university academics criticised 
Germany’s role in the Eurozone as paymaster of the eurozone, rejecting bailouts and praising 
that every member state should take responsibility for their finances. The creation of an anti-
system party whose purpose was solely against the euro and its subsequent astonishing 
electoral victories represent the force of economic ideas in Germany. Eventually, the AfD 
became the populist far-right party in Germany to enter the Bundestag in 2017.     
The hypothesis underlined that polarisation between actors escalated due to the roles 
of principled beliefs in crisis-management policies and solely halted after the enforcement of 
institutional rules. The research delineated in Chapter 01 the process of European integration 
and the adoption of the EMU, highlighting the divergences between Germany and France. 
The gradual decline of Keynesian economics in Europe intensified after the end of the Bretton 
Woods system, converging France and Germany economic policymaking. As France seemed 
willing to abdicate its intention to use the monetary union as an instrument of economic 
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hegemony ('le Gouvernment économique'), Germany shifted its priority of political union 
instead of monetary union that lingered since Adenauer's government. Nevertheless, Germany 
strongly reiterated its preference for an independent central bank that could ensure price 
stability and was vehemently against a banking union, as they feared German funds 
transferred to other European countries, therefore transforming national banking supervision 
in a priority. The incomplete nature of the euro derived from German mistrust from worries 
that other European countries, especially France, would abuse the potential single currency to 
force Germany to pay for other debts. It was not a misperception from the Germans, as France 
indeed aimed for a monetary union to revert the decline of the franc in comparison with the 
Deutsche Mark. However, Kohl's electoral ambitions influenced his decision to pursue an 
EMU with France. Distant from the Bundesbank president, who was against the common 
currency due to the difficulty of converging variety of European economies, Kohl focused 
solely on integration. It did not matter. Political decisions created the euro, not economic. 
As a measure to ensure that member states were adequate to the common currency, 
Germany demanded a series of economic requirements. Nevertheless, the German opposition 
stimulated the electorate to require stricter budgetary rules for the euro to avoid Germany 
bailing out other countries, which Kohl attended. Therefore, the creation of the SGP was the 
beginning of a series of rules that member states enshrined into European law to secure the 
stability of the euro. Due to external constraints that caused a recession in Germany and other 
European countries, Germany and France were the first European member states to breach the 
pact and face sanctions. Consequently, Germany and France pressed for lifting sanctions in 
other European institutions, which the European Council, above the European Commission 
and prone to political influence from member states, condoned. To avoid failing again in the 
economic surveillance, Germany and other member states weakened the SPG and its sanction 
procedure, diminishing incentives for other member states to comply with the convergence 
criteria. 
Meanwhile, the American financial sector was viciously expanding, with few viewing 
it as unsustainable, under the growing complexity of mortgage securities, collaterals, and repo 
markets. Due to the fierce German opposition of sharing banking duties, supranational 
institutions were not responsible for European banking supervision, becoming a duty to 
member states' regulation. However, the Single European Act permitted cross-over operations, 
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allowing the enlargement of European banks in the core of the eurozone into 'national 
champions' that shifted its operations to riskier countries in the periphery of the eurozone, 
such as Greece or Spain. Abundant liquidity in the US enticed the attention of those mega-
banks in Europe, linking the American with the European market. As European regulation 
was only on the national level, there was no supranational institution overseeing the massive 
growth of those banks, frequently originated from Northern Europe; instead, member states 
stimulated their banks to expand to protect themselves from other banks or to operate in other 
parts of Europe or overseas. Deregulation was the rule, so when the Basel Committee tried to 
regulate international finance, the American and European financial institutions pressured for 
changes to permit banks to improve competitiveness, which Basel complied. When Basel II 
was going to entry in force in the United States, it was already late. The American 
government had to rescue small investment banks, GSEs, and Citigroup. Thereby, when the 
American financial market froze, Europe ultimately entered in crisis as well. 
The research deepens in the case study of Greece in Chapter 02. The impact of the 
financial crisis in the European Union was critical. Eastern Europe, seeing no other option as 
the ECB was not obliged to act as a lender of last resort, pledged support to the IMF. Due to 
the fact that American regulated banks were better capitalized than European banks, they 
could support the crisis and absorb failed institutions, while European mega-bank needed 
urgent capital. As Northern European banks interwoven with mega-banks, the financial 
paralysis in the American financial markets inflicted a huge blow in those banks, thus 
Southern European economies. Northern Europe committed to a stimulus package that in 
brief bailed out its banks. However, most of the bad loans were retained on European banks 
balance sheets to guarantee leeway, so when credit froze they realised that borrowers could 
not pay (BAYOUMI, 2017, p. 104).  
Without any means to recover within the eurozone because the euro impeded the 
devaluation of their currencies, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Cyprus looked for help to 
other eurozone countries. While the FED funneled money to contain illiquidity in the 
American markets, Southern Europe was paralyzed and depended on an independent ECB 
other member states that reiterated the Maastricht rule of ‘no bailout’. Greece was the first 
case to demand help from the IMF, but needed the approval of other Europeans in the IMF 
board. France planned to help Greece and other Southern European countries in the name of 
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'European solidarity', but Merkel vetoed. Ensuring the rules, Merkel favoured that profligate 
countries should repay for their debts and denied any form of burden-sharing (DIE SPIEGEL, 
2012). Germany was only disposed to act if the IMF was involved. Because Greek 
productiveness and exports stalled since Greece entered the euro, Germany and other 
financial institutions, the IMF included, negotiated a series of structural economic reforms in 
exchange for bailing out the country. Without option, Greek signed the Memorandum of 
Understanding.  
Greece, like Italy, never had conditions to join the eurozone, entering the group due to 
political reasons and believing that EU discipline would improve Greek institutions. However, 
the SGP breach by France and Germany and its following weakness impeded it of monitoring 
Greek finance and sanction it accordingly. Under reforms fatigue after joining the euro, the 
Greek economy grew by the artificial low-interest rates of the common currency. As Greece 
used to rely heavily on debt and inflation to develop before entering the EMU, it devalued the 
drachma in order to improve competitiveness in times of macroeconomic instability. 
However, under the euro, there is no such possibility, as monetary issues are the responsibility 
of the ECB. Therefore, the Greek growth model, based on debt, could complement the 
Northern export-led model in stable periods, even if creating macroeconomic imbalances 
within the eurozone.  
However, the instability caused by Greece’s ‘making up’ its economic performance 
exposed the asymmetries that the EMU caused in both models. Under the supervision of the 
IMF, the ECB, and the European Commission, Greece implemented structural reforms that 
altered its model of growth. The severe adjustment not only worsened the financial crisis but 
engendered a social and health crisis in Greece. The Greek left party PASOK dismantled 
previous clientelistic relations and deficiencies in the public sector that kept the party's 
hegemony in politics until the crisis. Nevertheless, economic reforms and the loss of the 
party's base plummeted PASOK's popularity. Even though Greece adhered to a stern structural 
reform in its economy to improve competitiveness and correct its macroeconomic imbalances 
in the eurozone, the economy did not react, so it was clear that Greece would eventually ask 
for a second bailout. 
Meanwhile, the ECB decision to raise the interest rates caused a massive inflow from 
Southern European countries to Northern countries, worsening the crisis. Attacked by all other 
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Greek parties for unfairly implementing austerity in Greece, Papandreou, the prime minister, 
planned a referendum on austerity to contradict the opposition and gain popular support for 
showing that there is only one way to stay in the euro. Before setting further technical details, 
European leaders rebuffed Papandreou proposal, arguing that he would throw Greece in an 
immense crisis for politicising the question. As a result, Papademos resigned, and with the 
support of the Greek opposition and eurozone leaders, the former governor of Bank of 
Greece, Lucas Papademos, rose to power.  
Papademos continued the reform without popular support, thus increasing the 
radicalisation of the left. As support for PASOK was still low due to Papademos' 
chancellorship, left radical movements attained reach in the mainstream. Likewise, the 
intensification of the crisis caused the rise of fringe parties in Greece from the right, as a neo-
nazi movement gained prominence. The structural reforms in Greece pulled the populist left 
party SYRIZA to the leadership of resistance against orthodoxy left. As a result, SYRIZA 
obtained a baffling victory in the Greek elections of 2015. The populist left party was not 
against the European Union or the euro, but in favour of radical popular democracy 
(LACLAU, 2013, p. 19). In fact, Tsipras was pro-integration and gained influence in the field 
later.  
Nevertheless, SYRIZA skillfully denounced austerity as a technocratic manoeuvre 
from European technocrats such as Papademos and specialists from European institutions that 
composed the troika. It is striking that economic divergences about the economic reforms 
distressed the troika as well, due to the IMF preference for debt restructure of the European 
economies, which Germany refused. Under pressure from domestic opposition in Germany, 
Merkel insisted that indebted member states should be responsible for their financial 
mismanagements, so sharing European debt to creditors was not open to discussion. As the 
IMF was a minor partner in the troika with the ECB and the European Commission, the fund 
expressed its criticism toward investment cuts and economic reforms principally through 
reports (BLUSTEIN, 2016).  
Shaping its image internally as a leader against 'Eurocrats' (European bureaucrats) and 
externally as the defender of a devasted nation against the perils of liberalism, Tsipras defied 
the MoU rules, arguing that the terms of the agreement had no legitimacy in Greece. Tsipras 
did not want to detach himself from the European Union or the eurozone due to the fact that 
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the Greeks strongly supported it, but his unwillingness to reach an initial compromise 
impeded a compliant approach. Greece needed a new bailout, so Tsipras sought help from the 
Americans, the Chinese, and the Russians. Notwithstanding his insistence to adopt a hard 
bargaining position, he ended up obliged to negotiate with European creditors, alienating 
possible sympathisers in the process. Without options, he invoked a referendum to gain an 
upper-hand in the negotiations, but the Europeans did not cede, so Tsipras agreed to a MoU 
that was harsher than the ones offered before to him to obtain the third bailout. 
Chapter 03 delineates the shift of German position in European politics since the 
beginning of the crisis in the eurozone. Trichet's use of his position as president of the ECB to 
raise interest rates in 2011 induced a crisis of capital flight in riskier European countries, 
menacing the euro. As a result, Germany entered in negotiations to ensure that no country 
would fail its commitments, thus safeguarding the common currency. However, Merkel 
suffered sternly domestic opposition. German economists, and conservative newspaper 
condemned the chancellor's stance as an incentive to states continue borrowing over their 
capacity as they knew that Germany would eventually bail them out. Nevertheless, to avoid 
further contagion in the eurozone, Merkel advanced the enshrinement of a series of 
strengthened fiscal rules that determined the institutionalisation of supply-side oriented 
policies. European member states that signed the MoU had to commit to the six-pack, two-
pack and the Fiscal Compact. However, the lack of monetary control coaxed European 
countries to solely cut investment and social spending instead of devaluing the currency. 
During the crisis, the ECB kept a conservative stance with creditor and debtor countries, 
establishing a monetary policy that was conciliatory, but insufficient to change the European 
crisis. Trichet belatedly helped Germany and other European institutions to burden-sharing 
risky bonds after European states approved a stability mechanism in Luxembourg, but showed 
the ECB’s autonomy afterwards. 
In 2011, Trichet became unwillingly to cooperate, as he emphasised that the European 
central bank sole purpose was price stability and not to act as a lender-of-last-resort to 
indebted European countries. Thus, the crisis aggravated in the GIIPS, requiring higher 
German participation in the eurozone because the economic responses to the crisis were 
insufficient. The fact that Merkel helped to ‘bailout’ the GIIPS, even though the ESM did not 
judiciously break the norm of 'no bailout' according to the German Constitutional Court, 
  173
fueled fierce opposition in Germany. Ordoliberal economists were stern about the autonomy 
of the European central bank and the moral hazard that stoked the debate about bailing out 
debtor countries, thus organising a movement against the euro to reject the euro, the AfD. 
The dissertation found a critical intervening variable: the influence of economic ideas 
in macroeconomic policymaking in Europe not only on debtor countries but the changing 
nature of ordoliberalism in creditor countries and, specifically, the German electorate. Chapter 
01 showed how ordoliberal thinking in Germany kept pressuring German policymakers to 
commit to the stability of the currency and the liberalisation of free markets, engendering 
continued disputes with France about the role of the Economic and Monetary Union. It 
showed the German insistence for rules that designed the framework of the ECB, the 
Maastricht Convergence Criteria, and the SGP. Likewise, it vetoed the transformation of the 
EMU into a fiscal union, as Germans preferred European supervision at the national level to 
enforce moral hazard. The global contraction in 2002 plummeted the German economy, 
throwing the country on the verge of recession. Thus, the European Commission condemned 
Germany for falling into the SGP's debt rule. Schröder, the German chancellor, breached the 
SPG and pressured the European Council to overrule the Commission, thereafter reforming 
the Pact to reduce supervisory powers. Therefore, the lack of fiscal union and the subsequent 
weakening of supervisory activities within the EU surged the macroeconomic imbalances that 
devastated Southern European economies in the North Atlantic Financial Crisis. Similar to 
Schröder, Merkel acted pragmatically to maintain in the euro, even though drawing intense 
opposition from economists within Germany. 
Merkel decision to strengthen rules-based fiscal governance to guarantee the stability 
of the euro resonates with ordoliberal principles. Even though Erhard was against European 
economic integration for seeing French economic policies as a nuisance to liberalisation, he 
was overruled by Adenauer's foreign policy. In fact, ordoliberals wrote little about European 
integration. However, ordoliberalism continues to possess a strong influence on German 
policymakers. Regardless, Merkel highlighted that an ordering of the institutional framework 
is imperative to coordinate European economies and ensure the stability of the euro. Like 
Gerhard Schröder, the German chancellor pushed for ambivalent policymaking to provide the 
balance of the euro. Nevertheless, in contrast to Schröder, who left a weakened SGP in his 
term as chancellor, Merkel ensured the correction of the economic deficiencies within the 
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eurozone through a set of measures that relied on supply-side policies and the assistance of 
Mario Draghi, who calmed down markets in 2012.  
When the European central bank president announced the creation of a banking union, 
he used his position as president of an independent institution to ensure expanded capacities 
of supervision within the eurozone and promise that the ECB would bail out countries in risk. 
Therefore, Merkel and Draghi broke ordoliberal principles in order to protect the stability of 
the currency, a fundamental tenet of ordoliberalism. 
Notwithstanding Merkel firm refusal of ordoliberal arguments from Wolfgang 
Schäuble and Jens Weidmann to jettison Greece from the euro or of any form of financial 
risk-sharing, the chancellor had as primary objective to stabilise the eurozone as a whole. In 
the end, Merkel, like Schröder, Kohl, and Adenauer, made a political decision based on 
national politics and her 'legacy' to keep the eurozone united and upheld. It was primarily 
about political gains in a combination of domestic and European variables that permitted the 
enforcement of rules in Europe. That meant ensuring norms to populist parties like SYRIZA 
and supporting a technocratic government in Greece. However, as Brigitte Young (2017) 
declares, ordoliberalism is not a static idea. The endurance of extreme rigid economic ideas in 
Germany strengthened a unmerciful domestic backlash against Merkel for bailing out the 
GIIPS. The AfD began as a movement critical of Merkel's economic policies and later became 
the first far-right party to enter the Bundestag.  
Meanwhile, Greek economic indicators made little progress afterwards. The IMF’s 
Independent Evaluation Office reported that diminishing the public sector spending, 
privatisations, and labour market reforms in place of product market reforms impeded internal 
devaluation and delayed gains in productivity (IMF, 2016). Nonetheless, Greece’s GDP 
shrank in 2015, almost null in 2016, and grew around 1.3 per cent in 2017 after years of deep 
recession (OECD 2019). After the conflict between SYRIZA and European institutions, the 
Eurozone as a whole seemed to attain a stronger and more sustained rebound with diminished 
political risk (IMF, 2017). However, the political costs of the adjustment are still a variable. 
European leaders face a dilemma, as Southern Europe and Northern Europe continue 
polarised. Moreover, the deep structural flaws in the architecture of the Euro persists despite 
palliative developments.   
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The process of supply-side reforms in Mediterranean Europe created competition 
among countries with similar economies. Consequently, they were unable to improve export 
sectors because of complementary factors such as scarce bank lending, inefficient 
bureaucracy and the lack of investment in refining bulk commodities into branded products. 
One of Greece’s main export industry, olive oil, fits that description, as many exporters do not 
have the money to invest in productivity, so it is hard to compete with Italian and Spanish 
producers (STAMOULI, 2017).  
Meanwhile, Germany faces the prospect of a recession and increased hostility in 
global markets. German infrastructure is creaking and needs critical reforms (THE 
ECONOMIST, 2017). The coordinate market economy, solidly based in specialisation and 
incrementation, seems unable to develop disruptive technologies in telecommunication (5G) 
and artificial intelligence to compete with China and the United States. Moreover, China 
became a ‘systemic competitor’ instead of a lucrative market as it moves its global value 
chains to other countries and increments Chinese exports with high-qualified techniques. 
Higher competition and an environment of slow global growth in the global markets pressure 
for lower wages in Germany, hence increasing inequality in the country and strengthening 
populist parties like the AfD. The divergent varieties of capitalism within the eurozone could 
boost the economy, but the stagnant European economy forces German to focus on other 
markets. Therefore, the hostile Global economic environment makes the German export-led 
model makes the country vulnerable to periods of slow global growth (WORLD BANK, 
2019).  
In terms of European politics, the landscape shifted. The European elections of 2019 
set an innovative approach for European policymaking, as trans-European parties such as the 
‘Democracy in Europe Movement 2025’ (or DiEM25) proposes a veritable 'European' 
campaign. Yannis Varoufakis, the first Greek finance minister in the SYRIZA government, is 
running as prime minister in Greece simultaneously as a deputy in Germany. His polemics 
notwithstanding, it is striking to observe that Varoufakis envisions to restyle the image of 
European supranational politics, considered as ’technocratic’, to a ‘full-fledged democracy’. 
DiEM25’s compelling vision of a ‘democratic Europe’ revitalises integration, mainly driven 
by economic factors, to the manifestation of the ideas of ‘Pan-Europeanism’ as alive and 
present in contemporary politics. 
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Alexis Tsipras and Angela Merkel became allies after the agreement of the third 
bailout, working together in the refugee crisis. The Greek prime minister’ compromise with 
the MoU demands secured Greece in the euro and alongside the Commission and the ECB. 
However, SYRIZA’s indication of a radical left member to oversee the Greek legal system 
and the manipulation of public media outlets to benefit the left party raised fears that SYRIZA 
can erode the fragile Greek democracy (HOPE, 2018).  
The German chancellor underwent significant setbacks since the German elections of 
2017. Merkel's failed attempt to settle a coalition with the Grüne and the FDP (or the 
Jamaika-Koalition) engendered political instability, paralysing talks about reforms proposed 
by the French president Emmanuel Macron. The German chancellor disregarded the 
possibility of a minority government, affirming that she preferred to abdicate and call new 
elections than governing without consensus. The threat of a new poll amidst decreasing 
support to the AfD forced the SPD to accept a novel Grand Koalition (Gro-Ko) with the CDU. 
The social-democrat Olaf Scholz succeeded Wolfgang Schäuble as the finance minister, but 
he promised to continue Schäuble’s policy of the black zero (schwartze null), which is the 
practice of perfectly balancing the German budget. However, the Gro-Ko entered in a period 
of instability because of internal rebellions from the CDU members like Horst Seehofer, 
minister of the interior, who aimed to imitate the AfD’s discourse or the SPD’s turn to the left 
in economic policies.     
The consequence of the unstable coalition was Merkel’s declaration that she would 
step down of her role as the CDU leader. Consequently, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (AKK) 
defeated Friedrich Merz in the internal elections of the party, becoming the fourth leader of 
the CDU in 45 years. AKK appears to be Merkel’s natural successor as the next chancellor. 
Natural from Saarland, a small industrial state close to the French and Belgian border, AKK 
defends minimum wages to diminish the effects of deindustrialisation and further integration 
with Europe. It can send an encouraging signal to Europe in a time when the Franco-German 
relationship set out strong symbols like the Treaty of Aachen but disagree in themes like 
geopolitics (Nord Stream 2, relations with Saudi-Arabia), economics (further fiscal 
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integration, trade policy, fiscal union), and parliamentary politics.  Therefore, the 15
symmetrical assimilation of German economic power in Europe remains to be seen. As the 
Economist (2010) reminisced about the German question, or the possibility of Germany 
harmoniously integrated in an European system of states, “it never dies, but mutates”. 
 The CDU and the Hungarian FIDESZ (Magyar Polgári Szövetség, or the Hungarian Civic Alliance) are in the 15
same leading coalition at the European Parliament, the EPP (the European’s People Party). Consequently, 
FIDESZ leader and prime minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán, can erode Hungarian democracy in the country by 
defanging the judiciary, restricting media pluralism, and undermining the foundations of liberal democracy 
without suffering sanctions or consequences. However, Macron’s group, called ALDE (the Alliance of Liberals 
and Democrats for Europe), runs against EPP and FIDESZ, turning Macron and Merkel in indirect competitors 
in the European Parliament. Further information about FIDESZ, see Pappas (2014).
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APPENDIX A – DETAILED DATA FROM THE WORLD BANK. 
Table 3 – Exports of goods and services (annual % growth) 
Source: Author’s elaboration, based on data from the World Bank, 2018. 
Table 4 – Unemployment, total (% of total labor force). 
Year Germany Greece Euro area
2001 1,70% 4,13% 2,16%
2002 0% 3,92% 1,02%
2003 -0,71% 5,79% 0,72%
2004 1,17% 5,06% 2,33%
2005 0,71% 0,60% 1,70%
2006 3,70% 5,65% 3,24%
2007 3,26% 3,27% 3,06%
2008 1,08% -0,34% 0,44%
2009 -5,62% -4,30% -4,52%
2010 4,08% -5,48% 2,08%
2011 3,66% -9,13% 1,61%
2012 0,49% -7,30% -0,89%
2013 0,49% -3,24% -0,25%
2014 1,93% 0,74% 1,33%
2015 1,74% -0,29% 2,09%
2016 1,94% -0,24% 1,80%
2017 2,22% 1,35% 2,37%
Year Germany Greece Euro area
2001 7,8% 10,8% 8,4%
2002 8,6% 10,4% 8,7%
2003 9,7% 9,8% 9,1%
2004 10,3% 10,6% 9,3%
2005 11,0% 10,0% 9,1%
2006 10,0% 9,0% 8,4%
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Author’s elaboration, based on data from the IMF Database, 2018. 
Table 5 – Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 
2007 8,6% 8,4% 7,5%
2008 7,4% 7,8% 7,6%
2009 7,7% 9,6% 9,6%
2010 6,9% 12,7% 10,2%
2011 5,9% 17,9% 10,2%
2012 5,4% 24,4% 11,4%
2013 5,2% 27,5% 12,0%
2014 5,0% 26,5% 11,6%
2015 4,6% 24,9% 10,9%
2016 4,2% 23,6% 10,0%
2017 3,8% 21,5% 9,1%
Year Germany Greece Euro area
2001 31,87% 22,79% 35,31%
2002 32,57% 20,11% 34,59%
2003 32,59% 18,54% 33,62%
2004 35,45% 20,71% 35,15%
2005 37,74% 21,31% 36,44%
2006 41,19% 21,17% 38,42%
2007 43,01% 22,52% 39,51%
2008 43,46% 23,36% 39,88%
2009 37,80% 18,98% 34,95%
2010 42,25% 22,10% 38,93%
2011 44,82% 25,54% 41,63%
2012 45,98% 28,68% 43,22%
2013 45,40% 30,35% 43,36%
2014 45,70% 32,37% 43,88%
2015 46,87% 31,72% 44,68%
2016 46,12% 30,46% 44,27%
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Source: Author’s elaboration, World Bank national accounts data, 2018. 
Table 6 – GDP growth (annual %) 
Source: Author’s elaboration, World Bank national accounts data, 2018. 
2017 47,24% 33,22% 45,73%
Year Germany Greece Euro area
2001 1,70% 4,13% 2,16%
2002 0% 3,92% 1,02%
2003 -0,71% 5,79% 0,72%
2004 1,17% 5,06% 2,33%
2005 0,71% 0,60% 1,70%
2006 3,70% 5,65% 3,24%
2007 3,26% 3,27% 3,06%
2008 1,08% -0,34% 0,44%
2009 -5,62% -4,30% -4,52%
2010 4,08% -5,48% 2,08%
2011 3,66% -9,13% 1,61%
2012 0,49% -7,30% -0,89%
2013 0,49% -3,24% -0,25%
2014 1,93% 0,74% 1,33%
2015 1,74% -0,29% 2,09%
2016 1,94% -0,24% 1,80%
2017 2,22% 1,35% 2,37%
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Table 7 – General government gross debt (Percent of GDP) 
Source: Author’s elaboration, based on data from the IMF Database, 2018  
Year Germany Greece Euro area
2001 57,7% 107,1% 67,0%
2002 59,4% 104,9% 66,9%
2003 63,1% 101,5% 68,1%
2004 64,8% 102,9% 68,4%
2005 67,0% 107,4% 69,2%
2006 66,5% 103,6% 67,3%
2007 63,7% 103,1% 65,0%
2008 65,2% 109,4% 68,7%
2009 72,6% 126,7% 79,2%
2010 80,9% 146,2% 84,5%
2011 78,6% 180,6% 86,6%
2012 79,8% 159,6% 89,6%
2013 77,5% 177,9% 91,5%
2014 74,6% 180,2% 91,7%
2015 70,9% 178,8% 89,8%
2016 67,9% 183,5% 88,8%
2017 63,9% 181,8% 86,6%
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APPENDIX B – LIST OF GREEK PRIME MINISTERS (1974 – CURRENTLY) 
Table 8 – Greek Prime Ministers (1974 – Currently) 
Source: Author’s elaboration, based on Helennic Republic, 2019. 
Period Prime Minister
July 1974 - May 1980 Konstantinos G. Karamanlis
May 1980 - October 1981 Georgios Rallis
October 1981 - July 1989 Andreas Papandreou
July 1989 - October 1989 Tzannis Tzannetakis
October 1989 - November 1989 Ioannis Grivas
November 1989 - April 1990 Xenophon Zolotas
April 1990 - October 1993 Konstantinos Mitsotakis
October 1993 - January 1996 Andreas Papandreou
January 1996 - March 2004 Konstantinos Simitis
March 2004 - October 2009 Konstantinos A. Karamanlis
October 2009 - November 2011 George A. Papandreou
November 2011 - May 2012 Lucas Papademos
May 2012 -  June 2012 Panagiotis Pikrammenos
June 2012 - January 2015 Antonis Samaras
January 2015 - August 2015 Alexis Tsipras
August 2015 - September 2015 Vassiliki Thanou-Christophilou
September 2015 - Currently Alexis Tsipras
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APPENDIX C – LIST OF GERMAN PRIME MINISTERS AND COALITIONS (1949-
CURRENTLY) 
Table 9 – German Prime Ministers and Coalitions (1949-Currently) 
Source: Author’s elaboration, based on Bundeskanzlerin, 2019. 
Period Chancelor Coalition
1949-1953 Konrad Adenauer CDU, FDP, CSU, DP
1953-1957 Konrad Adenauer CDU, FDP, CSU, DP, GB/BHE
1957-1961 Konrad Adenauer CDU, CSU, DP
1961-1962 Konrad Adenauer CDU, FDP, CSU
1963-1966 Ludwig Erhard CDU, FDP, CSU
1966-1967
Kurt Georg 
Kiesinger CDU, SPD, CSU
1969-1974 Willy Brandt SPD, FDP
1974-1982 Helmut Schmidt SPD, FDP
1982-1998 Helmut Kohl CDU, FDP, CSU
1992-2005 Gerhard Schröder SPD, Grünen
2005-2009 Angela Merkel CDU, SPD, CSU
2009-2013 Angela Merkel CDU, FDP, CSU
2013- Angela Merkel CDU, SPD, CSU
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ANNEX A – EUROPEAN SEMESTER 
Figure 16 – European Semester 
!  
Source: EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2014 
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ANNEX B – SUMMARY OF MEASURES TAKEN BY THE EU INSTITUTIONS 
Figure 17 – Summary of Measures Taken by the EU Institutions 
!  
Source: EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2014 
